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ABSTRACT 
 
During an acute recession in Ireland, healthcare organisations were subjected to increasing 
pressures to provide more services for less money, highlighting the need for resources to be 
utilised efficiently and for effective management control. This presents quite a rare research 
opportunity, and the objective of this study is to use it to explore the design and operation of 
management control practices in what the literature already recognises to be one of the most 
complex and under-researched contexts, healthcare, particularly in a situation where such a 
system is under considerable stress.  The study of such extreme examples can cast additional 
light into effective management control in practice beyond that typically available under 
more “normal” conditions. To achieve the research objective, an in-depth case study of a 
large, acute, public hospital was conducted. Using qualitative research methods within an 
interpretive framework, it sought to explore the many complexities associated with the 
hospital context and to identify possible linkages between contextual factors and the 
operation of management control practices. 
  
The study demonstrates that the economic and fiscal crisis was perceived to have initiated a 
change in the attention provided to, and use made of, management control information. 
National healthcare management were perceived to have placed a higher emphasis on cost 
reduction targets and to use budget information in an inflexible manner. Senior hospital 
management perceived that this style of usage led them to be more focused on budget 
information and the achievement of budget targets, but they also perceived higher job-related 
stress and tense working relationships with national management. Senior hospital 
management were reluctant to replicate an inflexible style of budget usage within the 
hospital, but driven by the need to meet national cost reduction targets and frustrated by 
organisational arrangements, they adopted a centralised style of usage. It was recognised that 
while initially successful in removing organisational slack, this approach may lead to 
harmful side effects in the longer term. For example, clinicians were found to be apathetic 
towards the use of management control practices. 
 
The study contributes to the literature by highlighting how management control practices 
were perceived to operate during an economic and fiscal crisis. Further, addressing some 
limitations of previous research, it examined perceptions concerning multiple control 
practices at different organisational levels and among different professional groupings in the 
hospital, including senior hospital management, services managers, clinicians and clinician 
managers.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
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1.0 Introduction  
The purpose of Chapter One is to set the context for this piece of research. The motivation 
for the research is discussed in Section 1.1. In Section 1.2, the selection of the Irish hospital 
sector as an appropriate and opportune setting is explained. An overview of the research 
design is provided in Section 1.3. In Section 1.4, the structure of the dissertation is outlined. 
Section 1.5 concludes the chapter. 
1.1 Motivation for the Study 
As an economic sector, healthcare now ranks among the largest in many countries 
(Cardinaels and Soderstrom, 2013). In the 1960s, healthcare expenditure accounted for less 
than 4 per cent, on average, of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) across OECD countries. Yet, 
by 2007, this had risen to 9.6 per cent and, in twelve OECD countries, it accounted for over 
10 per cent of GDP.  Healthcare expenditure as a percentage of GDP has fallen across most 
OECD countries since 2007 (OCED, 2013). The financial crisis that emerged in late 2007 
had developed into an economic and fiscal crisis by 2008. As the economic and fiscal 
climate worsened, a focus was placed on reducing healthcare expenditure. However, 
simultaneously, such expenditure was also being subjected to significant additional upward 
pressure. This pressure derived from a number of demographic and structural developments, 
such as the progressive ageing of the population, autonomous increases in healthcare 
demands, the impact of lower incomes and higher unemployment and increased public 
expectations. Although this situation posed challenges, it also highlighted the need for 
healthcare expenditure to be utilised efficiently and for the operation of management control 
practices to become a key component of the strategies implemented to ensure sustainability.  
 
Management accounting research highlights many difficulties and challenges associated with 
the operation of management control practices. In particular, empirical studies demonstrate 
that any single management control practice is an imperfect tool and, therefore, each must be 
used in a way that takes account of its limitations and is appropriate to the particular 
circumstances. A failure to consider the implications of these issues has been shown to have 
the potential to create a wide variety of harmful side effects (Merchant and Van der Stede, 
2011). The findings of these studies have, however, not been unequivocal and a number of 
methodological and theoretical challenges have been made to this body of literature (Berry, 
Coad, Harris, Otley and Stringer, 2009; Chenhall, 2003; Ferreira and Otley, 2009; Fisher, 
1998; Malmi and Brown, 2008; Merchant and Otley, 2007). Furthermore, little is known 
about the operation of management control practices during an economic and fiscal crisis 
(Hopwood, 2008; Van der Stede, 2011; 2015). In addition, the management control literature 
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has been developed within a private manufacturing-oriented context, which is contextually 
very different from healthcare (Abernethy and Lillis, 2001). 
 
Healthcare provides a complex setting, which poses challenges for the operation of 
management control practices. For example, the concept of management control presupposes 
measurement but, in healthcare, measurement with reliability and precision is often not 
considered possible. Moreover, healthcare is not a standardised commodity and providing it 
involves many complex operating processes. Capturing this complexity in management 
control practices is, therefore, problematic. Healthcare is also an emotive issue and, as a 
result, attracts considerable media attention. This focus has resulted in the healthcare sector 
becoming more visible to the public, thereby raising expectations regarding the quality and 
availability of services. Finally, the control of core operating processes by dominant 
professionals creates a difficulty for the operation of management control practices in this 
field. Clinicians are primarily oriented towards providing effective clinical care for 
individual patients but management control practices are oriented towards the efficient and 
effective use of resources for all patient groups, as well as the overall needs of the healthcare 
sector. This conflict is also compounded by the fact that core operating processes in 
healthcare depend on the expertise of clinicians, thus granting them a significant degree of 
autonomy.  
 
Empirical research examining the operation of management control practices in a healthcare 
context is relatively scarce and diverse in nature (Abernethy, Chua, Grafton and Mahama, 
2006). The extant literature demonstrates that management control practices often play a 
symbolic role in a healthcare context and that the operation of such practices can result in 
harmful side effects (Broadbent, Jacobs and Laughlin, 2001; Jacobs, 2005; Jones and 
Dewing, 1997; Nyland and Pettersen, 2004). However, weaknesses in prior studies of the 
healthcare context are evident and many of these reflect similar flaws to those of the broader 
management control literature (Cardinaels and Soderstrom, 2013).  
 
In this way, a need for healthcare expenditure to be utilised more efficiently, combined with 
a lack of clarity with respect to the operation of management control practices in a healthcare 
context provided the primary motivation for this study. The research objective is discussed in 
Section 4.1. 
 
  
5 
 
1.2 The Irish Healthcare Sector  
The Irish healthcare sector was subjected to a substantial Reform Programme in 2003. The 
principal objective of the Programme was to improve the availability and quality of 
healthcare services by ‘improving the planning, management, delivery and evaluation of 
services and their respective accountability arrangements’ (Department of Health, 2003, p. 
23). While the Department of Health (DoH) retained overall responsibility for the 
development of healthcare policy, a new Health Service Executive (HSE) took full 
operational and budgetary responsibility for the management and delivery of healthcare 
services. The Health Reform Programme and the establishment of the HSE, however, 
occurred during a period of unprecedented economic and fiscal prosperity in Ireland, with 
healthcare expenditure increasing by 62 per cent between 2002 and 2007.  
 
In 2008, at the onset of the global financial crisis, the collapse of the overexposed banking 
and construction sectors precipitated an economic and fiscal crisis that required a Financial 
Support Programme from the European Union (EU), the European Central Bank (ECB) and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (collectively known as the Troika) with a total value 
of €85 billion. Accessing funds was made subject to compliance with certain conditions set 
out in the Programme Documents. Amongst other economic and fiscal reforms, the control 
and reduction of healthcare expenditure were cited as being of critical importance (DoH, 
2010). As a result, strict budget reduction targets were imposed, which included a 12 per 
cent reduction in healthcare expenditure during the period 2008 - 2012. Hospital expenditure 
was reduced by 24 per cent during this period (HSE, 2013). Consequently, the Irish 
healthcare sector in general, and Irish public hospital organisations in particular, were 
compelled to operate within unprecedented budget constraints.  
 
Creating conditions for the more efficient use of healthcare expenditure became a 
fundamental component of the strategies implemented to ensure sustainability. Key priorities 
identified to meet this challenge were a greater focus on accountability and the better 
management of healthcare resources. The operation of management control practices was 
considered by the HSE to be central to these initiatives (HSE, National Service Plans 2008 - 
2013). Consequently, for this study, the Irish hospital sector was deemed an appropriate and 
opportune setting in which to explore the operation of management control practices during 
an economic and fiscal crisis. The Irish hospital sector is discussed further in Section 3.1. 
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1.3 Research Design of the Study  
It is clear that the management of healthcare expenditure needs to become more efficient as, 
otherwise, healthcare demands will undermine public finances. The recent economic crisis 
and its impact on fiscal budgets have exacerbated the pressures on these services and made 
the issue more urgent. With this in mind, this study sought to explore the operation of 
management control practices in a healthcare context during an economic and fiscal crisis. 
To achieve this, the Irish public hospital sector was selected as an appropriate setting. As 
little was known about the operation of management control practices in an Irish hospital 
context, a preliminary phase of investigation was conducted. Utilising Ferreira and Otley’s 
(2009) Performance Management Control framework, the preliminary phase of the study 
aimed to develop an understanding of the type of management control practices that were 
operational in the research context being studied and to acquire a broad understanding of the 
factors influencing the operation of these practices. These objectives were achieved by 
exploring the perceptions, thoughts and encounters of individuals at distinct hierarchical 
levels in a large, acute, public teaching hospital.  The preliminary phase provided valuable 
insights into the research context. In particular, its findings established that three 
management control practices were operational: (i) budget control, (ii) activity control and 
(iii) operational control. They also revealed that the operation of these management control 
practices had mixed implications. Although the perceptions of each interviewee were 
fundamentally similar vis-à-vis the complex nature of the hospital context, the findings 
suggested that perceptions and attitudes towards the operation of management control 
practices differed.  
 
Careful analysis and reflection on the preliminary findings, combined with a critical review 
of the empirical literature, helped to shape the scope and design of the main phase of 
empirical work. From a research design perspective, the preliminary findings indicated that a 
single qualitative case-based research approach would be appropriate. It was, therefore, 
decided to conduct in-depth interviews with organisational members, including hospital 
managers, clinician managers, nurse managers and non-management clinicians. In addition, 
a wide range of organisational documentation and archival records were gathered and 
analysed. By these means, the study sought to develop an improved understanding of the 
topic in order to provide insights that contribute to the literature on management control and 
management accounting in healthcare. The research design is further discussed in Section 
4.4. 
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1.4 Dissertation Structure 
Chapter Two locates the study within the domain of management control research. It 
provides a review of the management control literature, which will form the study 
framework. Chapter Three reviews the characteristics of the hospital context and examines 
the suitability of management control practices for that environment. This chapter also 
reviews the relevant empirical literature in relation to the operation of management control 
practices in hospital organisations.  
 
Chapter Four presents the research objective of the study. In addition, it provides a 
discussion of philosophical trends in management accounting research and the particular 
theoretical basis on which this research study is founded. This chapter also describes the 
process of selecting an appropriate research approach. Finally, it explains the research design 
of the study and presents a justification of the research methods used within an interpretive 
framework.  
 
Chapters Five and Six present the findings of the preliminary and main study phases 
respectively. Each commences by providing a description of relevant developments 
regarding the organisational context and management control practices. Chapter Five 
presents the findings from interviews conducted in the preliminary phase of empirical study. 
Chapter Six presents the findings from interviews conducted in the main phase of empirical 
study.   
 
Chapter Seven draws together the study’s findings in order to identify implications for the 
management control and management accounting in healthcare literature.  
 
Chapter Eight provides a summary of the study’s conclusions and presents its contributions. 
It also examines the study’s implications, strengths and limitations and makes suggestions 
for future research. 
1.5 Conclusion  
This chapter has provided an overview of the study reported in this thesis. It has delineated 
the motivations for the study and presented the thesis structure, outlining the contribution of 
each chapter to the study as a whole. The next chapter locates the study within the domain of 
management control research to set out its foundation. 
 
 
  
8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: MANAGEMENT CONTROL  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
9 
 
2.0 Introduction  
Management accounting researchers have long recognised the significance of management 
control practices in enhancing organisational performance. As a result, a rich history of 
theoretical and empirical research is evident in the domain of management control (Berry et 
al, 2009). The purpose of Chapter Two is to provide a review of this literature in order to 
yield insights into the types of management control practices implemented by organisations, 
as well as to highlight those factors that influence their operation in different situations. The 
chapter is organised as follows. In Section 2.1 the domain of management control is 
considered. This includes a discussion of the various definitions and typologies of 
management control practices. In addition, it examines the theoretical frameworks that have 
been developed in the literature and considers the functional and dysfunctional outcomes of 
management control. A critique of empirical management control research is provided in 
Section 2.2. Section 2.3 traces the development of contingency theory and discusses its 
impact on management control research. Section 2.4 concludes the chapter.  
2.1 The Domain of Management Control  
2.1.0 Introduction 
In broad terms, management control practices are designed to help an organisation adapt to 
its environment and to deliver the results desired by its stakeholders (Otley, Broadbent and 
Berry, 1995). An organisation that is ‘in control’ is likely to perform well in meeting its 
objectives, regardless of whether these objectives are to maximise shareholder returns, heal 
the sick or educate the young (Merchant and Van der Stede, 2011). Beyond this general 
understanding, however, definitions and classifications of management control vary widely. 
The purpose of this section is to examine the most prevalent of these definitions and 
classifications.  
2.1.1 Management Control Definitions 
The literature contains a large number of definitions of management control (Fisher, 1998). 
In the 1960s, Anthony (1965, p .17) separated management control from both strategic 
planning and operational control and defined it as ‘the process by which individuals ensure 
that resources are obtained and used effectively and efficiently in the accomplishment of the 
organisation’s goals’. Effectiveness can be understood in terms of achieving pre-defined 
objectives, while efficiency relates to the extent to which those objectives are achieved 
economically. Anthony’s (1965) terminology and framework guided management control 
research and teaching for many decades and have tended to encourage a strong emphasis on 
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financial accounting-based management control practices. However, wider definitions of 
management control have emerged over the years as researchers have adopted a variety of 
different approaches to its study. Simons (1995, p. 5) defines management control as ‘the 
formal, information-based routines and procedures individuals use to maintain or alter 
patterns in organisational activities’. Some researchers have outlined very broad conceptions 
of management control. For example, Chenhall (2003, p. 129) describes management 
accounting as a ‘collection of practices such as budgeting or product costing’, management 
accounting systems as the ‘systematic use of management accounting to achieve some goal’ 
and management control systems as ‘a broad term that encompasses management accounting 
systems and also other controls such as personnel and clan controls’.  On the other hand, 
Merchant and Otley (2007, p. 785) note that management control can include factors such as 
strategic development, strategic control and learning processes and conclude that it is 
‘anything designed to help an organisation to adapt to the environment in which it is set and 
to deliver the key results desired by stakeholder groups’ to ‘keep organisations on track’.    
 
Many researchers have also highlighted the behavioural implications of management control. 
For example, Flamholtz, Das and Tsui (1985, p. 36) describes it as ‘attempts by the 
organisation to increase the probability that individuals will behave in ways that lead to the 
attainment of organisational goals’. Meanwhile, Merchant and Van der Stede (2011, p. 8) 
characterise it as ‘including all the devices or systems individuals use to ensure than the 
behaviours and decisions of their employees are consistent with the organisation’s objectives 
and strategies’. Abernethy and Chua (1996, p. 573) adopt a similar approach in stating that a 
management control system comprises ‘a combination of control mechanisms designed and 
implemented by management to increase the probability that organisational actors will 
behave in ways consistent with the objectives of the dominant organisational coalition’. In 
their exploration of the wide variations and inconsistencies regarding how management 
control has been defined, Malmi and Brown (2008, p. 290) propose a definition of 
management control that includes ‘all the devices and systems individuals use to ensure that 
the behaviours and decisions of their employees are consistent with the organisation’s 
objectives and strategies’. This definition is supported by Ferreira and Otley (2009, p. 267) 
who define management control as the ‘evolving formal and informal mechanisms, 
processes, systems and networks used by organisations for conveying the key objectives and 
goals elicited by management, for assisting the strategic process and on-going management 
through analysis, planning, measurement, control, rewarding and broadly managing 
performance, and for supporting and facilitating organisational learning and change’. 
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While definitions of management control have evolved, the central question has remained 
the same: how can management control practices be developed to help ensure that an 
organisation achieves its objectives? For clarity, in this study, the term ‘management control 
practice’ is used to describe devices that organisations use to ensure that individuals work to 
achieve the organisation’s strategic objectives, while the term ‘management control system’ 
is used as suggested by Merchant and Van der Stede (2011) to refer to the portfolio of 
management control practices that may be used by an organisation to this end. It is important 
to recognise that management control practices come in many different forms, from simple 
operating procedures to more elaborate performance evaluation processes. Researchers have 
categorised these management control practices in a variety of ways. The next section will 
discuss this work.  
2.1.2 Management Control Typologies 
The forms through which management control manifests itself in organisations have been 
classified in a variety of ways. For example, Hopwood (1974a) categorised control as 
administrative controls, social controls and self-controls. Administrative controls denote the 
formal rules and standard procedures used to regulate the behaviour of individuals within the 
organisation. This type of management control focuses on the output resulting from the 
behaviour rather than the behaviour itself. In contrast, social controls develop informally in 
order to regulate individuals’ behaviour. In other words, by establishing social relationships 
with colleagues, individuals may become socialised into accepting the dominant norms and 
values within their social network. Finally, self-controls refer to those rules that are 
internalised whereby individuals will typically behave according to the established norm. 
However, Ouchi (1979) categorises management controls into behavioural controls and 
output controls. Behavioural controls refer to personnel surveillance and direct supervision 
that monitors individuals’ activities. Output controls, then, denote the monitoring of output 
results through written records. In his study of a supply division, Ouchi (1980) identifies 
three types of management control mechanisms: market mechanisms, bureaucratic 
mechanisms and clan mechanisms. Market mechanisms regulate control through their ability 
to precisely measure and reward individual contributions. Bureaucratic mechanisms rely 
upon a mixture of close evaluation with a socialised acceptance of a common objective.  
 
Ouchi (1980) describes clan mechanisms as relying upon a relatively complete socialisation 
process that effectively eliminates goal incongruence between individuals. Similarly, 
Macintosh (1994) categorises management controls into five categories: bureaucratic, 
charismatic, market, tradition and collegial. Bureaucratic controls emphasise hierarchy, 
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procedures, rules and record-keeping and are suitable to situations characterised by certainty 
and no ambiguity. Conversely, charismatic controls are appropriate where objectives are 
unambiguous but the means by which they are to be achieved are uncertain. Typically, 
charismatic controls are associated with revolutionary change and it has been suggested that 
a fundamental element of this type of control is the importance of a charismatic leader. 
Market controls are characterised as acting as the disciplinary glove on the invisible hand 
through the organisation’s performance in the market. Control by tradition suggests that 
beliefs, rights and norms are handed down and generally followed in the interests of the 
greater good. Finally, collegial controls relate to specific groups possessing privileged 
authority (e.g. clinicians) where the administrators are themselves subject to this control.  
 
Merchant (1985) and Merchant and Van der Stede (2011) distinguish between result, action, 
personnel and cultural controls. Result controls involve defining the output that individuals 
are expected to deliver that influence the actions taken, as they cause them to be concerned 
about the consequences of such actions. Action controls evaluate the means taken to achieve 
the objective as opposed to the result in itself. In this way, action controls prohibit 
undesirable behaviour (behavioural constraint), derive desired behaviour from plans (pre-
action review) and monitor behaviour directly by observation or formal controls (action 
accountability). Personnel controls are primarily constructed so that individuals will design 
the desired task satisfactorily on their own, in contrast with cultural controls which shape 
organisational norms. Cultural controls take into account recruitment, training and promotion 
of norms to reinforce individual self-control. This typology is used in Section 3.2 to discuss 
the operation of management control practices in the context of the hospital sector. 
 
This exploration of management control typologies indicates the broad range of management 
control practices that may be employed to ensure that management control is achieved. 
Moreover, many of the classifications have strong similarities and different management 
control typologies are often discussed synonymously (Malmi and Brown, 2008). 
Consequently, management control frameworks have been developed to facilitate the study 
of management control practices. These will be examined in the following section.  
2.1.3 Management Control Frameworks  
Given the breadth and complexity of issues emerging in the area of management control, 
researchers have developed frameworks to give greater clarity to the study of management 
control practices. Drawing on the work of cyberneticians, Otley and Berry (1980) have 
identified four essential criteria that must exist for a process to be deemed under control: (1) 
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the system must have an objective; (2) it must be possible to measure results in relation to 
that objective; (3) the system must have a predictive model; and (4) a number of alternative 
actions must be available for selection. Figure 2.1 presents the four required conditions for 
control in Otley and Berry’s (1980) cybernetic control framework. 
 
Figure 2.1: Cybernetic Control Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Otley and Berry (1980, p. 236 )  
 
This cybernetic model incorporates both feedback and feed-forward control. Feedback 
control involves detecting deviations or errors in actual outcomes, compared with planned 
outcomes, and instigating any required corrective action as a result, while feed-forward 
control involves detecting deviations or errors in predicted outcomes, compared with 
planned outcomes, and similarly implementing any corrective action deemed necessary to 
achieve the planned outcome (Otley and Berry, 1980). Thus, feedback control is 
retrospective while feed-forward control is prospective in nature.  
 
Otley and Berry (1980) argue that their framework contains the essential building blocks of a 
traditional management control system; that is, the setting of objectives, the preparation of 
budgets, performance measurement, feedback and feed-forward regulation mechanisms, the 
calculation of variances and the consideration of alternative courses of action. However, they 
also recognise the limitations of this framework and cite four main drawbacks in this regard: 
(i) objectives are difficult to define and not easily reconciled between varying groups within 
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an organisation; (ii) predictive management control practices are often imprecise and 
inaccurate and there are usually several conflicting predictive control models within a given 
management control system; (iii) identifying an appropriate measure with which to compare 
actual results and desired objectives is a complex decision and may lead to organisational 
conflict as it will may not always be considered appropriate for such measures to be financial 
in nature; and (iv) for a control system to be effective individuals must be persuaded to 
implement the required actions. These challenges are indicative of an overarching issue in 
designing control practices, namely, individuals are themselves self-controlling systems and, 
therefore, may react in ways that are difficult to predict. Yet, despite these limitations, this 
framework represents a significant step forward in relation to the management control 
concepts proposed by Anthony (1965). In particular, it facilitates a holistic approach to 
management control, which relates strategic objectives to day-to-day operational processes 
and continuously revisits each stage of the process as events develop.  
 
A further framework that merits discussion is the Levers of Control framework developed by 
Simons (1995). This framework was inductively derived from case studies and related 
discussions with individuals at a senior management level. According to Simons (1995), 
there are four key types of control, termed levers, and senior individuals must make explicit 
decisions about the relative appropriateness of each. The four types of control identified in 
the framework are: belief systems, boundary systems, interactive controls and diagnostic 
controls. Belief systems set the core values and contribute to the overall culture and ethos of 
an organisation. They instil in an individual the central aspirations of an organisation in 
terms of the values it aspires to create. To achieve this, they may operate through devices 
such as mission statements and overall corporate policies. Boundary systems involve the 
setting of limits and rules which employees are then discouraged from exceeding or 
infringing. Simons (1995) describes belief and boundary systems as the ‘yin and yang’ of 
organisational control. In his view, beliefs are warm, positive and inspirational in nature but 
are controlled by the dark, cold constraints of boundary systems. Diagnostic control is 
manifest in the processes of variance accounting or management by exception that are 
typically implemented by senior management to track the progress of individuals, 
departments or units by measuring their performance against pre-defined targets. In contrast, 
interactive control is manifest by organisational learning and the process of developing new 
ideas and strategies. Interactive control is used to distinguish strategic failure from 
inadequate strategic implementation. In this regard, interactive controls are intended to give 
early warnings that a given strategy is no longer appropriate to a given situation and hence 
needs revision.  
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Empirical research has tended to focus on the interactive and diagnostic elements of the 
Levers of Control framework and the use of specific management control practices. For 
example, Tuomela (2005) found that the ‘Balanced Scorecard’ (BSC) can be used both 
diagnostically and interactively. Notably, he concludes that context is very important as his 
study found that resistance to change developed as new information made actions more 
visible, power structures shifted and workload increased. Similarly, in their case study 
organisation, Abernethy and Brownell (1999) found that budget control practices were used 
both diagnostically and interactively. Abernethy and Brownell’s (1999) study, using data 
collection from CEOs in 63 public hospitals, also showed that an interactive style of budget 
use can mitigate the disruptive performance effects of the strategic change process. 
Subsequently, Henri (2006) has explored the differences in impact between using 
management control practices interactively and diagnostically. This study found that the 
diagnostic use of management controls had a negative effect on strategic capabilities (i.e. 
market orientation, entrepreneurship, innovativeness and organisational learning) and that 
interactive use had a positive effect. In addition, Bisbe and Otley (2004) examined the 
relationship between the interactive use of management control practices and innovation and 
found that the direction of the relationship was contingent upon the level of innovation in the 
organisation. For high-innovation organisations, the interactive use of management control 
practices was negatively associated with innovation, while in low-innovation organisations 
the analysis suggested the opposite direction of relationship. Research has also explored the 
belief and boundary elements of the Levers of Control framework. In this regard, Collier 
(2005) found that informal controls such as group norms, socialisation and culture were 
more important than formal controls. Furthermore, Widener (2007) found evidence of 
interdependence and complementarity between all four levers of control and hence argues 
that the full benefit of management control arises when they are used both diagnostically and 
interactively.  
 
Empirical research has identified a number of strengths and weaknesses associated with the 
Levers of Control framework. In terms of strengths, Langfield-Smith (2008, p. 220) asserts 
that the framework provides a complex conceptualisation of ‘the use of management control 
practices to manage behaviour and effect strategic change’.  Moreover, Ferreira and Otley 
(2009) contend that the Levers of Control framework is useful in offering a broad 
perspective of management control by taking account of the range of controls employed and 
how they are used by various organisations. However, with regard to its weaknesses, Collier 
(2005) maintains that, while the framework attempts to include informal groups, the 
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conceptualisation of belief systems does not encompass other informal controls such as 
group norms, socialisation and culture. A further limitation noted is that the framework is 
strongly focused on the top level of management and is difficult to translate at lower 
hierarchical levels (Ferreira and Otley, 2009). 
 
Otley (1999) sought to ensure that a holistic view of management control practices was 
preserved and, therefore, proposed the Performance Management framework. It is founded 
on the premise that good results are likely to be produced by many alternative management 
control system configurations and, hence, studying only one aspect of management control 
system design at a time will tend to introduce statistical noise into the results. For example, 
Otley (1999) argues that the light use of one control practice (e.g. budget control) may be 
counterbalanced by the heavy use of an alternative control practice (e.g. the Balanced 
Scorecard) and vice versa. Therefore, he suggests that it is only when the overall 
management control system is considered that meaningful connections between the use of 
management control practices and the overall results can emerge. The Performance 
Management framework is based around five central questions:  
 
i. What are the key objectives that are central to the organisation’s overall future 
success and how can it evaluate its achievement of each of these objectives? 
ii. What strategies and plans have the organisation adopted, what are the processes and 
activities that it will require to successfully implement these and how will it assess 
and measure the performance of these activities? 
iii. What level of performance does the organisation need to achieve in each of the areas 
defined in questions (i) and (ii) and how will it set appropriate performance targets 
for them? 
iv. What rewards will individuals (and other employees) gain by achieving these 
performance targets or, conversely, what penalties will they suffer by failing to 
achieve them? 
v. What are the information flows (feedback and feed-forward loops) that are necessary 
to enable the organisation to learn from its experience and to adapt its current 
behaviour in the light of that experience?                          (Otley, 1999, p. 366) 
 
Otley (1999) applies this framework in discussing three major management control practices 
- budget control, the Balanced Scorecard and economic value added - to demonstrate how 
each practice takes different approaches to each of the five main areas. A number of key 
strengths of the Performance Management framework have been highlighted. In particular, 
  
17 
 
the framework has been commended for the breadth of management control issues it 
encompasses and for its integrated nature (Stringer, 2007).  Furthermore, it has been found to 
be straightforward in its application and the areas it addresses are considered meaningful at 
different levels of management (Ferreira and Otley, 2009). However, a number of 
weaknesses have also been highlighted. For instance, the Performance Management 
framework has been criticised for its failure to consider the roles of vision and mission in 
management control given that this issue was deemed a key element in Simons’ (1995) 
Levers of Control framework. An additional criticism made is that it fails to recognise the 
importance of management control use, despite the importance given to this factor in the 
literature (Hopwood, 1974; Otley, 1978; Simons, 1995). Finally, it has been noted that the 
interconnections between the different management control practices have not been 
explicitly addressed in the framework (Malmi and Granlund, 2009; Stringer, 2007). 
 
A subsequent model was proposed in the Performance Management and Control framework 
developed by Ferreira and Otley (2009). Drawing from a further set of case study data, this 
framework was intended to refine the insights of Otley (1999) and Simons (1995) to produce 
a more developed framework. For this purpose, they expanded the original five questions 
proposed to 12, eight of which related to the management of the objectives and the means by 
which this would be done. The other four questions relate to the underlying issues that 
influence the operation of management control practices. Based on a range of findings in the 
literature, Ferreira and Otley (2009) propose that variables relating to external environment, 
strategy, culture, organisational structure, size, technology and ownership structure all 
influence the operation of a management control system. Through these factors, the 
framework is designed to provide a broad view of the key aspects of management control 
practices and to form the basis upon which further investigation can be developed (Ferreira 
and Otley, 2009). Ferreira and Otley (2009) contend that the 12 questions proposed 
constitute a heuristic tool to facilitate the rapid description of significant aspects of 
management control system development. The 12-question Performance Management and 
Control framework is outlined below: 
 
1. What is the vision and mission of the organization and how is this brought to the 
attention of managers and employees? What mechanisms, processes, and networks 
are used to convey the organisation’s overarching purposes and objectives to its 
members? 
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2. What are the key factors that are believed to be central to the organisation’s overall 
future success and how are they brought to the attention of managers and 
employees? 
3. What is the organisation structure and what impact does it have on the design and use 
of performance management systems (PMSs)? How does it influence and how is it 
influenced by the strategic management process? 
4. What strategies and plans has the organisation adopted and what are the processes 
and activities that it has decided will be required for it to ensure its success? 
5. How are strategies and plans adapted, generated and communicated to managers and 
employees? 
6. What are the organisation’s key performance measures deriving from its objectives, 
key success factors, and strategies and plans? How are these specified and 
communicated and what role do they play in performance evaluation? Are there 
significant omissions? 
7. What level of performance does the organisation need to achieve for each of its key 
performance measures (identified in the above question), how does it go about 
setting appropriate performance targets for them, and how challenging are those 
performance targets? 
8. What processes, if any, does the organisation follow for evaluating individual, group, 
and organizational performance? Are performance evaluations primarily objective, 
subjective or mixed and how important are formal and informal information and 
controls in these processes? 
9. What rewards financial and/or nonfinancial will managers and other employees gain 
by achieving performance targets or other assessed aspects of performance (or, 
conversely, what penalties will they suffer by failing to achieve them)? 
10.  What specific information flows feedback and feedforward, systems and networks 
has the organisation in place to support the operation of its PMSs? 
11.  What type of use is made of information and of the various control mechanisms in 
place? Can these uses be characterised in terms of various typologies in the 
literature? How do controls and their uses differ at different hierarchical levels? 
12. How have the PMSs altered in the light of the change dynamics of the organisation 
and its environment? Have the changes in PMSs design or use been made in a 
proactive or reactive manner. How strong and coherent are the links between the 
components of PMSs and the ways in which they are used.  
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The Performance Management and Control framework (or earlier versions of it) has been 
used by Silva and Ferreira (2010), Stringer (2007) and Tuomela (2005) to structure case 
findings. Certain criticisms of the framework should be noted. Malmi and Granlund (2009) 
point out that it offers little guidance on the interconnections between the questions. In 
addition, Collier (2005) highlights the need to understand the antecedents, background and 
organisational context of the design of a management control system. The concern arising is 
that management control research may remain focused on the formal system design, rather 
than the system in use. Berry et al, (2009) argue that many of these criticisms could be 
overcome by using an in-depth and longitudinal field study approach, so that a range of 
control issues are able to emerge. 
 
Broadbent and Laughlin (2009) have built on and extended the framework of Ferreira and 
Otley (2009) by focusing on the contextual factors that influence the nature of a management 
control system. Their conceptual Performance Management framework highlights the key 
role played by alternative models of rationality that allow any management control practice 
to be described conceptually and empirically as either ‘relational’ or ‘transactional’. They 
argue that a relational management control practice is driven by the exercise of 
communicative rationality between stakeholders to debate and arrive at a consensus on the 
objectives to achieve. This has led to the discursively agreed definition of performance 
indicators based on substantive rationality which could, if discursively agreed, accommodate 
quantitative measures to typify performance indicators but more often employs qualitative 
indicators, with which stakeholders are more comfortable. It also relies on transactional 
rationality in the choice of means to achieve those objectives, performance indicators and 
targets.  Thus, the key characteristic of this management control practice is that stakeholders 
have ‘ownership’ of it, which drives action in an organisation working under a reflexive 
authority structure. A transactional management control practice is driven by instrumental 
rationality to define objectives, which take on the characteristics of being highly functional 
and directed to specific outcomes. In this context, ‘ownership’ is associated with either a 
particular sub-group of stakeholders, or is linked to an abstract requirement that appears not 
to be owned by anyone. Performance indicators are defined through formal rationality, 
which tends to be more associated with precise and quantitative forms of measurement. 
Implicit in a transactional management control practice is a reliance on legal-rational 
authority structures to ensure compliance. Broadbent and Laughlin (2009) argue that this 
typecasting facilitates a better understanding of empirical situations, as well as providing a 
means of evaluating any management control practice by raising alternatives for comparison.   
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2.1.4 Management Control Outcomes 
The development of management control practices is believed to result in a wide range of 
improved organisational outcomes; however, providing a definition of a successful 
management control practice is complex. Zimmerman (1997, 2001) conceptualises the 
development of management control practices as purposive and argues that it produces two 
distinct outcomes: (i) improved decision-making and (ii) improved control. Improved 
decision-making is achieved by providing information to reduce ex-ante uncertainty. This 
enables decision-makers to improve their selection of actions by facilitating better informed 
effort (Kren and Liao, 1988). Improved control outcomes stem from the assumption that 
individuals act in their own best interest rather than that of their organisation. Management 
control practices are, therefore, developed by management to increase the probability that 
individuals will behave in a manner that will enable organisational goals to be achieved 
efficiently and effectively (Flamholtz, et al, 1985). Management control practices are 
designed to serve this purpose by providing information ex-post about the action decisions 
made by subordinates. This information is then used to change subordinate behaviour by 
influencing the actions taken so that organisational outcomes can be effectively achieved. 
Management control practices are thus deemed to have achieved positive organisational 
outcomes if they are likely to be used and to satisfy individuals, who then can approach their 
tasks with enhanced information. As a consequence, individuals make better decisions and 
achieve organisational goals more successfully.  
 
However, organisational outcomes are not easily measured and studies have concentrated on 
different functional and dysfunctional outcomes of management control practices. 
Researchers have assessed the effects of management control practice on functional 
outcomes such as job satisfaction (Aranya, 1990), performance (Brownell and Dunk, 1991), 
and motivation (Kenis, 1979). Chenhall (2003) categorises management control outcomes 
into issues related to the usefulness of management control systems, behavioural outcomes 
and organisational outcomes and argues that there is an implied connection between these 
outcomes. However, Chenhall (2003, p. 136) also contends that there are ‘clear leaps in 
logic’ made between useful management control practices and enhanced organisational 
performance and that the usefulness of a management control practice will depend on the 
appropriateness of the practice to the context of the organisation. Furthermore, Chenhall 
(2003) suggests that achieving the goals of the organisation and achieving the operative 
goals may not necessarily be the same. In other words, attempting to align strategy with 
operations by translating official goals into operative goals, which cascade down the 
  
21 
 
organisational hierarchy, is a challenge that has largely been ignored by the literature. He 
also refers to the issue of complexity of goal formulation, including the difficulty of 
measuring particular goals, which may result in goals that are easier to measure becoming 
dominant. Finally, Chenhall (2003) identifies the difficulty of satisfying the multiple and 
competing goals that may be imposed on the organisation by external and internal 
stakeholders. 
 
The dysfunctional outcomes associated with management control practices were first 
identified in an influential study by Argyris (1952) of factory supervisors in four production 
organisations. The study demonstrates that budgeting induces behavioural and organisational 
side effects that could be regarded as dysfunctional from a management control perspective, 
with dysfunctional referring to outcomes that are not in the organisation’s best interest. The 
supervisors in this study perceived budgets as sources of pressure and tension, forcing them 
to narrow the focus of their attention strictly to problems of their own departments. He 
reported that subordinate feelings around budget pressure derived from three main factors: 
the propensity of superiors to emphasise the need to meet the budget (budget emphasis); the 
raising of budget standards to a more challenging level once they are met; and the inflexible 
nature of the budget documents, which failed to disclose the real reasons for the budget 
variances. Consequently, the supervisors expressed negative attitudes towards their superiors 
and towards budget procedures, which in turn caused dysfunctional side effects such as 
absenteeism and interpersonal conflict.  
 
Argyris (1952) also suggests that dysfunctional side effects may be viewed as individual 
defensive routines, meaning that individuals activate a human theory of control to deal with 
embarrassment or threat and engage in responses he terms ‘individual defensiveness’. Such 
actions, in turn, lead to the creation of organisational defensive routines, which Argyris 
(1952, p. 505) describes as ‘any routine policies or actions that are intended to circumvent 
the experience of embarrassment or threat by bypassing the situations that may trigger these 
responses’.  He suggests that the best way to overcome organisational defensive routines is 
to design management control practices that individuals agree are likely to be achieved, 
thereby signalling budget participation as a means of addressing the harmful outcomes 
associated with budget control. Finally, Argyris (1952) indicates that economic conditions 
will influence budget emphasis. His study found that budget personnel acknowledged that 
when economic conditions were poor, budget pressure increased. Argyris’ (1952) study 
remains important for two primary reasons: firstly, it demonstrates the need to complement 
technical budgeting with knowledge of human behaviour; secondly, it suggests that 
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dysfunctional behaviour is not just a natural human tendency, creating a need for control 
practices, but that it could in fact be provoked by the use of management control practices. 
This study was, therefore, an important milestone in management control research, which 
has sought to examine the outcomes associated with the operation of management control 
practices. Furthermore, Argyris (1952) provides a broad foundation, and, indeed, motivation 
for future studies (Briers and Hirst, 1990).  Much of the subsequent research is discussed in 
the following sections.  
2.1.5 Summary   
This section introduced the domain of management control and outlined the various 
definitions proposed by researchers relating to it. It also discussed typologies or 
categorisations that have been used to structure the field. The management control 
frameworks described represent the progression of thought in management control theory. 
These frameworks have been suggested as particularly suitable research tools for examining 
the operation of management control practices in a holistic manner (Ferreira and Otley, 
2009). Finally, the evaluation of management control practice outcomes in terms of 
functional and dysfunctional side effects was introduced.  
2.2 Management Control - Empirical Research  
2.2.0 Introduction  
The purpose of this section is to provide a review of the management control literature, 
which has highlighted the many difficulties and challenges associated with the operation of 
management control practices.   
2.2.1 Management Control Issues  
2.2.1.1 Budget Control  
Budgeting has long been viewed as an integral part of management control and proponents 
of budget control argue that it provides a mechanism to weave together the many disparate 
threads of an organisation into a comprehensive plan (Hansen, Otley and Van der Stede, 
2003). Groot and Selto (2009) describe budget control as the practice of developing the 
financial and non-financial aspects of future plans of action by management. Budgeting is 
purported to support planning by compelling an organisation to make decisions about the 
level of resources available for the planning period and the allocation of resources to 
different parts of the organisation. Furthermore, budgeting supports operational planning by 
helping to anticipate potential problems and to prepare solutions to resolve them. The budget 
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also fulfils management control purposes by specifying objectives, targets and processes 
with the aim of creating a better understanding of, and adherence to, organisational control, 
which helps budget holders in the coordination of their activities with other related 
organisational entities (discussed in Section 2.2.1.3). In addition, as the budget period 
progresses, budgets are used as the basis of performance evaluation. For example, variance 
analysis compares actual performance with planned performance for the purposes of 
understanding the magnitude and causes of the differences between them and the related 
costs and revenues. The variance analysis can then be used for learning, taking corrective 
actions, performance assessment and reward decisions (discussed in Section 2.2.1.2). 
Consequently, in theory, the budget process should proceed logically through a series of 
sequential stages. Nonetheless, the empirical literature has recognised the difficulties 
associated with fulfilling the multiple functions of budgets and a discussion of the main 
issues influencing the operation of the budget control process will be provided in the 
following subsections. 
 
2.2.1.2 Accountability and Controllability  
Budget control practices are implemented in order to hold individuals (or sometimes groups 
of individuals) accountable either for their actions or for the results produced by them or by 
their organisations. Being held accountable means that individuals are rewarded when 
performance is favourable to the organisation and punished where it is unfavourable. 
Merchant and Otley (2007) recommend that, in an accountability-oriented budget control 
practice, individuals whose behaviour is being controlled should be informed of what is 
expected of them prior to the performance period and an appropriate determination of target 
difficulty and level of required participation should be taken into consideration (further 
discussion in Sections 2.2.1.3 and 2.2.1.4 respectively). After the performance period has 
ended, superiors should monitor the performance reports of the activities for which the 
individuals were being held accountable and should reward good performance and penalise 
bad performance. In this way, the rewards and penalties, or punishments, associated with a 
management control practice are frequently suggested to be an important means for 
motivating and improving the performance of individuals.  
 
Rewards include factors valued by individuals and thus may come in many forms. For 
example, extrinsic rewards include salary increases, bonuses, promotions, praise and public 
recognition, while intrinsic rewards stem from an individual’s inner feelings, such as 
satisfaction and accomplishment. Punishments also come in multiple forms, including 
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criticism, loss of autonomy, the absence of rewards received by others (e.g. salary increases) 
and, in extreme cases, loss of the individual’s job. The relationship between rewards, 
motivation and performance has been demonstrated to be complex; however, there is 
agreement that the primary reason for organisations’ use of reward systems is to ensure that 
their employees’ efforts are channelled into activities that facilitate the achievement of 
organisational objectives (Flamholtz et al, 1985). Bonner and Sprinkle (2002) assert that 
monetary incentives increase effort and performance by focusing individuals’ efforts on a 
particular relevant task. Furthermore, they argue that the linking of effort with a task impacts 
on performance in three ways: (i) through effort direction, in terms of the tasks on which 
individuals focus; (ii) effort duration, referring to the length of time devoted by individuals 
to the task; and (iii) effort intensity, meaning the amount of attention individuals devote to 
the task. Research also suggests that extrinsic rewards and punishments only produce 
temporary compliance and that intrinsic rewards are more powerful and enduring (Deci, 
Koestner and Ryan, 1999). Nevertheless, the vast majority of organisations have 
implemented some form of reward system, which suggests that intrinsic rewards alone do 
not typically produce adequate motivation (Merchant and Van der Stede, 2011).   
 
The controllability principle is also regarded as one of the strongest aspects of a budget 
control practice and is considered to be directly relevant to evaluations of individuals’ 
performance. Most commonly discussed as a normative principle, the controllability 
principle stipulates that individuals should only be evaluated based on factors within their 
control (Merchant and Otley, 2006; Merchant and Van der Stede, 2011). Therefore, if 
uncontrollable factors, such as unforeseen changes in the environment or decisions taken by 
others in the organisation, affect individuals’ results, the controllability principle implies that 
the impact of these factors should be nullified in the performance evaluation of the 
individuals concerned. According to Merchant, Van der Stede and Zheng (2003), this 
nullification process may take two forms. It may occur ex ante, whereby performance 
measures are selected that exclude items that individuals cannot control. Alternatively, it 
may occur ex post, whereby adjustments are made to remove the impact that unforeseen 
uncontrollable factors may have had on individuals’ performance. Two main arguments are 
proposed by Merchant et al, (2003) in support of the utility of applying the controllability 
principle by an organisation. Firstly, it provides a reliable assessment of managerial 
performance. Since the profits of a division are the result both of its manager’s efforts and of 
uncontrollable factors, this factor may not be considered a good surrogate for effort unless 
the impact of uncontrollable factors is neutralised (Choudhury, 1986). Secondly, the 
controllability principle helps organisations influence the behaviour of individuals because it 
  
25 
 
is intrinsically linked to the idea of equity and fairness, which is deemed a fundamental 
condition underpinning the effectiveness of a performance appraisal (Ittner and Larcker, 
2001).   
 
Prior literature suggests that non-application of the controllability principle leads to 
decreased motivation and increased role stress, which results in dysfunctional behaviour 
among individuals (Dent, 1987; Merchant, 1989). Dysfunctional outcomes emerge mainly in 
the form of manipulation of data as described by Merchant (1989) and Jaworski and Young 
(1992). Merchant (1990) reports that when individuals feel that a management control 
practice is unfair, they may engage in behaviour to protect themselves that is harmful to the 
organisation, such as manipulating data or creating budget slack. Birnberg, Turopolec and 
Young (1983) divide dysfunctional behaviour into six broad categories, namely ‘smoothing’, 
‘biasing’, ‘focusing’, ‘gaming’, ‘filtering’ and ‘illegal acts of falsification’.  More recently, 
Jaworski and Young (1992) have classified dysfunctional behaviour into two categories: 
gaming and information manipulation. Gaming refers to choosing ‘an action which will 
achieve the most favourable personal outcome regardless of the action the superior prefers’ 
while information manipulation refers to ‘subordinates altering the free flow of information, 
reporting only those aspects of an information set that is in their best interest or, in the 
extreme, falsify data and company records’ (Jaworski and Young, 1992, p. 18). Merchant 
(1989) also argues that applying the controllability principle can prevent the organisation 
form adopting an ‘excuse culture’ whereby individuals spend their time trying to convince 
superiors that their performance stems from uncontrollable factors rather than their own 
freely chosen actions.   
 
Despite the theoretical arguments supporting it, empirical studies indicate that the 
controllability principle is not always strictly applied (Dent, 1987; Drury and El-Shishini, 
2005; Merchant, 1989). Individuals are frequently expected to achieve financial objectives 
that incorporate, to varying degrees, factors outside their control, while year-end adjustments 
for the effects of uncontrollable factors in performance assessment reviews are often only 
partially applied (Merchant, 1989). Furthermore, it must be acknowledged that 
uncontrollable factors are not always easy to evaluate. For example, Giraud, Langevin and 
Mendoza (2008) differentiate between three types of uncontrollable factors in their study: 
horizontal interdependencies (i.e., decisions made by other individuals in the company); 
vertical or hierarchical interdependencies (i.e., decisions made by superiors); and external 
factors (i.e., unforeseen changes in the economic and competitive environment, such as 
natural catastrophes, etc.). The results of their study show a significant difference according 
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to whether uncontrollable factors are external to the company or internal (interdependencies 
and hierarchical decisions), with the percentage of individuals wanting the impact of internal 
factors to be completely neutralised found to be far higher than that for external factors.  
Burkert, Fischer and Schaffer (2001) investigate whether application of the controllability 
principle equally affects the role perceptions of top-level and lower-levels individuals. They 
suggest that top-level individuals cope with uncontrollable factors more effectively.  Overall, 
research has demonstrated that there are considerable impediments to the application of the 
controllability principle, leading to the conclusion that ‘the principle of controllability is 
more honoured in the breach than its observance’ (Marginson and Ogden, 2005, p. 49).  
 
2.2.1.3 Budget Targets  
There is a wealth of empirical evidence indicating that the existence of a defined, 
quantitative goal or target is likely to motivate higher levels of performance than when no 
such target is stated.  In an influential study, Stedry (1960) claim that actual performance 
was dependent on the point in the budgeting process at which the budget holder’s own 
personal goals or aspiration level were set. Three levels of target difficulty (easy, medium 
and difficult) were reported. The evidence suggests that, if individuals receive the imposed 
budget goal before setting their personal aspiration level, their performance will be highest in 
pursuing the difficult budget goal because they then adopt this goal as their own aspiration 
level. In contrast, if individuals receive the imposed budget after setting their own aspiration 
level, then the difficult budget goal does not result in higher performance levels than the 
medium budget goal. This is because individuals tend to retain the (lower) level of aspiration 
that they chose initially.  
 
Hofstede (1967), based on an examination of the effects of participative budgeting in relation 
to budget goal difficulty, propose that budget goal difficulty has a non-linear effect on 
motivation to achieve the budget. Furthermore, he found that maximum motivation levels 
occur when budget goal difficulty is moderate (neither very easy nor very difficult). In 
addition, budget goal difficulty was found to have no effect on job satisfaction, while 
participation exerted a positive effect on motivation to achieve the budget. However, 
contemporaneous, Locke (1968) conducted a series of experiments investigating the 
relationships between targets, motivation and performance and concluded unequivocally that 
the harder the goal, the higher the performance levels. Emmanuel, Otley and Merchant 
(1990) suggest that the relationship between budget difficulty and performance may be 
described as an inverted U-shape, as illustrated in Figure 2.2.  They demonstrate that 
performance was at its highest point (point C) when the budget level of performance resulted 
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in certain adverse budget variables (B-C). Budget levels below or above this level resulted in 
lower performance levels.  
 
Hirst (1987) suggest that, where task uncertainty is high, setting budget targets is less 
effective in promoting task performance than where task uncertainty is low. Shields and 
Shields (1998) model a direct relationship between three variables (the difficulty or tightness 
of the standard, participation and standard-based incentives) and job performance, and an 
indirect relationship using job stress as an intermediated variable between the three variables 
and job performance. For the direct relationship, the tightness of the standard was modelled 
as having a positive relationship to performance but, for the indirect relationship, the 
tightness of the standard was modelled as having a positive effect on job stress, which has a 
negative effect on job performance, meaning that overall standard tightness has a negative 
effect on job performance. The results of this study suggest that tighter standards are 
associated with lower performance. 
 
Figure 2.2: The Effect of Budget Difficulty on Performance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Emmanuel et al, (1990, p 185) 
 
2.2.1.4 Budget Participation  
As mentioned above, research has also investigated the role of participation in the budget-
setting process. Brownell (1982) defines budget participation as a process through which an 
individual is involved with, and has influence on, the determination of his or her budget. 
Participation is sometimes referred to as bottom-up budget setting, whereas a non-
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participatory approach, whereby individuals have little influence on the target-setting process, 
is called top-down budget setting. The importance of budget participation as a means of 
improving performance has been studied extensively in the literature. As noted above, 
Stedry’s (1960) findings indicate that, for difficult budgets, performance is improved if 
individuals set their own aspiration levels after, rather than before, the budget is finalised. 
Therefore, it appears that participation in budgeting may ensure that an individual’s mind 
remains open throughout the budget process, giving them ownership of the budgets they 
design and leading to improved final results.  
 
Based on goal-setting theory, Locke and Schweiger (1979) claim that budget participation 
increases budget goal commitment. They argue that the opportunity to engage with and have 
influence on the budget-setting process increases an individual’s feeling of control over and 
involvement in the budgets produced. This view is consistent with that of Shields and Shields 
(1998, p. 59), who suggest that ‘budget participation increases an individual’s trust, sense of 
control and ego-involvement’ with the organisation, which ‘leads to less resistance to change 
and greater acceptance of and commitment to the budget decision’. Shields and Shields 
(1998) also argue that budget participation provides an opportunity for individuals to gather 
job-relevant information to facilitate their decision-making. In this regard, Kren (1992) 
suggests that budget participation provides cognitive benefits that enable subordinates to 
clarify and comprehend the means by which objectives can be fulfilled. Furthermore, Shields 
and Shields (1998, p. 58) point to the existence of a positive relationship between budgetary 
participation and job satisfaction and argue that ‘the act of participation allows an individual 
to experience self-respect and a feeling of equality arising from the opportunity to express his 
or her values’. Finally, as highlighted by Magner, Welker and Campbell (1996, p. 43), budget 
participation may result in more realistic plans and more accurate budgets as it ‘allows 
individuals to introduce private information into the budget process, thereby enhancing the 
budget’s quality’. However, empirical evidence supporting the value of participation in 
budgeting has been inconclusive. While participation has been advocated as a means of giving 
individuals a greater sense of accountability, it may also lead to budget slack and poor 
performance. Merchant (1990, p. 301) defines budget slack as ‘the excess of the amount 
budgeted in an area over that which is necessary’. In contrast, Lukka (1988, p. 282) states that 
a budget with slack is one in which the ‘figure had been intentionally made easier to achieve 
in relation to the forecast.’ According to Schiff and Lewin (1970), individuals create slack in 
budgets through a process of understating revenues and overstating costs. Although the 
amount of slack varies over time and between companies, Schiff and Lewin (1970) indicate 
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that it might account for as much as 20-25 per cent of a division’s budgeted operating 
expenses.  
 
To address the conflicting results, research has concentrated on studying factors that influence 
the effectiveness of participation.  Hopwood (1974a, p. 6) identifies the importance of task 
characteristics in determining the appropriateness of participation and argues that ‘in highly 
programmed, environmentally and technologically constrained areas, where speed and 
detailed control are essential for efficiency’ participative approaches may have much less to 
offer. In contrast, in areas where flexibility, innovation and the capacity to deal with 
unanticipated problems are important, participation in decision-making is of greater value and 
may confer an immediate benefit. The personalities of the participants in the budget process 
have also been suggested to exert significant influence on whether participation leads to 
improved performance. Merchant (1985) found that authoritarian individuals are unaffected 
by participative approaches while high participation is effective for individuals with a high 
need for independence. Studies have also explored the impact of environmental uncertainty 
on the efficiency of participation. For example, Mai (1989) found that level of participation 
should be commensurate with level of job difficulty. This study shows that participation was 
effective when both job difficulty and environmental uncertainty were high but that high 
participation was ineffective when job difficulty was low. These findings suggest that the 
level of participation required to derive the maximum value from budgeting should be 
adjusted to the circumstances of the budget holder’s environment. The behavioural 
implications of budget participation will be examined further in Section 2.3.3. 
 
2.2.1.5 Perceived Usefulness & Relevance  
The importance of user perceptions of management control system design has been well 
recognised in the management control literature (Pierce and O’Dea, 2003). Prior studies have 
discussed four main attributes of management control practice design: scope, timeliness, 
level of aggregation and information that assists with integration (Chenhall and Morris, 
1986; Bouwens and Abernethy, 2000).  The scope of a management control practice refers to 
its dimension of focus, quantification and time horizon (Chenhall and Morris, 1986; Gordon 
and Narayanan, 1984). A traditional budget control practice provides information that 
focuses on events within an organisation and will be quantified in monetary terms, relating to 
monetary data. In contrast, a broad scope management control practice will provide 
information related to the external environment and other non-monetary factors. Broad scope 
information has long been recognised as being of value to individuals involved in decision-
making (Gordon and Narayanan, 1984; Larcker, 1981; Hayes, 1977). However, an important 
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finding is that the value of broad-scope information can differ significantly between 
functional areas. Mia and Chenhall (1994) reported the perceptions of marketing individuals 
that showed significantly higher levels of uncertainty than those of production individuals 
and conclude that ‘the beneficial effect on managerial performance of using broad scope 
MAS information is moderated by differentiation of activities in ways that isolate 
uncertainty within particular functions’ (p. 10). Their study shows that a higher usage of 
broad scope information is associated with enhanced performance for marketing activities 
but not for production. In a related study, Pierce and O’Dea (2003) investigated the 
perceptions of the usefulness of management accounting information in 12 manufacturing 
organisations in Ireland.  The findings demonstrate that individuals anticipate less need for 
management accounting information unless it becomes broader in scope and more flexible, 
timely and user-friendly. In addition, a high degree of consistency was found in the 
perceived deficiencies of current information, regardless of whether comments related to 
relatively new systems such as Activity-Based Costing (ABC) or more traditional areas such 
as budgeting. In contrast, Bouwens and Abernethy’s (2000) study, which examined linkages 
between strategic choice, interdependence and management control design, revealed that the 
scope dimension is not important for operational decision-making, which was contrary to 
their general expectation and findings of earlier research (e.g. Abernethy and Guthrie, 1994). 
In addition, their analysis revealed only minor differences in management control use 
between production and sales individuals. The issue of timeliness was the only area where a 
significant difference was found.  
 
Timeliness is specified in terms of the provision of information on request and the frequency 
of reporting systematically collected information (Kaplan and Cooper, 1998; Pierce and 
O‘Dea, 2003). It has been suggested that timely information enhances the facility of a 
management control practice to report upon the most recent events and to provide rapid 
feedback on decisions. Chenhall and Morris (1986) indicate that perceived environmental 
uncertainty influences the perceived usefulness of timely information. They contend that, in 
uncertain situations, individuals are likely to find that the need to respond rapidly to 
unpredictable events changes and, as a consequence, timely information is perceived as 
becoming particularly significant. Hilton (1979) modelled the value of management control 
information in a cost-volume-profit decision setting and found that the more timely 
information, the greater the perceived value.  For example, it was suggested that if 
information is reported monthly rather than quarterly, individuals can address concerns that 
arise between quarters, rather than waiting until the end of the quarter.  
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The third characteristic, aggregation, refers to the level and type of information provided by 
the management control practice in terms of its ability to supply data about cost objects that 
vary in size from entire divisions to individual products, components and services. Prior 
studies generally contend that the ability to provide sufficient detail and flexibility to allow 
information to be analysed for different purposes is perceived as useful (Karmarker, Lederer 
and Zimmerman, 1990; Shank and Govindarajan, 1993). Chenhall and Morris (1986) 
propose that that management control practices that can isolate the effects of specific events 
on different functions are of greater use to individuals in uncertain environments. Feltham’s 
(1977) study supports these assertions in finding that the expected benefits from decisions 
based upon more detailed information is generally greater than from decisions based on more 
aggregated information. Within a healthcare context, Comerford and Abernethy’s (1999) 
findings suggest that, unless budget control practices can identify and aggregate costs for 
cost-relevant objects (i.e. patients, devices etc.) with reasonable accuracy, managers will not 
be able to make informed decisions on these issues. In a recent study, Pizzini (2006) 
examines the association between the type of budget control information provided, an 
individual’s beliefs about the usefulness of budget data and actual financial performance. 
Four attributes of budget control design were analysed: the level of detail provided, the 
ability to disaggregate costs according to behaviour, the frequency with which information 
was provided and the extent to which variances were calculated.  Using data from a sample 
of 277 hospitals, the results indicate that individuals’ evaluations of the relevance and 
usefulness of cost data are positively correlated with the extent to which budget control 
practices provide greater cost detail, better classify costs according to behaviour and report 
cost information more frequently. However, only the ability to supply cost detail was 
favourably associated with measures of financial performance.   
 
A final important aspect of management control practice design relates to the coordination of 
various segments within an organisation. Integration refers to the ability of a management 
control practice to manage the interrelationship between segment activities.  Chenhall and 
Morris (1986) contend that integrative information will be perceived as useful by individuals 
in decentralised organisations and by individuals operating in situations of high 
organisational interdependence.  
 
2.2.1.6 Non-Financial Performance Measures 
It has been suggested that budget control practices have lost relevance in light of the 
changing business environment (Johnson and Kaplan, 1991). In response, non-financial 
based management control practices, commonly referred to as Balanced Scorecards have 
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been developed as a means of providing a balanced presentation of both financial and 
operational performance (Kaplan and Norton, 1996). Empirical research examining the 
Balanced Scorecard (BSC) has investigated the cause-effect relationship upon which this 
management control practice is premised. For example, Norreklit (2000) explored the 
existence of a cause-effect relationship between the four perspectives and argued that it did 
not hold and that it was not always true that increased customer loyalty was the cause of 
long-term financial performance. Bukh and Malmi (2005) also examine this issue and argue 
that, if establishing significant correlations between measures and causal chains were 
immediately obvious and easy, the need for strategy or even management would diminish. 
Empirical research is also somewhat unclear on the benefits of using the cause and effect 
characteristic in BSC design. Malina and Selto (2001), Malmi (2001) and Ittner, Larcker and 
Randall (2003) all provide evidence that organisations acknowledge the need to develop 
cause-effect relationships between each of the four perspectives but also report that few 
organisations could demonstrate such a relationship following implementation. Furthermore, 
in their study investigating how the BSC has been used, Ittner et al, (2003) find that it is 
often used differently from how it was intended and, in particular, that future-oriented 
performance measures are often ignored, while financial measures are emphasised. Epstein 
and Manzoni (1998) question the ability of organisations to agree on a strategy in the clear 
terms necessary to enable construction of a BSC. They also contend that developing and 
maintaining it is laborious and requires high levels of top-management support for its 
successful development. Lau and Moser (2008) investigated the behavioural responses of 
individuals to the use of non-financial performance measures contained in the BSC. Based 
on a sample of 149 individuals from the United Kingdom, the results indicate that the use of 
non-financial performance measures was perceived as procedurally fair.  
 
Empirical studies have also sought to examine the relationship between the BSC and 
organisational performance. Davis and Albright (2004), in their study of bank branches, 
found that the organisational units that used the BSC had better financial performance that 
those that had not implemented it. A study conducted by De Geuser, Mooraj and Oyon 
(2009) demonstrates that the BSC has a positive impact on organisational performance. More 
specifically, the BSC was shown to improve the integration of the management control 
processes and to empower individuals.  However, in contrast, to the Epstein and Manzoni 
(1999) study, top management support and individual involvement were not found to 
influence the operation of the BSC.   
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2.2.2 Summary  
This section has demonstrated that the main aim of management control practices is to 
induce individuals to behave in ways that will lead to the achievement of an organisation’s 
objectives. However, empirical studies have also demonstrated that, where management 
control practices are used, attention needs to be paid to issues of controllability, 
accountability, target difficulty, the extent to which individuals are allowed to participate in 
setting targets and perceptions regarding the relevance and usefulness of management 
control information.  A failure to consider the implications of these issues has been shown to 
result in harmful side effects. 
2.3 Management Control - Contingency Research  
2.3.0 Introduction 
Since its introduction to the management accounting literature in the late 1970s, a body of 
contingency literature has developed that relates specific features of management control 
practices to the particular contexts in which they are found (Fisher, 1995, 1998; Chapman, 
1997; Chenhall, 2003). The purpose of this section is to trace the development of 
contingency theory and discuss its impact on the design and use of management control 
practices.  
2.3.1 The Design of Management Control Practices  
Contingency-based management accounting research is founded on the premise that there is 
no universally appropriate management control system applying equally to all organisations 
in all circumstances (Emmanuel et al, 1990). Rather, it suggests that the appropriateness of 
particular features of a management control system will depend upon the specific 
circumstances in which an organisation finds itself. Drawing upon earlier developments in 
organisational theory, contingency-based management control research has identified the 
most important variables influencing the design of management control practices. The 
following subsections will provide a review of this work.  
 
2.3.1.1 External Contingency Factors    
The main external factors that have been examined at the organisational level in management 
control research are the external environment (Chapman, 1998; Merchant, 1990; Hartmann, 
2000) and national culture (Harrison, 1993, Van der Stede, 2003). With regard to the 
external environmental, uncertainty and hostility have been the most widely emphasised 
aspects investigated. Environmental uncertainty relates to the level of change in the 
  
34 
 
environment that occurs unexpectedly, such as unpredictable shifts in the economy or 
unexpected changes in customer demand or competitor actions (Chapman, 1998). 
Contingency studies related to environmental uncertainty have found that a high level of 
environmental uncertainty affects organisational structure, performance evaluation and 
budget control practices. For example, Govindarajan (1984) found that organisations that 
face higher levels of environmental uncertainty use more open and external management 
control practices whereas organisations facing lower levels of environmental uncertainty use 
more formula-based approaches to designing management control. Govindarajan (1984) 
defines a formula-based approach as an evaluation based solely on meeting various required 
levels of financial performance. Chenhall and Morris (1986) and Gul and Chia (1994) 
provide evidence to suggest that the greater the perceived level of environmental uncertainty 
the greater the need for more sophisticated management control practices that have a 
‘broader scope’. They define ‘broad scope’ as encompassing information that is external, 
non-financial and future oriented. Other studies provide evidence that environmental 
uncertainty is associated with an emphasis on budgets for evaluation as well as a need for 
high participation and flexible communication among superiors and subordinates 
(Chapmann, 1998; Ezzamel, 1990; Merchant, 1990). Where the hostility of the external 
environment has been examined, environmental hostility produced by intensive competition 
has been found to emphasise formal control and sophisticated accounting (Khandwalla, 
1972; Otley, 1978; Merchant, 1984).  In contrast, environmental hostility derived only from 
suppliers and government was associated with a reduced emphasis on budgets (Brownell, 
1985). Such empirical ambiguity has led Chenhall (2003, p. 135) to conclude that the 
question of ‘what the appropriate management control practices for an organisation operating 
in conditions of uncertainty and turbulence are’ remains unanswered.   
 
It has been noted that there is a dearth of knowledge in relation to how externally-induced 
organisational crises, particularly in relation to economic crises, affect the operation of 
management control practices (Arnold, 2009; Ezzamel and Bourn, 1990; Hartmann, 2000; 
Hopwood, 2008:2009; Van der Stede 2011: 2015). Hopwood’s (2009) discussion of an 
unpublished study by Olofsson and Svalander in 1975 suggests that the reporting of internal 
financial information broadens following the occurrence of an external crisis associated with 
economic downturn. Financial information is subsequently reported in greater detail, more 
frequently, for more organisational segments and units and both systematically and in an ad 
hoc manner. Furthermore, they argue that the economic and financial aspects of the 
functioning of the organisation become amplified to the degree that, whereas previously 
there may have been competing dimensions of visibility (for example, operational data, 
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human resource information, marketing and competitor analysis), these alternative sources of 
information become less significant. Ezzamel and Bourn (1990) conducted a single case 
study of a UK university confronted with problems caused by drops in external financing 
and found that, in a crisis, its use of management control practices changed, which they 
characterise as shifting from a reflexive ‘answering machine’ mode to a more creative ‘idea 
generating machine’ approach. However, they conclude that the management control 
practices involved did not possess the requisite qualities for either effective pro-active or 
effective responsive crisis management. 
 
2.3.1.2 Organisational Contingency Factors  
The most common organisational factors that have been examined in relation to management 
control are size (Khandwalla, 1972; Bruns and Waterhouse, 1975; Merchant, 1981), structure 
(Bums and Stalker, 1961; Lawrence, Lorsch and Garrison, 1967), technology (Khandwalla, 
1977; Merchant, 1984; Dunk, 1992) and strategy (Miles and Snow, 1978; Gupta and 
Govindarajan, 1984; Simons, 1987; Chenhall and Morris, 1995). With respect to 
organisational size, it has been argued that, as organisations become larger, the need for 
individuals to handle greater quantities of information increases to a point where they need 
to institute controls, such as rules, documentation, specialisation of roles and functions, 
extended hierarchies and greater decentralisation to hierarchical structures (Child and 
Mansfield, 1972). Khandwalla (1972) found that large organisations are more diversified in 
product lines and employ more mass production techniques and sophisticated controls. 
Similarly, according to Merchant’s study (1981), large companies are more decentralised and 
use more sophisticated budget control practices in a participative way.  Moreover, Innes and 
Mitchell (1995) demonstrate that the adoption of Activity-Based Costing (ABC) is much 
greater in larger organisations. 
 
Chenhall (2003) defines organisational structure as ‘the formal specification of different 
roles for organisational members, or tasks or groups, to ensure that the activities of the 
organisation are carried out’. Research investigating this aspect has focused on both the 
extent to which management control practices are consistent with organisational structure 
and the extent to which organisational structure is consistent with environmental uncertainty, 
technology and strategy (Chenhall, 2003). As a result, Chenhall (2003) suggests that greater 
insights into the appropriateness of management control practices are likely to be gained 
from considering the combined effect of structure and other variables. Different researchers 
have concentrated on different aspects of structure, such as differentiation (the extent to 
which sub-unit individuals have control over their sub-unit), integration (the extent to which 
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sub-unit individuals act in ways that are consistent with organisational goals) (Lawrence et 
al, 1967), mechanistic and organic structures (Bruns and Stalker, 1961), and bureaucratic 
and non-bureaucratic structures (Perrow, 1970). Merchant (1981) found that performance 
levels are highest in large, diverse, decentralised firms when an administrative approach to 
budgeting is used, in contrast with smaller firms where the best performance is associated 
with a more personal approach. Merchant (1984) extended this study to the departmental 
level and found that size, functional differentiation (more responsibility over areas of 
manufacturing) and the degree of automation all lead to greater formality in the budgeting 
process. Bruns and Waterhouse (1975) also found that large decentralised organisations with 
sophisticated technologies are associated with a strong emphasis on formal management 
accounting systems. Meanwhile, Gordon and Narayanan (1984) found that organic structures 
are best served by broad-scope, future-oriented information.  
 
One of the longest-established relationships between a contingent variable and management 
control practice design relates to production technology. Technological contingency factors 
include the nature of the production process, its degree of routine, how well means-end 
relationships are understood and the amount of task variety (Emmanuel et al, 1990). It has 
been demonstrated that standardised and automated process technologies are best served by 
more traditional formal management control practices (Khandwalla, 1972). In contrast, 
organisations producing highly specialised, non-standardised, differentiated products require 
management controls that ‘encourage flexible responses, high levels of open communication 
within the work force and systems to manage interdependencies used. Uncertainty, the 
second component of technology, is defined by Thompson (1967) as the interaction of two 
antecedent conditions: rationality of task instrumentality and clarity of purpose. Task 
instrumentality refers to the available means for performing the task. According to 
Thompson (1967), when task instrumentality is well understood and goals are clear and 
unambiguous, efficiency tests are most appropriate. Conversely, where there is uncertainty in 
one of the categories, effectiveness measures are more appropriate. However, where 
uncertainty is associated with both categories, the social test is a more appropriate means of 
assessment. Where the social test is applied, accomplishment and fitness are assessed using 
the collective opinions and beliefs of one or more relevant groups, rather than on the basis of 
efficiency or instrumentality. Thompson (1967) also identifies a third component of 
technology, interdependence, which is influenced by the pattern of workflow among 
departments. He notes three patterns of interdependence: pooled (no direct relationship 
between adjacent processes), sequential (one-way interdependencies), and reciprocal (two-
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way interdependencies). Thompson (1967) reports increasing levels of co-ordination 
difficulty as the technologies become incorporated into more complex interdependencies.  
 
There has also been considerable investigation of strategy as a contingency variable (Dent, 
1990, Ittner and Larcker, 1997). Chenhall (2003, p. 150) describes strategy as ‘how a 
business chooses to compete in its industry and tries to achieve a competitive advantage 
relative to its competitors’. The majority of the empirical research has examined the 
relationship between strategy and the design of management control practice using different 
typologies. Examples of these typologies include defenders, prospectors, adapters and 
reactors, cost leadership, differentiation and build, and hold and harvest. Simons (1987) 
found that business units that follow a defender strategy tend to place a greater emphasis on 
the use of short-term financial measures. Similarly, Ittner and Larcker (1997) found that the 
use of non-financial management control measures for performance evaluation increases as 
organisations follow an innovation-oriented prospector strategy. Finally, a study by Chenhall 
and Langfield-Smith (1998) demonstrates that organisations following product 
differentiation strategies gain benefits from implementing contemporary management 
control practices, such as the BSC, and strategic management accounting techniques, such as 
benchmarking and quality control practices. In contrast, they suggest that organisations 
adopting a low-price strategy can gain from continuing to use traditional management 
control practices. However, despite the considerable number of studies conducted in the 
field, it is suggested that a clear understanding of the relationship between strategy and 
management control practice design remains lacking (Chapman, 1997). For example, 
Langfield-Smith (1997) argues that the inconsistent way in which control, effectiveness and 
strategy are operationalised and measured results in fragmented and sometimes conflicting 
research evidence. Supporting this claim, Chenhall (2003) and Ittner and Larcker (1997) 
assert that strategy measured as a continuum between organisations ignores the 
multidimensional nature of strategic choices. Chenhall (2003) concludes that the linkage 
between typologies of strategy and management control practices is problematic, and that 
these typologies have lost relevance in contemporary settings.  
2.3.2 Reliance on Accounting Performance Measures  
A second line of contingency-based management control research has focused on the use 
made of management control practices and has indicated that this aspect may be more 
significant than the formal design of management control practices. Building on Argyris’ 
(1952) study, in an effort to isolate the behavioural effects of using management control 
information, Hopwood (1972, 1973) distinguishes between three supervisory styles: (i) a 
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budget-constrained style, in which budgets play a key role in evaluating performance and are 
used in an inflexible manner such that failure to achieve budget goals results in poor 
evaluations regardless of the reasons for such failure; (ii) a profit-conscious style, in which 
budgets provide goals to indicate whether performance is good or bad but are used in a more 
flexible manner and viewed as just one indicator of a longer-term concern with profits; and 
(iii) a non-accounting style, in which budgets are considered to be of secondary importance 
and performance is primarily evaluated by reference to non-accounting information.  
 
Hopwood (1972) argues that budget control information for evaluating performance 
frequently provides incomplete, imprecise or biased information about individuals’ 
behaviour. When budget control information is used to evaluate performance, individuals are 
likely to experience role conflict due to uncertainty as to how their behaviour affects these 
measures. This conflict results in stress, poor mental states (e.g. attitude towards and 
dissatisfaction with budget control practices) and dysfunctional behaviour (e.g. gaming). 
Hopwood (1972) found that a budget-constrained performance evaluation style causes 
individuals to experience stress, have poor relations with superiors and peers and manipulate 
accounting data. He also demonstrated that the budget-constrained style is associated with 
lower budget-related performance and ultimately concludes that the budget-constrained style 
in performance evaluation is universally inappropriate. Finally, he holds that, while a profit-
conscious style is likely to result in greater efficiency than the budget-constrained style, both 
are likely to result in greater efficiency than the non-accounting style because ‘the possibility 
does remain that it is still better to place at least some emphasis on the accounting data’ 
(Hopwood, 1972, p. 176).  
 
Otley (1978) sought to replicate Hopwood’s (1972) study in a profit-centre environment. 
Otley’s (1978) findings contradict those of Hopwood (1972). No significant relationship 
between budget emphasis and either job-tension or negative social relations was identified. 
Furthermore, Otley (1978) found a positive relationship between budget emphasis and 
budget performance, which undermines Hopwood’s proposal that a strict reliance on budget 
information is always inappropriate. In relation to antecedent variables, Otley (1978) found 
that management philosophy, environmental conditions and organisational size (in terms of 
profit, manpower and output) influence the choice of a supervisory style. In particular, in 
difficult environmental and economic conditions a strong emphasis on meeting the budget (a 
budget-constrained style) prevails, while in easy and stable conditions a less rigorous 
approach is adopted, which finding supports Argyris’ (1952) earlier case evidence (Section 
2.1.4). Onsi (1973) found, in line with Hopwood (1972) that a strong reliance on accounting 
  
39 
 
information was associated with a greater propensity to create budget slack and to engage in 
‘creative’ accounting, caused by a tendency to enhance the attainability of budget targets. A 
study by Kenis (1979) investigated the effect of a budget-constrained style on an array of 
job-related variables, such as job tension and job satisfaction. A strong budget emphasis was 
found to have a negative effect on tension but, contrary to expectations, several positive 
effects were also identified. These effects include an increase in managers’ motivation to 
participate in the budgeting process. Similarly, Hirst and Yetton (1984) found that a strong 
budget emphasis reduces managers’ role ambiguity. In a review of the empirical results, 
Hartmann (2000, p. 455) concludes that the ‘results provide rather strong support for the 
effects of budget emphasis on slack creation and data manipulation’. However, Hartmann 
(2000) notes that positive effects have also been reported. These conflicting results 
motivated a significant body of management control research to adopt a contingency 
perspective in an attempt to understand the conditions under which a strong budget emphasis 
may be more (or less) effective. This literature, now categorised as ‘Reliance on Accounting 
Performances Measures’ (RAPM), has identified a number of contingent factors influencing 
the appropriate use of management control information, details of which are discussed in the 
following subsections.  
 
2.3.2.1 External Contingency Factors  
Studies have tried to explain differences in the appropriateness of relying on management 
control information by examining an organisation’s external environment. Research 
examining the external environment has focused on factors contributing to the variability, 
unpredictability or uncertainty of the external environment. Hirst (1983) suggests that a 
strong reliance on management control information is inappropriate when uncertainty levels 
are either high or low. He suggests that, with high uncertainty, management control 
information is incomplete, which causes job-related tension and poor working relationships. 
Conversely, low uncertainty causes management control information to result in a loss of 
individuals’ discretionary power, which also leads to conflict and job-related tension.  In his 
investigation of environmental uncertainty, Govindarajan (1984) found that management 
control information is used less frequently when environmental uncertainty is high; however, 
later studies examining this issue produced mixed results. Ross (1995) failed to find a 
negative effect of environmental uncertainty in relation to the appropriateness of 
management control information. On the other hand, Ezzamel (1990) found a positive 
relationship. Merchant (1990) also examined the effects of environmental uncertainty and 
found that, as uncertainty increases, the use of management control practices becomes 
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associated with more manipulative behaviour. Rather than attributing such behaviour to a 
negative behavioural response to the use of management control information as previous 
researchers have done, however, Merchant (1990) concludes that the incidence of 
manipulative behaviour increases when uncertainty is high simply because budget forecasts 
are less certain in such environments so individuals are more easily able to conceal this type 
of behaviour. The evidence regarding the importance of environmental uncertainty in 
predicting the appropriate use of management control information, therefore, remains mixed 
and inconclusive (Chenhall, 2003). In particular, both Hartmann (2000) and Chenhall (2003) 
suggest that reliance on budget control in circumstances of external, environmental 
uncertainty warrants further investigation.  
 
2.3.2.2 Organisational Contingency Factors   
In terms of examinations of the internal environment of the organisation, the majority of this 
research has investigated the link between the characteristics of task uncertainty and the 
appropriate use of management control information. Task uncertainty is defined as high 
where individuals are unsure about the consequences of their actions. Hirst (1983) found 
that, as task uncertainty increases, management control information progressively loses the 
capacity to accurately reflect the actions necessary to accomplish organisational objectives. 
Thus, when uncertainty is high, management control information is relatively incomplete, 
causing conflict and job-related tension. The study concluded that the appropriateness of 
RAPM, in terms of job-related tension, is low (high) when uncertainty is high (low). Later 
studies by Brownell and Dunk (1991) find support for this effect of task uncertainty. 
Emmanuel et al, (1990) distinguish between programmed and non-programmed decisions. 
They define a programmed decision as one where the situation relating to the decision is 
sufficiently well understood to reliably predict the outcomes of the decision. A non-
programmed decision, then, is defined as one that is dependent on the judgement of 
individuals because there is no formal mechanism for predicting likely outcomes. Emmanuel 
et al, (1990, p. 125) suggest that management control systems ‘are generally constructed on 
the assumption that the situation in which they will be used is essentially programmable, but 
in practice the techniques (systems) are used in a much wider variety of circumstances’.  
They demonstrated that, where the ability to measure output is high and the goals clear and 
unambiguous, ‘tight’ management control systems should be used. The term ‘tight’ is used to 
refer to management control practices that ensure a high probability that people will act in 
the best interests of the organisation. Reviews of contingency-based management control 
research have suggested that uncertainty is important in determining the appropriateness of 
management control (Chapman, 1997; Hartmann, 2000). 
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2.3.2.3 Individual Contingency Factors  
Empirical research has also explored the appropriateness of relying on management control 
by examining the distinctiveness of the individuals involved. The most common individual 
factors that have been examined in relation to the use made of management accounting are 
participation (Brownell and Dunk, 1991), personality (Abernethy and Stoelwinder, 1995), 
subordinate relationships (Hopwood, 1974; Merchant, 1990) and leadership style 
(Abernethy, Bouwens and van Lent, 2010; Otley and Pierce, 1995). The importance of 
budget participation in explaining the conditions that render style of use more (or less) 
effective has received considerable attention. Brownell (1982) suggests that budget 
participation and reliance on management control information should be matched for optimal 
performance in the sense that, when participation is high, reliance on management control 
information should also be high.  On the other hand, a low budget emphasis is appropriate in 
circumstances where there is a low level of participation. He concludes that such a match 
between budget emphasis and participation is necessary for effective managerial 
performance. Subsequent studies have attempted to establish a relationship between budget 
participation, task uncertainty and performance. The findings of this research suggest that the 
association between budget participation and a high reliance on management control 
information only holds true in low task-uncertainty situations (Brownell and Hirst, 1986; 
Brownell and Dunk, 1991). Finally, contrary to expectations, Dunk (1990) and Merchant 
(1985a) found that budget slack is low when budget emphasis is high. They had expected 
budget slack to be high under a rigid budget control style.   
 
In a more recent study, Van der Stede (2000) maintains that both arguments for a positive 
and for a negative relationship between budget emphasis and slack, or other dysfunctional 
behaviours, may contain a grain of truth. In other words, it is suggested that being able to 
detect and reduce one form of so-called dysfunctional behaviour might lead to its re-
emergence elsewhere in another type that is not as closely monitored or as easily discernible. 
He argues that most studies have considered only one form of budget-related behaviour, 
which makes an investigation of potential spill-over effects impossible. In his study, Van der 
Stede (2000) tested the relationship between a constrained style and two dysfunctional 
consequences - budget slack creation and managerial short-term orientation. The results 
demonstrate that reducing one form of dysfunctional behaviour (slack creation) through rigid 
controls may spill over into another form (stronger management focus on business matters 
that affect short-term results). 
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With respect to the personality of the individual, Abernethy and Stoelwinder (1995) 
examined the effects of goal orientation on the relationship between the appropriate use of 
management control information, task uncertainty and performance. They hypothesised that 
a high reliance on management control information would not be effective in evaluating an 
individual who had not accepted the organisation’s goals. They tested this hypothesis using a 
sample of hospital administrators where ‘system orientation may conflict with the 
professional model of behaviour’ (p. 109). This study provides support for a three-way 
interactive model in which the ‘fit’ between task uncertainty and the appropriate use made of 
management control information is dependent on system-goal orientation.  In a similar way, 
Weisenfeld and Killough (1992) propose that an individual’s perception of the management 
control practice is related to the perceived accuracy and fairness of the management control 
measures and that these perceptions will determine whether the management control 
practices are viewed as instrumental towards achieving rewards or, alternatively, as a barrier. 
In a further study examining how differences in the personality of an individual manager 
affect the use made of management control information, Collins (1982) proposes that the 
behaviour of superiors and peers explain the performance effects of using management 
control practices. Specifically, he found that inconsistency in budget emphasis between 
superiors caused individuals to perceive ambiguity about budget goals, which was 
detrimental to organisational performance.  
 
Research has also examined the social relationship existing between a superior and an 
individual in an organisation. Both Hopwood (1974b) and Merchant (1990) investigated the 
relationship between leadership style and the appropriate use of management control 
practices. Hopwood (1974b) found support for the proposition that a high reliance on 
management control information is associated with more considerate and less initiating 
superiors, but Merchant (1990) failed to replicate these findings. A leader characterised by 
consideration shows concern for the feelings and ideas of subordinates, while a leader 
characterised by initiating structure clearly defines the roles of his subordinates. Hopwood’s 
(1974b) evidence indicates that budget-constrained supervisors are less considerate than 
either profit-conscious or non-accounting supervisors. Further, budget-constrained and 
profit-conscious supervisors are rated more highly on initiating structure than non-
accounting supervisors. Hopwood (1973) also found evidence for a ‘contagion effect’. The 
contagion effect identified by him refers to the tendency of individuals to evaluate their 
subordinates as they themselves are evaluated. Hopwood (1974b) also posits that, when 
individuals have personal motivations (e.g. financial incentives) to utilise their supervisor’s 
evaluative style, they will be more motivated to do so than they would without such personal 
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motivations and, consequently, these may exacerbate the contagion effect. Few studies have 
sought to establish whether this contagion effect exists; however, one study by Barrett, 
McDonagh and Granleese (1992) used survey data from 72 senior marketing individuals to 
show that superiors tend to match their evaluation style with the style used in their own 
performance evaluation. 
 
Otley and Pierce (1995) examined how subordinates’ reaction to management control is 
influenced by the leadership behaviour of supervisors. A leadership style characterised by 
high structure and low consideration was found to be associated with the highest level of 
dysfunctional behaviour for the behaviours examined, while the lowest level of 
dysfunctional behaviour is associated with a style depicting low structure and high 
consideration. Furthermore, the study reports that perceived environmental uncertainty was 
found to moderate these relationships. In a more recent study, Abernethy et al, (2010), using 
data collected from 128 profit centres, studied the effects of leadership style on the use made 
of management control practice. Top management with a consideration leadership style were 
found to use management control practices as an interactive communication device to 
informally reveal their preferences to subordinates and to obtain input from them. The 
initiating leadership style also influences the interactive communication use of the planning 
and control system but the usage is less intensive than it is for those with a consideration 
leadership style. Abernethy et al, (2010) conclude that an initiating supervisor uses 
management control practices to structure the planning process while those with a 
consideration leadership style will use it to personally interact with subordinates, 
communicate their strategic preferences and to obtain feedback from subordinates during the 
process. Hartmann, Naranjo-Gill and Perego (2010), using survey data from 196 middle-
level individuals in 11 organisations, investigated the effects of superiors’ performance 
evaluation behaviours on subordinates’ work-related attitudes. The results show that an 
initiating structure leadership style affects subordinates’ work-related attitudes through the 
use of objective performance measures, while a consideration leadership style only has a 
direct impact on work-related attitudes. 
 
Finally, investigating the role of trust, Hopwood (1974b) found that subordinates report 
higher trust in their superiors when these superiors measure subordinates’ performance 
strictly against budget. This finding was later confirmed by Lau and Buckland (2001), who 
show that trust mediates the relationship between the use of budget control information and 
job-related tension. In both studies, these findings were explained by the fact that 
subordinates perceive the use of budget-related performance criteria as the superior’s attempt 
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to provide ‘precise’ and ‘honest’ performance feedback. Similarly, Ross (1995) found that 
trust reduces the effect that a high reliance on management control information exerts on role 
conflict.  Hartmann and Spalnicar (2009) found that the formality of the performance 
evaluation processes matters for trust because it enhances the perceived quality of feedback 
for subordinates. They found that higher perceived quality of feedback results in higher trust, 
both directly and via higher perceptions of procedural justice. Overall, they conclude that the 
relevance of trust in the superior-subordinate setting provides a fruitful avenue for studies in 
management control. 
2.3.3 A Critique of Contingency Research   
With reference to contingency-based management control research, Brownell and Dunk 
(1991, p.703) state that ‘the continuing stream of research devoted to this issue constitutes, in 
our view, the only organised critical mass of empirical work in management accounting 
research’. However, a number of both methodological and theoretical challenges have been 
made to this body of research.  The main criticisms are set out below. 
 
Narrow Focus: Management control research has been criticised for the narrow focus it has 
adopted and there have been numerous calls to adopt a broader and more holistic approach 
(Berry et al, 2009; Chenhall, 2003; Fisher, 1998; Malmi and Brown (2008); Ferreira and 
Otley, 2009). Critics have outlined several implications of this narrow approach. Fisher 
(1998) argues that if the links between various management control practices are not 
recognised, then erroneous conclusions will be drawn about how management control 
practices relate to the contingent variables studied. This concern may also underpin Dent’s 
(1990, p. 10) assessment of contingency-based management research where he argues that, 
‘while some relationships have been found between some contingency variables and 
management control practice, on the whole the relationships are weak and the conclusions 
are fragmentary’. Similarly, Chenhall (2003) argues that the variables considered have not 
provided consistent explanations of the kind of management control systems that fit 
differing organisation types or drive performance and concludes by warning that the study 
of specific elements in isolation has ‘the potential for serious model under-specification’ (p. 
131).   
 
In a similar vein, Briers and Hirst (1990, p. 392) assert that very little is known about the 
processes by which supervisory styles are chosen and how a particular style affects 
individual responses.  While numerous management control studies have concluded that it is 
the way in which management control practices are used, rather than their mere existence, 
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that determines their behavioural effects and effectiveness, few studies have sought to 
investigate the use made of management control practices. For decades, management control 
research, in particular RAPM research, has emphasised the importance of the organisational 
and behavioural consequences associated with the use made of management control practices 
in performance evaluation (Merchant and Otley, 2007; Berry et al, 2009; Ferreira and Otley, 
2009). However, an understanding of the types of use made of management control practices 
remains under-developed and under-researched. Ferreira and Otley (2009, p. 274) argue that 
‘the concept of use has not been well developed in the literature’, while Merchant and Otley 
(2007, p. 63) claim that few studies have ‘conceptualised what style of use actually entails’.  
Furthermore, while there have been numerous studies on the outcomes of management 
control, inspired by authors such as Argyris (1952) and Hopwood (1972), the evidence has 
been described as piecemeal in terms of the types of outcomes studied (Briers and Hirst, 
1990). 
 
A third but related point is that accounting researchers have spent much time studying 
innovations in practice, such as Activity-Based Costing, the Balanced Scorecard and Target 
Costing, with the goal of explaining their development, adoption and operation. However, 
Malmi and Brown (2008) argue that studying these practices in isolation may influence any 
conclusions drawn if the use and impact of a new management control practice relates to the 
functioning of the existing broader management control system. Malmi and Brown (2008, p. 
288) conclude ‘by taking a broader package approach to the study of management control 
systems, researchers will be able to develop better theory of the real impact of innovations 
such as the balanced scorecard, ABC and target costing’. Similar, Otley (1999) contends that 
gaining a broader understanding of management control practices operating as a package 
may facilitate the development of better theory regarding how to design a range of controls 
to support organisational objectives, control activities and drive organisational performance.  
Finally, Chenhall (2003) notes that most contingency-based management control research 
has involved large manufacturing organisations and argues there has been little research 
investigating the service and government sectors. In particular, Chenhall (2003) argues that 
the importance of the public sector to the economy and the introduction of managerial 
approaches to the public sector provide an opportunity for future research. 
 
Poor Theoretical Development: Briers and Hirst (1990, p.385) are critical of the under-
development of theory, highlighting ‘the inclusion of variables in hypotheses with little 
supporting explanation’. Furthermore, they point to the use in studies of box diagrams with 
arrows indicating causally related variables and argue that, although this is a parsimonious 
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way of communicating connections, the supporting argument given in many studies is only 
suggestive. They conclude that theoretical development has been piecemeal and has taken a 
secondary role to statistical analyses, which means that, as a consequence, a complete and 
holistic understanding of the factors influencing the operation of management control 
practices remains lacking.  Similar arguments have been articulated by Chapman (1997) and 
Hartmann (2000). 
 
Methodology: Chapman (1997) suggests that contingency-based management control 
research is viewed as being synonymous with large-scale cross-sectional postal questionnaire 
studies and claims that the over-reliance on these methods and techniques has led to the lack 
of an overall contingency framework. He suggests that management control research would 
benefit from greater levels of integration between quantitative and qualitative research 
methodologies. In considering RAPM research, Otley and Pollanen (2000) observe the 
dearth of replication and propose that, in order to maintain the relevance of management 
control research, it is necessary to focus attention on contemporary management control 
practices in contemporary organisational contexts. Otley and Berry (1994) recommend that 
the study of management control practices cannot be fully understood in isolation and that a 
contextual case-based research approach is more appropriate to developing a fuller 
understanding of the relative role of management control practices in the management of 
organisational performance. Otley and Pollanen (2000, p. 495) call for ‘more intensive 
studies of single organisations aimed at elucidating the impact of different accounting 
control practices within their wider contexts performed over a period of time’.  Furthermore, 
Berry et al, (2009) conclude that it is essential that more emphasis be placed on the study of 
management control practices in the conditions within which they operate. They conclude 
that the advantages of field studies in this context are considerable and would allow the 
many factors that influence the operation of these practices to be considered.  
 
Thus, the idea of an organised critical mass of RAPM studies is challenged in terms of both 
methodological and theoretical problems. Lindsay and Ehrenberg (1993, p. 224) note that 
‘taken as a whole, this body of research, although typically interesting in seeking to explain 
discrepancies, does not add up to a coherent body of knowledge or understanding’. 
2.3.4 Summary 
Contingency-based management control research explores the notion that there is no 
universally applicable management control practice that serves all organisations; rather, 
particular contingencies dictate the best design and use in particular circumstances. Based on 
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this understanding, researchers have investigated how different contingency factors impact 
on the design of management control practices. The findings have been varied but they are 
generally supportive of the existence of a relationship between contextual variables such as 
the external environment, organisational size, strategic characteristics, organisational 
structure and the design of management control practices. A second stream of contingency-
based management control research concludes that it is the way in which management 
control practices are used, rather than their mere existence, which determines their 
behavioural effects and effectiveness. However, despite considerable empirical attention 
devoted to the issue, researchers appear not yet to have reached definitive conclusions as to 
behavioural and performance effects of budget emphasis (Hartmann, 2000). Table 2.1 
provides a summary of the key aspects of these studies, organised by contingency factor. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
48 
 
Table 2.1 : Summary of Management Control Contingency Research  
Design of Management Control Practices 
Contingency Factor  Author (s) Key Findings  
External environment Chapman (1998) 
Merchant (1990) 
Hartmann (2000) 
The more uncertain the external environment the more open and 
externally focused the management control practice. 
Organisational size  Khandwalla (1972) 
Merchant (1981) 
Large organisations are associated with more divisionalised 
organisational structures, formalisation of procedures and 
specialization of functions.  
Organisational 
structure 
Burns and Stalker (1961) 
Lawrence et al, (1967) 
 
Large organisations that have more decentralised structures are 
associated with more formal, traditional management control practices. 
Decentralisation is associated with management control characteristics 
of aggregation and integration. 
Technology  
 
Khandwalla (1972) 
Thompson (1967) 
Technologies characterised by more standardised and automated 
processes are served by more traditional formal management control 
practices. 
Technologies characterised by high levels of interdependence the more 
informal the controls including fewer statistical planning reports and 
informal coordination, less emphasis on budgets and more frequent 
interactions between superiors and subordinates. 
Strategy 
 
 
 
Dent (1990) 
Ittner and Larcker (1997)  
Chenhall et al, (1998) 
Chenhall (2003) 
Strategies characterised by conservatism, defender orientations and 
cost leadership are more associated with formal, traditional MCS 
focused on cost control, specific operating goals and budgets and rigid 
budget controls, than entrepreneurial, build and product differentiation 
strategies.  
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Reliance on Accounting Performance Measures 
Contingency Factor  Author (s) Key Findings  
External environment Hirst (1983) 
Govindarajan (1984) 
Ross (1995) 
Ezzamel (1990) 
Merchant (1990) 
Ross (1995) 
The more hostile and turbulent the external environment the greater the 
reliance on formal controls and an emphasis on traditional budgets. 
 
Where management control practices focused on tight financial 
controls are used in uncertain external environments they will be used 
together with an emphasis on flexible, interpersonal interactions. 
Participation 
 
 
 
Brownell (1982) 
Brownell and Dunk 
(1991) 
Van der Stede (2000) 
Budget participation and reliance on management control information 
should be matched for optimal performance. Functional consequences 
may result from information sharing and from a positive effect on 
subordinates’ goal-acceptance and motivation. Dysfunctional 
consequences may result from subordinates’ attempts to negotiate 
slack into their budgets.    
Sub-ordinate 
relationships  
 
 
Hopwood (1974) 
Merchant (1990) 
Otley and Pierce (1995) 
Ross (1995) 
Subordinates’ reaction to management control is influenced by the 
leadership behaviour of supervisors.  
Reliance on accounting performance measures is matched with more 
considerate and less initiating structure leaders.  
Reliance on accounting performance measures is appropriate when 
managers trust their supervisors.  
Personality  
 
 
 
Abernethy and 
Stoelwinder (1995)  
Weisenfeld and Killough 
(1992) 
Individual goal orientation will influence the use of management 
control information. 
Source: Author  
50 
 
2.4 Conclusion  
Chapter 2 has demonstrated that management control is an essential function in a 
contemporary organisation and that it is usually reliant upon management control systems 
that comprise multiple control practices that operate together simultaneously. However, 
empirical research has found that any management control practice is an imperfect tool and, 
therefore, must be used in a way that takes account of its limitations and is appropriate to the 
particular circumstances. In this way, this chapter sought to develop an improved 
understanding of the issues that influence the operation of a management control system. 
The next chapter will examine the characteristics of the hospital context and the suitability of 
management control practices in relation to it. In addition, it will provide a review of the 
literature exploring the complex organisational, external and individual influences on the 
operation of management control practices in a hospital context. 
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CHAPTER 3: MANAGEMENT CONTROL IN A HOSPITAL 
CONTEXT 
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3.0 Introduction 
The purpose of Chapter Three is to review the characteristics of the hospital context and to 
examine the suitability of management control practices for this setting.  Section 3.1 first 
describes the nature and importance of the Irish hospital sector before examining the 
complexities that influence the operation of management control practices within it. Section 
3.2 discusses the issue of management control in a hospital context. Section 3.3 reviews 
empirical research exploring the responses of management and clinicians to the operation of 
management control practices in hospital organisations. A critique of the research discussed 
is provided in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 presents the conclusions to the discussion. 
3.1 The Nature and Importance of the Irish Hospital Sector 
3.1.0 Introduction  
The specific nature of hospital organisations may render them unsuited to management 
control practices, as such practices can be extremely difficult to implement within this 
setting (Ouchi, 1979). This section provides a brief introduction to the Irish hospital sector 
and discusses the unique challenges that organisations operating in this context must address 
in order to implement management control practices. 
3.1.1 The Irish Hospital Sector 
Similar to many developed economies, Ireland witnessed a substantial decline in national 
income during the late 2000s. The collapse of the banking and construction sectors at the 
onset of the global financial crisis precipitated an economic and fiscal crisis that required a 
Financial Support Programme from the European Union (EU) and the International 
Monetary Fund (collectively known as the Troika) with a total value of €85 billion. Access 
to these funds was subject to compliance with the conditions set out in the Programme 
Documents. Along with other economic and fiscal reforms, the control and reduction of 
healthcare expenditure was stated as being of critical importance (DoH, 2010). 
Consequently, strict budget reduction targets were imposed, which included a 12 per cent 
reduction in healthcare expenditure during the period 2008 - 2012. Hospital expenditure was, 
in fact, reduced by 24 per cent during this period. In addition, it was estimated that, by 
December 2013, there were at least 12,000 fewer individuals employed in the Irish 
healthcare sector than there had been in 2007 (HSE, 2013).  
 
The economic and fiscal crisis also had broader consequences for the Irish hospital sector. 
Ireland’s unemployment rate grew from 4 per cent in 2008 to 14 per cent in 2013 (Central 
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Statistics Office, 2013). As a consequence, the number of individuals registered for medical 
cards increased exponentially, with half a million more individuals registered in 2013 than in 
2008 (Burke, Thomas, Barry, Keegan 2014). In addition, sharp increases in private health 
insurance (PHI) premiums combined with deteriorating incomes resulted in the number of 
individuals purchasing private health insurance reducing, with 245,000 fewer individuals 
covered in December 2013 than in December 2008 (Health Information Authority, 2013). 
Overall, this analysis indicates that the number of individual’s dependent on public hospital 
services increased as a consequence of the economic and financial crisis. The growth of 
Ireland’s ageing population also placed increasing pressure on hospital services. The 
population figure for those aged 65 and over rose to 623,200 in 2013, compared to 467,000 
in 2007 (Central Statistics Office, 2013). The population also increased by 1 per cent each 
year during 2007-2013 (Central Statistics Office, 2013). The cumulative effects of these 
demographic pressures were estimated to have caused a 10 per cent increase in demand for 
hospital services (Smyth, 2015).  
 
As a result, the Irish healthcare sector and, in particular, public hospitals organisations were 
compelled to operate within unprecedented budget constraints. Although this situation of 
reduced expenditure and increased demand for hospital services posed challenges, it also 
highlighted the need for hospital expenditure to be utilised efficiently. Key priorities 
identified in addressing this challenge included a greater focus on accountability and the 
more effective management of hospital resources. The operation of management control 
practices was considered by the HSE to be central to these initiatives (HSE Service Plans, 
2008 - 2012). The next section discusses the method used to implement such healthcare 
reform agendas. 
3.1.2 Healthcare Reform and Change    
For the past two decades, the focus of many developed countries, including Ireland, has been 
on public sector reform and it continues to be so. A central element of this strategy has been 
the pursuit of improved performance of public services and this has particular relevance to 
this study of management control in healthcare. The label, New Public Management (NPM), 
has been used to encapsulate these types of changes in public management. Different 
researchers have defined NPM in different ways, such that ‘sometimes NPM seems to be like 
an empty canvas; you can paint on it whatever you like’ (Ferlie, 1996, p. 261).  Hood (1991), 
a seminal theorist on NPM, suggests that, while NPM has been a significant global trend in 
international public administration since the mid-1970s, its intellectual origins can be traced 
back to a much earlier period. Typifying NPM as a ‘marriage of opposites’, Hood (1991, 
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p.45) characterises it as a synthesis between post-World War II ‘new institutional 
economics’ and ‘business-like public sector managerialism’.  While the search for consensus 
on an exact definition of NPM has fuelled academic debate since the early 1980s, one 
common feature of NPM reform has been a growth in the power and influence of 
management control practices. Hood (1995, p. 94) asserts that ‘accounting is a key element 
in this new conception of accountability, since it reflects high trust in the market and private 
business methods and low trust in public servants and professionals whose activities 
therefore need to be more closely costed and evaluated by accounting techniques’. However, 
the increased prevalence of management control practices in healthcare prompted Power and 
Laughlin (1992, p. 132) to issue a note of caution highlighting the potential for management 
control to ‘subvert existing value systems and to redefine the world or social space which it 
enters’. In this regard, Power and Laughlin (1992) identify healthcare organisations as being 
at particular risk. Specific sources of complexity in this context are highlighted in the next 
section. 
3.1.3 Sources of Complexity  
In many respects, Irish healthcare structures and functions are similar to those existing in 
other developed countries but there are some unique important differences that have 
implications for management control practices.  This section outlines the key features of the 
Irish hospital sector.  It is important to note that many of these factors have evolved from a 
long history of incremental policy decisions, influenced by economic and non-economic 
factors as well as by specific institutions, such as the Catholic hierarchy and the medical 
profession.  
 
3.1.3.1 Healthcare Principles and Goals  
The priorities of the Irish healthcare sector are set out in a report issued by the Department of 
Health (DoH) in 2001 entitled ‘National Health Strategy - Quality and Fairness’ (DoH, 
2001). It outlines a strategy that adopts a holistic systems-based approach to addressing 
health needs, focusing on health and social well‐being and encompassing both public and 
private providers of health services, in addition to any other individuals or institutions with a 
role to play in the health of the population. A number of actions are proposed in the context 
of the central aim to ‘deliver a healthier population and a world‐class health system’ (DoH, 
2001, p.15).  Specifically, the overarching vision articulated by the 2001 report is ‘a health 
system that supports and empowers you, your family and community to achieve your full 
health potential. A health system that is there when you need it, that is fair, and that you can 
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trust. A health system that encourages you to have your say, listens to you, and ensures that 
your views are taken into account’ (DoH, 2001, p.8).   
 
3.1.3.2 Governance and Organisational Arrangements  
The Irish healthcare sector was subjected to substantial organisational reform in 2005. This 
Reform Programme was instigated partly in response to the recommendations of a number of 
key reports produced regarding the Irish healthcare sector, most notably the Brennan (2003) 
and Prospectus (2003) reports. The principal objective of the Reform Programme was to 
improve the availability and quality of healthcare services by ‘improving the planning, 
management, delivery and evaluation of services and their respective accountability 
arrangements’ (Health Service Reform Programme, 2003, p. 23).  It also set out the key 
bodies to be involved in the reformed healthcare system, namely, the DoH, a newly 
established Health Service Executive (HSE) and a new regulatory agency, the Health 
Information and Quality Authority (HIQA). Following the Reform Programme, the DoH 
assumed a stewardship function for the healthcare sector and provided support to the 
Minister for Health (MoH), who is politically accountable for the healthcare service. The 
DoH is also responsible for strategic policy and planning, the evaluation of resource 
allocations and the development of an effective legislative and regulatory framework for the 
sector.  HIQA was established in 2007 and is responsible for promoting quality and safety in 
Irish healthcare services.   
 
Following the enactment of the Health Act (2004), the HSE was mandated to manage and 
deliver health and personal social services. The HSE Board is the national governing body of 
the organisation, with the CEO occupying the role of accounting officer. At a national level, 
there are eight directors who are responsible for leading the planning, monitoring and 
evaluation of services, as well as developing standards and best practice. The Integrated 
Service Directorate (ISD) was charged with overall responsibility for the primary care and 
hospital services. There are four ISDs, each of which is led by a Regional Director of 
Operations (RDO). The RDO is responsible for ensuring that, within each region, all of the 
resources available to the HSE are used in the most appropriate way possible to meet the 
needs of the people living in that region. Each area is also led by an Integrated Service Area 
(ISA) manager, who is responsible for the operation of both primary care and acute hospital 
services in their area.  
 
The HSE is bound by specific legal requirements set out in the Health Act (2004), which 
govern the relationship between the DoH and the HSE. Under the Health Act (2004), a 
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National Service Plan (NSP) must be prepared according to the form and manner directed by 
the Minister and must: (i) indicate the type and volume of health and personal social services 
to be provided by the HSE during the period to which the plan relates; (ii) indicate any plans 
related to capital proposed by the HSE; (iii) contain estimates of the number of people to be 
employed by the HSE for the period and the services to which the plan relates; (iv) contain 
any other information specified by the Minister; (v) comply with any directions issued by the 
Minister; and (vi) align with the policies and objectives of the Minister and the Government.  
 
During the past decade, there has also been a continued impetus from the HSE to encourage 
clinicians to become involved in the management of Irish hospital services (Mc Dermott, 
Callanan and Buttimer, 2002). This policy was predicated on the fact that clinicians are the 
major resource consumers in hospitals, with their decision-making accounting for up to 70 
per cent of hospital expenditure (Abernethy and Stoelwinder, 1995; Broyles and Reilly, 
1988; Cardinaels et al, 2004). As a result, it has been argued by the HSE that clinician 
involvement in managerial roles will lead to improved managerial decision-making and 
resource-management by linking executive and operational issues (Fitzgerald and Stuart, 
1992). The Clinicians in Management (CIM) initiative was introduced by the DoH in 1998. 
This initiative aimed ‘to move decision-making closer to the point of service delivery, to 
move the patients closer to the centre of decision-making and to improve the quality of care’ 
(Smith, 2005). Specifically, it aimed to ‘provide for balanced involvement in decision-
making between doctors, nurses and allied health professionals and to decentralise the 
responsibility for managing resources down to local units with their direct participation’ 
(Office for Health Management, 2001, p.1). To this end, it advocated that clinicians should 
be given responsibility for service delivery and resource allocation through clinician sub-
units. To formalise and consolidate the principles of CIM, the DoH introduced clinician 
directorates as the accepted method for the organisation of hospital services and the 
involvement of clinicians in decision-making about service and resource management 
(O’Shea, 2009). The primary purpose of the clinician directorate structure was to incorporate 
clinicians into hospital management and to balance clinician decision-making power with 
financial responsibility (Willcocks, 1994). However, the extent to which clinician 
directorates have been operationalised in Irish hospitals remains unclear (O’Shea, 2009).  
 
Therefore, while many structural reforms were introduced during the past decade to govern 
the Irish hospital sector, the two main reforms highlighted in this section, the Health Act 
(2004) and the clinician directorate structure were among the key reforms that influenced the 
operation of management control practices in the sector.   
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3.1.3.3 Hospital Service Delivery  
Hospital services are delivered through both public and private hospitals. There are over 48 
public hospitals and 21 private hospitals in Ireland (DOH, 2011). Of the 48 public hospitals, 
34 are public hospitals that are owned and operated by the HSE. The remainder are public 
voluntary hospitals that are owned by voluntary organisations and provide services to the 
HSE based on service‐level agreements. While both public HSE and voluntary hospitals 
receive funding from the HSE, a key difference between them relates to their governance 
structure. Brennan (2003, p. 21) explains that public voluntary hospitals are ‘publicly funded 
but privately owned’. In public HSE hospitals, individual managers manage the delivery of 
services and are directly accountable to the HSE. In this way, the HSE effectively has a dual 
role as both funder and manager of services delivered by public HSE hospitals. Private 
hospitals are independent and receive no direct State grant funding. In 2012, there were 
13,576 inpatient beds and 2,063 day-beds in the 34 public hospitals. The number of 
individuals who receive inpatient or day-case treatment is estimated to be 1.43 million each 
year, while 2.4 million individuals attend hospital outpatient departments each year (HSE, 
2013). 
 
3.1.3.4 Resource Allocation  
Each year, the HSE prepares an annual budget document, the Statement of Revenue 
Requirements, which sets out the funding requirements for the forthcoming year. This 
statement is submitted to the DoH in order to inform the Department of Finance of these 
matters during its formulation of Government Estimates. The annual financial allocation (i.e. 
budget) provided to each Government Department is known as ‘the Vote’. On its 
establishment in 2005, the Health Vote was transferred from the DoH to the HSE and, as a 
result of this process, each public hospital receives an annual budget grant allocation from 
the HSE in return for undertaking activity levels as specified in the NSP.  Both the activity 
levels and the budgets are determined on the basis of preceding years, with adjustments for 
items such as inflation, public pay alterations or any other new developments.  
 
All public hospitals also participate in the Casemix Programme. The Casemix Programme 
involves both the measurement of individual hospital output captured by the Hospital 
Inpatient Enquiry (HIPE) system and the comparison of cost and activity between peer-
group hospitals. Hospitals are arranged into four distinct categories in order to ensure 
comparisons are made based on similar entities: ‘Teaching’ (8), ‘Non-Teaching (25), 
‘Maternity’ (3) and ‘Paediatrics’ (2). This system was introduced to facilitate comparisons of 
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similar hospitals and, in particular, to ensure that hospitals with significant teaching costs 
were not disadvantaged through comparisons with non-teaching hospitals (Casemix, Ireland, 
2010).  Each hospital’s cost-per-case is compared with the national mean to provide a Value 
for Money measure. The national mean is based on diagnostic-related groups (DRGs), 
groups based on clinician diagnostic categories. Those having costs per DRG that are lower 
than the national mean within the relevant hospital group gain additional funding, while 
those with costs higher than the national mean lose funding, but this is small relative to the 
main annual budget allocated to each hospital.  Despite consecutive governments advocating 
the need to replace the current block grant allocation mechanism with the Casemix 
Programme, progress has been slow (Wiley, 2005).  
3.1.4 Summary  
This section provided a brief overview of the Irish hospital sector, highlighting its key 
features in terms of governance, organisation, resource allocation and service delivery.  
Developing an understanding of how this complexity influences the operation of 
management control practices is important given the relative size and significance of the 
hospital sector in relation to the economy as a whole. 
3.2 Management Control in a Hospital Context  
3.2.0 Introduction 
In Section 2.1.2, the typology proposed by Merchant and Van der Stede (2011) was 
described as categorising management controls into: (i) action controls; (ii) personnel 
controls; and (iii) result controls. This typology is adopted in this section to discuss the 
operation of management control practices in the context of hospital organisations. 
3.2.1 Action Controls  
Action controls relate to the observation of individuals’ actions as they carry out their work 
(Merchant and Van der Stede, 2011). In hospitals, these include structural constraints, such 
as passwords that restrict access or updating information sources only to authorised 
personnel. Pre-action reviews involve the scrutiny and approval of action plans of 
individuals before they are permitted to undertake a course of action. Examples include the 
approval by management of a clinician’s plans for the purchase of a new piece of medical 
equipment. Action accountability, then, involves defining which actions are acceptable and 
which unacceptable in order to reward acceptable actions and punish unacceptable actions. 
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Examples of action accountability measures in hospitals include instruction manuals, quality 
standards and action plans for different activities.  
 
Action controls have been found to be most appropriate where cause and effect relationships 
are well understood so that it can be reliably predicted that following certain specified 
procedures will produce certain desired outcomes (Chapman, 1997).  An examination of the 
operation of action controls in the context of hospitals necessitates recognition that service 
provision involves the operation of many complex processes of different types, ranging from 
administrative tasks and protocols to services provided to patients by clinicians such as 
assessment and treatment. In this regard, hospital operating processes are highly complex 
and dynamic, involving many interconnected elements that exert a mutual influence on each 
other. Uncertainty in cause and effect relationships occurs when it is difficult to predict with 
certainty the outcomes that will result from particular actions taken. This may be due to 
incomplete knowledge concerning the input/output relations or the highly interdependent 
nature of work processes with multiple inputs, which makes it difficult to programme 
workflows. In this way, the role of action controls differs across different sub-units in the 
context of a hospital organisation.  
3.2.2 Personnel Controls 
Merchant and Van der Stede (2011) define personnel controls as those that enable employees 
to perform well by building on their natural tendencies to control themselves. A fundamental 
issue in implementing personnel controls in the context of hospitals is the conflict of interest 
between the different stakeholders involved in the management of a hospital organisation. 
Glouberman and Mintzberg (2001) characterise the internal organisation of hospitals as 
comprising four different professional groups: clinicians, nurses, management and trustees. 
Cardinaels and Soderstrom (2013) suggest that each professional group evaluates a hospital’s 
decision from its own standpoint and that the differing perspectives can result in conflict 
between groups.  
 
In considering the operation of management control practices, conflicts of interest between 
management and clinicians are particularly important. Eldenburg, Hermalin and Weisbach 
(2004) and Mintzberg (1997) indicate that fundamental divergence between the viewpoints 
of clinicians and management primarily occurs in relation to how resources should be 
deployed. Furthermore, clinicians who are classified as ‘dominant professionals’ are 
primarily oriented towards providing effective clinical care for individual patients, while the 
management group are oriented towards the efficient and effective use of resources for all 
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patient groups, as well as the overall needs of the hospital system (Mintzberg, 1997). These 
conflicts of interests have implications for the operation of management control practices, 
which aim to control resource usage for the hospital as a whole (Chua and Preston, 1994). 
The conflict is also compounded by the fact that the core hospital operating processes 
depend on the expertise of clinicians, thus granting them a significant degree of autonomy. 
Further, the training and education of clinicians have long emphasised their role in 
advocating for their patients to ensure that they receive effective care. In order to be patient 
advocates, however, clinicians believe that they must also maintain clinician autonomy to 
determine the care needed (Baker and Denis, 2011). The literature has given considerable 
attention to examining this issue, which is reviewed in Section 3.3. 
3.2.3 Result Controls  
Result controls relate to the gathering and reporting of information concerning the outcomes 
of work efforts. Establishing such controls requires the selection of performance measures. 
However, as highlighted in Section 2.2, the selection of performance measures is a difficult 
and onerous task. While most private organisations have finance-related goals focused on 
maximising profits and satisfying stakeholders, hospital organisations tend to adopt more 
broadly defined mission statements. For example, as highlighted in Section 3.1, ‘equity and 
fairness’ is a stated principle of healthcare policy in Ireland but such abstract objectives are 
unfocused and, therefore, difficult to measure. This creates a political environment where 
preferences in hospitals are continuously challenged and debated, which ultimately translates 
into ambiguity at the micro-level of hospitals themselves as they attempt to respond to the 
political agenda through resource allocation decisions (Robinson, 2001).  
 
The operation of result controls also requires performance to be measured but in hospitals 
measurement, reliability and precision in this regard are not always attainable. For example, 
‘quality of care’ is an important healthcare outcome but it can be difficult to measure and 
interpret. In addition, patient service outcomes (including both care and cure of the patient), 
in contrast with other service products, are intangible and cannot be packaged or stocked 
(Abernethy et al, 2006). The highly emotive nature of discussions around the healthcare 
sector also poses difficulties for the operation of output control practices. As an emotive 
issue, healthcare attracts considerable media attention. This focus has resulted in the sector 
becoming more visible to the public, thereby raising expectations regarding the quality and 
availability of services. Finally, the operation of output controls in hospitals is complicated 
by the fact that the organisational charters of these organisations typically preclude the use of 
monetary incentives as a mechanism for achieving goal congruence, rendering the 
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implementation of any system of reward or punishment a very complicated task (Eldenburg 
et al, 2004).  
3.2.4 Summary  
The lack of clarity around hospital objectives, the conflicting goal sets and the problems in 
measuring and comparing outputs of hospitals render the operation of management control 
practices complex in this setting. However, the Irish hospital sector is not alone in seeking to 
address management control issues and there is much to learn from prior empirical studies. 
The next section presents a discussion of the research focusing on the operation of 
management control practices in a hospital context.  
3.3 Responses to Management Control Practices 
3.3.0 Introduction 
Section 3.2.2 highlighted that conflicts of interests arising between management and 
clinicians are a fundamental issue influencing the operation of management control in a 
hospital context. This section provides a review of the empirical research examining how 
management and clinicians respond to the operation of management control practices in this 
setting. 
3.3.1 Management Attitudes and Responses 
Relatively, few studies have investigated how management in hospitals respond to budget 
control practices. Abernethy and Brownell (1999) used data collected from 63 Chief 
Executive Officers (CEOs) in public hospitals to explore the use made of budget control 
information in adapting to organisational change. Adopting the typology of Simons (1990), 
they found that organisational performance is enhanced if management control practices are 
used interactively. In particular, the study suggests that the interactive use of budget control 
information by management is effective in supporting the learning and adaptation required 
when strategic change is implemented. It should be noted that Abernethy and Brownell’s 
(1999) study focused entirely on top-level managers and it was acknowledged that the results 
may be sensitive to the managerial level selected and that identifying the conditions that 
influence the use made of management control practices at middle management level would 
be beneficial.  
 
In a related study, Naranjo and Hartmann (2007) collected data from 218 CEOs of public 
hospitals in Spain to explore how the composition of the top management team influences 
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the use made of these practices. The results indicate that CEOs with a predominantly clinical 
background focus more on non-financial information for decision-making and prefer an 
interactive style in using management control practices as, together, these support flexibility 
strategies. Conversely, the results suggest that CEOs with a predominantly administrative 
background are more effective in establishing cost-reducing strategies due to their greater 
inclination to consider financial information combined with a diagnostic use of management 
control practices. Naranjo and Hartman (2007) suggest that hospital performance would 
improve if top managers (i.e. members of the Board of Directors) actively stimulated 
dialogue among clinicians and management to ‘demystify’ management control practices 
and create a broader sense of ownership of them.   
 
Finally, King, Clarkson and Wallace (2010) explored linkages between organisational 
characteristics, budget control and organisational performance. Based on survey data 
collected from 144 primary care providers, the findings show that a manager’s use of budget 
control is positively related to the size and structure of the organisation (i.e. 
decentralisation). Furthermore, for those organisations that use budget control practices, the 
extent of use is positively related to a cost leadership strategy and negatively associated with 
perceived environmental uncertainty. King et al, (2010) conclude that organisational 
performance was positively associated with the use of management control practices by 
administrative management in the study context.   
 
Thus, little is known about how members of management respond to the operation of 
management control practices, despite these individuals playing a pivotal role in the 
everyday delivery of hospital services. The next section will discuss empirical studies 
examining the responses of clinicians in this regard. 
3.3.2 Clinician Attitudes and Responses  
A considerable amount of research attention has been devoted to understanding the 
responses of clinicians to the operation of management control practices (Cardinaels and 
Soderstrom, 2013).  UK and American papers dominate the literature on clinicians’ attitude 
towards cost information. This research shows that clinicians have a poor understanding of 
the cost of the resources they use.  Fowkes (1985) found that 77 per cent of clinicians in their 
study had no knowledge of the true costs of the drugs that they were using. O’Connell and 
Feely (1997) found that the majority of clinicians were unable to accurately estimate the 
costs of the medicines they used. More recently, Ryan, Yule, Bond and Taylor (1996) found 
that only one third of the clinicians studied were able to accurately estimate the costs of 
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drugs. Ryan et al, (1996) also report that clinicians underestimate the costs of expensive 
drugs and overestimate those of inexpensive drugs. At a macro level, empirical studies have 
also examined the effects of management control practices on national hospital expenditure. 
Covaleski, Dirsmith and Michelman (1993) argue that, despite various attempts at cost 
containment, hospital costs in the US have continued to escalate.  
 
There is also evidence that the provision of accurate cost information alters clinician 
behaviour. For example, Cohen, Lillenberg and Neuhausse (1982) investigated if providing 
clinicians with budget control information relating to their x-ray and laboratory tests would 
lead to a reduction in test usage and if this effect would diminish when the feedback of 
budget information ceased. The study sample comprised four teams of clinicians, each 
working in similar inpatient units. It was reported that test usage fell during the study period 
in all four teams. Furthermore, in the one team that had an ‘interested leader’, test usage 
continued to decrease after the study ended. Cohen et al, (1982) conclude that the 
introduction of budget control information would not assure reductions in test usage and 
argue for the necessity of educating clinicians about the potential benefits of management 
control information as, without this intervention, budget information will be ineffective. 
Subsequently, in a cross-sectional analysis of hospitals, Eldenburg (1994) also investigated 
the response of clinicians to budget control information. Differences in expenditure patterns 
were analysed in relation to the types of budget information received. The results suggest 
that hospitals that provide clinicians with their own case costs and some comparison 
information have significantly lower average charges than hospitals that do not. Eldenburg 
(1994) concludes that the provision of disaggregated and benchmarking information is 
necessary to induce a reputation effect that may influence behaviour and reduce 
overtreatment.   
 
Prior studies have also examined clinician responses to the operation of budget control 
practices. Jones and Dewing (1997) describe the findings of a longitudinal study of a large 
acute hospital in the UK, which demonstrated the effects of implementing management 
control practices in an organisation with a deeply embedded clinical culture that is at odds 
with the control objectives associated with these practices. The findings showed that 
clinicians in the study sought to resist these practices and to continue their day-to-day 
activities as before. It was acknowledged by the authors that part of the difficulty in 
implementation was the quality and relevance of the management control practices; 
however, they suggest that the main obstacle to successful implementation is the difficulty of 
effecting change in an entrenched professional culture where priorities do not reflect 
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efficiency-related concerns. Furthermore, they argue that the professional training of these 
clinicians had imposed powerful controls on their behaviour which they internalised, 
including an emphasis on patient welfare and a desire to adopt the best medical practice 
available. Control in relation to budget targets was found to be of secondary interest and was 
exercised only when budget targets were in danger of being exceeded. Instead, clinicians 
discussed control in terms of patient progression through the system, with no evidence of 
linkages between budget information and quantities. Their findings support the earlier work 
of Coombs (1987) in the context of Swedish hospitals.  
 
Preston, Cooper and Combs (1992) also report the emergence of tension between clinicians 
and management as a result of the implementation of a management control practice. They 
suggest that the implementation of management control practices increases managers’ 
awareness with regard to medical outcomes and enables them to exercise greater control over 
hospital organisations. Realising that the shift in authority is embedded in management 
control practices, clinicians, therefore, seek to limit the legitimacy of the management 
control practices on the grounds that they inhibit or distort the exercise of clinical 
professional judgement. In a study of three Finnish hospitals, Kurunmaki (1999) describes 
how ‘financial augmentation’ has become an accepted practice and the language of 
management control has become dominant. Furthermore, she argues that management 
control is an integral part of the struggle for power and control in the Finnish hospital sector. 
The study found that management control information was being used to redistribute 
symbolic and economic capital between clinicians and management, thereby shifting power 
and authority away from the former to the latter. Previously, clinicians had exercised 
significant control over hospital matters through the professional freedom they enjoyed. The 
redistribution of power, which involved a gradual shift of control from clinicians to 
administrators, was regarded by clinicians as undermining of their professional judgement 
and an unnecessary interference with their authority. This reaction generated a strong 
resistance to, and covert circumvention of, management control practices by clinicians.  
 
Broadbent et al, (2001) further explore clinician resistance to management control practices. 
They found that these practices ‘do not sit easily’ with clinicians and they have, 
consequently, used various strategies to resist them. Their analysis highlights three key 
issues. Firstly, when clinicians perceive a regulative threat to their professional freedom, 
resistance is inevitable. Secondly, the actual nature of this resistance tends to manifest in the 
emergence of, as Broadbent et al, (2001) term them, ‘absorbing groups’. These groups will, 
either internally and privately or externally and publicly, absorb and resist these changes. 
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The choice of the absorbing group between internal and external processes is contextually 
determined. They conclude that this choice is likely to be related to the perceived intensity of 
the threat in relation to normative interpretive schemes. It seems from the findings discussed 
above that there is compelling evidence to suggest that clinicians have demonstrated an 
antagonistic attitude towards management control practices due to the fact that these 
practices are perceived to be a fundamental threat to the values of the medical profession and 
are hence to be resisted. However, these findings have not been unequivocal.  
 
In a subsequent study, Kurunmaki, Lapsley and Melia (2003) observed the impact of 
accounting in hospital organisations. The study analysed two different hospital contexts, in 
order to understand the alternative phenomena occurring within them and hence provide an 
accurate description of the ability of accounting to influence and penetrate clinical culture 
and the impact of accounting in terms of its use in decision making. Kurunmaki et al, (2003) 
note that the incremental nature of Finnish reforms is associated with the gradual 
implementation of accounting processes within hospital organisations and the progressive 
involvement of clinicians with it. They suggest that this context has favoured the emergence 
of the phenomenon of ‘accountingisation’. Accountingisation describes the ability of 
accounting to penetrate the clinical culture and modify it. It results in the acquisition by 
medical professionals of accounting skills and expertise which can then be combined with 
their existing clinical knowledge.  
 
In a subsequent study also set in both the UK and Finland, Kurunmaki (2004) analysed the 
adoption of accounting and control systems by clinicians through a longitudinal qualitative 
study carried out over a ten-year period. He observed that clinicians in the Finnish setting 
absorbed management control information while, in the UK setting, clinicians employed 
management control information as a defensive shield. Kurunmaki (2004) claims that the 
clinicians in Finland welcomed and adopted management control practice to the point that 
they became hybridised. She explains the differences in the accounting professions in the 
following way. In the UK, highly professionalised accountants have sought and succeeded in 
retaining control over accounting practices and their jurisdiction; however, with a less 
formalised and powerful accounting profession in Finland, cost and management accounting 
have been understood as being available to any individual or occupational group. Therefore, 
Kurunmaki (2004) claims that Finnish clinicians have willingly adopted management control 
practices as part of their legitimate competencies leading to a hybrid profession.   
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Jacobs (2005) sought to address the question of whether Kurunmaki’s (2004) theory was 
valid in Germany, Italy and the UK. The study focused on the education, training and 
socialisation of clinicians and sought to determine if these issues needed to be altered to 
accord with the Finnish system where hybridisation had occurred. However, Jacobs’ (2005) 
results contradict the findings of Kurunmaki (2004) with regard to hybridisation. The 
findings challenge the assumption that there is simply a clash between the values of 
accounting and medicine and indicate that, in some settings, clinicians are willing to engage 
with management control practices while, in others, they delegate responsibility for these 
activities to a subordinate. Kurunmaki’s (2004) assertion that clinicians’ adoption of 
management control practices is explained by the nature of the accounting profession is not 
supported by Jacobs (2005), who found, rather than a universal change in attitudes, a small 
groups of clinicians who were relatively happy to engage with the activities and 
responsibilities associated with management control practices.  Jacobs (2005) concludes that 
attempts to bring about a change in clinician responses should, therefore, focus on the 
education of clinicians and argues that these changes should encourage clinicians to consider 
how issues of cost, budget and resource management could be understood as a part of their 
role, as opposed to a specialist area of interest of a polarised group of clinician managers. 
Llewellyn’s (2001) study explores how the medical profession absorbs accounting 
information by focusing on the leadership of medical departments. Using the metaphor of a 
‘two-way window’ to understand the aspirations and activities of clinical directors, the study 
reports that clinical directors simultaneously work with sets of ideas from both clinical 
practice and management. She concludes that clinical directors can relatively easily occupy 
the ‘two-way space’, the only issue being a lack of financial management expertise, which 
can be overcome by providing adequate professional training.  
 
In the ongoing debate about the responses of clinicians to the operation of budget 
management control practices, overall, clinicians have been found to be antagonistic towards 
the operation of management control practices. Management control practices have been 
perceived as a fundamental threat to the values of the medical profession and, consequently, 
have often been resisted (Kurunmaki, 1999; Broadbent et al, 2001) but studies have also 
reported clinicians to be accepting of the need for management control (Kurunmaki, 2004; 
Llewellyn, 2001). This research has demonstrated a certain willingness amongst clinicians to 
accept greater responsibility and to be centrally involved with budget control practices.  
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3.3.3 Contextual Factors Influencing Clinician Responses 
This section reviews the findings of previous research examining how contextual factors 
influence the responses of clinicians to the operation of management control practices.  
 
3.3.3.1 Organisational Factors   
Empirical research highlighting the need for management control practices to consider the 
organisational context has, for the most part, adopted a rational perspective. The rational 
perspective views management control in hospital organisations as purposive; that is, 
designed and implemented to facilitate decision making and control. This research has 
stressed the importance of designing organisational structures and management control 
practices to match the organisational context.  
 
Abernethy and Vagnoni (2004) investigated the impact of authority structures in this regard. 
Their study was based on survey and interview data collected from clinician managers in two 
large public teaching hospitals in Italy. It examined the relative importance of formal 
authority delegated by management to clinicians and informal authority derived from the 
power and influence that clinicians maintain within the hospital. The findings indicate that 
the formal delegation of authority to clinicians has a direct impact on the use of budget 
control information for decision making.  Abernethy and Lillis (2001) used data collected 
from CEOs and medical directors in hospitals to examine interdependencies between 
strategy, structural autonomy and management control design. Their findings suggest that 
strategy choice has a direct influence on top management’s decision to grant autonomy to 
lower level managers and that this, in turn, influences the importance attached to measures of 
performance. The issue of autonomy was examined by Silva and Ferreira (2010). They found 
that hospital organisations that were financially and administratively dependent on a parent 
organisation were characterised by weak hierarchical controls, poor information-flow 
mechanisms and low levels of accountability. Their results indicate that a lack of direction, 
low motivation and, in some circumstances, poor managerial ability were key control 
problems in the case organisations studied. The evidence also suggests that the strength and 
coherence of the links between the different elements of management control practices were 
generally poor. Silva and Ferreira (2010) conclude that, to be effective, it is necessary to 
ensure that strong hierarchical controls, good information-flow mechanisms and high levels 
of accountability are developed to support these practices.  
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Studies have also explored the effects of uncertainty on the operation of management control 
practices; for example, using data collected from hospital accounting information system 
groups, Kim (1988) investigated how task predictability influences user satisfaction 
regarding the information provided. Task predictability was defined as the number of 
exceptions arising in the work carried out, or the frequency of occurrence of unexpected or 
novel events. The evidence suggests that, in healthcare, where tasks are predictable, formal 
administrative controls such as budget control practices are appropriate. However, where 
tasks are unpredictable, more impersonal forms of control and co-ordination are found to 
work best. Kim (1988) also reports that matching the design of management control 
practices to the decision contexts faced was significantly associated with improved 
organisational performance as measured by user satisfaction in this study. Abernethy and 
Stoelwinder (1990) selected a broader sample of hospital managers, including managers of 
departments providing clinical services directly to patients (e.g. medical, surgical or 
paediatric) and clinical support services (e.g. laboratory services, medical imaging or food 
services). They demonstrated that budget control practices were used to a significantly lesser 
extent in the direct clinical departments than in support departments. On this basis, they 
argue that the judgement required for decision making in clinical departments limits the 
relevance of budget control information, as these practices are based on the assumption that 
input-output relations can be pre-specified in financial terms.  
 
The issue of task interdependence was investigated by Mai and Gayol (1991). Using survey 
data from 31 public hospitals in New Zealand, the impact of span of control and perceived 
task interdependence was investigated. The results suggest that span of control influences the 
usefulness of management control practices by means of their perceived task 
interdependence. It was found that the information needs of each particular manager need to 
be considered if management control information is to be used to assess the consequences of 
alternative means of achieving an identified outcome. Mai and Gayol (1991) suggest that this 
may be achieved by involving the manager in the design of budget control practices but 
concede that further research is required to determine the validity of this claim. Previously, 
Bourn and Ezzamel (1986) had highlighted the design difficulties associated with 
management control practices in UK hospital organisations. They found particular 
difficulties in the identification and measurement of outcomes and the treatment of 
overheads. Bourn and Ezzamel (1986, p. 66) concluded that the management control 
practices under examination were inadequate and ‘grossly incomplete’, with the result that 
‘the quality of much of the underlying data was often dubious’.  More recently, based on a 
sample of 277 US hospitals, Pizzini (2006) examined the association between cost-system 
  
69 
 
functionality, clinicians’ beliefs about the relevance and usefulness of cost data and actual 
financial performance. The results reveal that clinicians’ evaluations of the relevance and 
usefulness of cost data are positively correlated with the extent to which systems can provide 
greater cost detail, better classify costs according to behaviour and report cost information 
more frequently. However, only the ability to supply cost detail was found to be positively 
associated with measures of financial performance, including operating margins, cash flow 
and administrative costs.  
 
Ballantine, Brighall and Modell (1998) compare and contrast management control practices 
operating in the UK and the Swedish hospital systems. As demonstrated in their case studies, 
it was found that the effectiveness of multidimensional management control practices in 
hospitals depends heavily on the information system infrastructure in place and the degree of 
integration between different organisational levels. Moreover, they found that tensions 
emerge in attempting to balance the provision with the use of financial and non-financial 
information. Finally, Abernethy, Horne, Lillis, Malina and Selto (2005) describe how to 
design management control practices that actively involve clinicians and nurses. Their study 
adopted a multi-method approach to identify the key factors that should be considered in the 
design. It also sought to elicit expert knowledge from relevant individuals and to reflect this 
in the design of the management control practices. They organise the key success factors 
found into three categories: human, production processes and external factors.  
 
Aidemark (2001) investigated the use of the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) in Swedish hospital 
organisations. Based on interview and archival data, widespread support for the BSC’s use 
was found and, overall, the participants considered it to be an appropriate management 
control practice. Aidemark (2001) contends that the BSC replaces the previously applied 
one-sided financial measurement with a management control practice that not only focuses 
on considering a balance of judgements in relation to the organisation but also on optimising 
the use of clinician judgement. In a follow-up study, Aidemark and Funck (2009) examined 
a hospital organisation where the BSC had been implemented for over ten years. The 
interview data was unanimous; during the ten-year period, enthusiasm for the BSC and 
management control had increased. The explanation for the continued interest in 
measurement in this way may be found in three particular aspects of the process: (i) 
decentralisation of the development of the measure; (ii) management interest, demand and 
support; and (iii) the flexibility of the design and use of the BSC.  Jiang, Lockee, Bass, 
Frazer and Norwood (2009) argue that ‘oversight’ has an important impact on the operation 
of the BSC in healthcare. Based on a survey of managers at 490 hospitals, the study 
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demonstrates that a hospital scores better on quality in terms of process of care and mortality 
rates when top managers (i.e. members of the Board of Directors) focus on performance 
evaluation. Furthermore, the authors suggest that quality performance improves when the 
BSC links the performance evaluations of senior executives with clinical quality and patient 
satisfaction indicators.   
 
The development and diffusion of ABC principles in hospital organisations have been 
widespread and Casemix funding has constituted the vehicle through which such 
organisations have implemented ABC principles. Advocates of Casemix funding practices 
have cited many favourable outcomes. For example, Duckett (1995) asserts that the 
implementation of Casemix practices has led to a more equitable distribution of financial 
resources. Casemix funding is also argued to introduce incentives for greater efficiency and 
effectiveness. Bourn and Ezzamel (1986) found that hospitals in which costs are higher than 
the prices paid for services improve performance rapidly. Furthermore, Duckett (1995) 
demonstrates that many of the intended incentives inherent in Casemix funding practices did 
induce the desired efficiency improvements in the hospital organisations studied. Fetter and 
Freeman (1986) argue that the introduction of Casemix funding in their study made hospital 
actions more visible and led to improved accountability. In addition, this increased visibility 
provided a basis for organisational rewards and sanctions. Fetter (1991) suggests that 
Casemix funding introduces incentives for the efficient utilisation of services, as well as 
efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of those services. Lehtonen (2007) claims that 
Casemix funding improves hospitals’ ability to engage in prediction of costs. This study also 
found that some organisations were able to compare different service providers, thereby 
gaining more control of the costs of specialised healthcare. In addition, it was found that 
clinicians had become more resource conscious and were increasingly aware of the financial 
implications of their activities. Eldenburg, Soderstrom, Willis and Wu, (2010) examined 
clinician responses to implementation of the ABC system developed and designed with 
clinician input. They analysed changes in resource utilisation in the treatment of cataract 
patients and found changes in practice patterns in that clinicians redeployed resources 
towards more severely ill patients and reduced the average length of hospital stay. The study 
also provides preliminary evidence of improvements in financial performance.  
 
However, evaluations of the introduction of Casemix practices have also raised a number of 
concerns. Combs (1987) highlights certain unfavourable outcomes that are associated with 
Casemix practices, such as reduced length of patient stay, increase in hospital admissions 
and the reduced prioritisation of outcomes not related to efficiency, such as quality of care. 
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Doolin (1999) explored the implementation of Casemix funding in a large public hospital in 
New Zealand and found that clinicians distrusted the validity of Casemix information. 
Furthermore, clinicians expressed little interest in using it to inform their decision-making. It 
was reported that Casemix funding in the hospital had been largely dominated by financial 
and costing perspectives and had produced little information of perceived clinical relevance 
or benefit. The low regard that many clinicians had for management control information and 
the occupations associated with its generation and processing also presented a major 
difficulty in enrolling clinicians. Lehtonen (2007) and Eldenburg et al, (2010) both argue 
that the key to the successful implementation of Casemix funding practices is the ability to 
persuade clinicians to become centrally involved in its management and development. They 
claim that integrating clinical and financial accountability and assigning responsibility for 
the implementation to clinicians will serve this purpose. Furthermore, they emphasise the 
importance of allowing freedom of choice and flexibility in the adoption of the practice as a 
means of facilitating alleviation of conflict and settling of disputes. Finally, Eden, Lay and 
Maingot (2006) and Cardinaels, Roodhooft and Herck (2004) have demonstrated that there is 
little motivation to adopt ABC when the national financing and resource allocation system is 
still based on retrospective budgeting. Cardinaels et al, (2004) also discovered that the 
responses of clinicians to ABC could largely be explained by hospital-specific characteristics 
such as an awareness of problems regarding the existing budgeting practices and contracts 
governing clinician payment. They conclude that hospital management should not 
underestimate the level of clinicians’ willingness to be involved in the design of management 
control practices.   
 
Overall, empirical research that has adopted a rational perspective has highlighted the need 
for management control practices to consider the organisational context in which these 
practices are operating. Such studies have asserted the need for valid, comprehensive, 
relevant and timely information on which these practices may be based (Mai and Gayol 
1991; Pizzini, 2006). Others have argued that the success of their design is dependent on the 
level of task uncertainty (Kim 1988; Abernethy and Stoelwinder 1990), hierarchical 
autonomy (Silva and Ferreira, 2010) and information flows (Ballantine et al, 1998). 
However, empirical research in this domain generally ignores the historical and political 
contexts in which organisations are located and treats them as closed systems. In contrast, 
studies that adopt a critical perspective locate their research in a precise historical context 
and interpret their findings in the light of the research context. The next section discusses 
this body of research.  
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3.3.3.2 External Factors  
Research adopting a critical/social perspective generally views the implementation of 
management control practices as part of a political and social regime that enables 
governments to question the prevailing modes of organising medical practices and to 
introduce managerial discourse into the everyday practices of organising and managing 
hospital delivery. This research adopts a critical/sociological viewpoint. In particular, this 
perspective analyses how the external environment attempts to colonise the clinical culture 
by means of management control practices, and how clinical culture reacts to this 
colonisation.  In many instances, this perspective has been associated with NPM reforms.  
 
Based on a combination of quantitative and qualitative data collected in Norwegian 
hospitals, Pettersen (2001) found that the limited importance attached by the Norwegian 
County Council to the achievement of budget targets affected its role in this regard. The 
County Council considered the budget only as a formality; it argued that the only priority 
was to produce a handwritten document, regardless of whether anybody was aware of the 
content. Consequently, the County Council did not consider the ability to stay within budget 
constraints as a matter of importance and did not link overspending to any penalty. As a 
result of this approach, clinicians, equally, did not perceive the importance of staying within 
budget constraints. Similar conclusions were drawn by Nyland and Pettersen (2004) in 
investigating the link between budget control information and decision-making processes at 
both strategic and operational levels in a large Norwegian hospital. They found that clinical 
responsibility was associated with professional ethics and norms, whereas managerial 
responsibility was based on individual responsibility and adherence to rules. The rhetoric 
used by staff revealed that management control practices were important, but that adverse 
performance results did not have negative effects on the evaluation of the performance of 
clinician managers. Furthermore, they found that poor budget performance was viewed as a 
means of acquiring more resources. Nyland and Pettersen (2004) also note that the presence 
of informal feedback mechanisms such as ‘coffee-room talks’ influences the effectiveness of 
management control practices.   
 
In a comparative study of management accounting in intensive care units in the UK and 
Finland, Kurunmaki et al, (2003) found certain commonalities between the countries in 
terms of intensive care problems but also significant differences, which were attributed to 
contrasts in the role of management control practices between the two countries. They noted 
that the absence of an established management accounting profession and the willingness of 
healthcare professionals in Finland to assume the accountant’s role was accompanied by a 
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commitment to financial targets and an acceptance of financial responsibilities. This was 
contrasted with the UK hospital, where it was found that healthcare professionals continued 
to have primacy. This dominance was strengthened by the use of management control 
information to enhance their position. They described the resulting dynamic as ‘accounting 
as a legitimating function’ in which accounting facts, figures and arguments were assembled 
to project a defensive shield around the activities of healthcare professionals (Kurunmaki et 
al, 2003, p. 19). In terms of responses, a study conducted by Abernethy and Chua (1996), 
looking at both management and clinicians, found that these are not only contingent on the 
organisation’s technical environment but also on its institutional environment. In an Irish 
context, Robbins (2007) identified and developed explanations for obstacles to the 
implementation of performance practices. Using data from a case study of an Irish acute 
public hospital, she argues that a lack of robust financial information systems has 
undermined and impeded the introduction of NPM principles and created tension and 
frustrations between management and clinicians.  
 
3.3.3.3 Individual Factors  
Considerable attention has been given to empirically assessing the consequences of 
introducing management control practices in contexts where the pursuit of efficiency is often 
in conflict with the professional objectives of the healthcare professionals involved. Using 
survey data collected from a large public teaching hospital in Australia, Abernethy and 
Stoelwinder (1995) investigated the level of clinician orientation towards budget control 
practices. The Abernethy and Stoelwinder (1995) study suggests a reluctance on the part of 
clinicians to accept management control practices, related to their ability to identify with 
efficiency-based goals. They, therefore, suggest that incorporating clinicians into the formal 
management structure would enhance the orientation of clinician managers towards 
management control practices and, consequently, they would be more likely to accept 
resource management. Abernethy (1996) built on the research of Abernethy and Stoelwinder 
(1995) and explored whether an individual’s managerial orientation was more important for 
the effective use of formal accounting controls or non-accounting forms of control. The 
study employed questionnaire data obtained from 63 clinician managers in four large 
Australian teaching hospitals. Accounting controls in the study included budgeting and 
standard operating procedures. Non-accounting controls related to the informal interactions 
that occurred between organisational members during task performance. From its findings, 
the study concludes that the implementation of socialisation strategies designed to enhance 
an individual’s managerial orientation will improve the effectiveness of accounting controls 
in hospitals. However, the findings also suggest that increasing an individual’s managerial 
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orientation to enhance the effectiveness of accounting forms of control may reduce the 
effectiveness of some bureaucratic forms of control (i.e. the use of standard operating 
procedures).   
 
Comberford and Abernethy (1999) extended the research of Abernethy and Stoelwinder 
(1995) by examining the conditions necessary to facilitate the effective involvement of 
healthcare professionals in the budgeting process. Specifically, they argue that the 
development of a commitment to managerial values can mitigate the potential for conflict 
when individuals with a high commitment to professional goals and values become involved 
in the budgeting process. In this context, they propose that top management must create the 
necessary level of trust if tendencies to pursue self-interest are to be contained. If this is not 
achieved, they contend that clinicians will be unwilling to share information or cooperate in 
the achievement of organisational goals and are likely to delay or even sabotage the 
implementation of any such initiatives. Finally, a study by Bouillon et al, (2006) examines 
the importance of goal congruence with management control practices using a theoretical 
framework that draws upon both agency theory and stewardship theory. The results indicate 
that managers, clinicians and nurses are not motivated by individual opportunism alone and 
that goal congruence does not depend solely upon the selection of appropriate performance 
measures and incentives to remove inefficiencies and moral hazards; rather, the study 
concludes that hospitals realise significant performance improvement only when nurses, 
clinicians and management reach a consensus on strategic direction.   
3.3.4 Summary  
Overall, the management accounting literature presents a view of clinicians demonstrating 
antagonistic attitudes to management control practices. In this regard, it has been argued that 
control practices play a symbolic or ritualistic role in healthcare and that clinicians are 
reluctant to engage with management control practices (Broadbent et al, 2001; Jones and 
Dewing, 1997, Kurunmaki, 1999; Preston et al, 1992). One explanation suggested for this 
finding is that management control practices are poorly designed and that a great deal of 
improvement is required before management control information is legitimised in clinical 
decisions (Pizzini, 2006). A further obstacle identified as influencing their effective use is 
the absence of identification with the managerial goals and values necessary to engage with 
management control practices (Comberford and Abernethy 1999; Bouillon et al, 2006).   
  
75 
 
3.4 A Critique of Empirical Research  
A number of weaknesses emerge in the previous empirical studies conducted on the 
operation of management control practices in hospitals. Many of the deficits identified in this 
review have already been highlighted as shortcomings in the management control literature 
(Section 2.3.4).   
 
Narrow Focus:  
- There has been a tendency in the research to focus on specific management control 
practices as opposed to adopting a comprehensive and integrated approach (Abernethy and 
Chua, 1996; Abernethy and Lillis, 2001). It has been suggested that studying the operation 
of a management control practice independently may skew any conclusions drawn where 
the operation of a different practice is related to the functioning of the practice under 
investigation. Understanding how a range of management control practices operate 
simultaneously in hospital organisations is an important research question that has 
received little research attention (Lehtonen, 2007).   
- Previous studies have been conducted at an organisational, sub-unit or individual level. 
However, it remains unclear how management control practices relate to each other with 
regard to organisational hierarchical levels. It would seem likely that the emphasis given to 
management control practices will differ at different organisational levels (Abernethy and 
Brownell, 1999; Cardinaels and Soderstrom, 2013).   
- Existing research has tended to focus on clinicians to the virtual exclusion of other 
individuals that interact with management control practices. Significantly, little is known 
about how management employees interact with management control practices, despite 
these individuals playing a pivotal role in the everyday management of hospital services 
(Abernethy and Brownell, 1999; King et al, 2010). 
 
Methodology: 
-  The vast majority of the evidence in this field has been accumulated through the use of 
questionnaires; however, survey-based methodologies are unlikely to capture the richness 
of this research context. There is an increasing need to use case-based or field evidence to 
explore the operation of management control practices in a hospital context (Abernethy 
and Stoelwinder, 1990; Eldenburg et al, 2010). 
- The majority of the existing empirical research has been conducted in the UK, Australia or 
Nordic settings. Research in other empirical contexts would be advantageous in yielding 
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further insights into the operation of management control practices in a hospital context 
(Eldenburg and Krishnan, 2007).  
 
Poor Theoretical Development: 
- There is a scant and fragmented understanding about how contextual factors associated 
with the hospital context influence the operation of management control practices. Studies 
have considered an insufficient number of factors at any one time and have thus failed to 
elucidate how the nature of the hospital context affects the operation of these practices 
(Abernethy and Chua, 1996). Moreover, the empirical literature has identified an 
individual’s professional orientation as an important factor in understanding the operation 
of management control in a hospital setting. However, a clear understanding of this factor 
remains lacking. It has been suggested that qualitative analysis may provide useful 
additional insights (Abernethy and Stoelwinder, 1991; Abernethy et al, 2006). 
- It remains unclear how the operation of management control practices has influenced the 
responses of the various stakeholders in a healthcare context. While the literature provides 
some insights into clinician responses, the evidence is mixed and somewhat ad hoc in its 
approach. Moreover, little is known about the responses of hospital management to the 
operation of management control practices (Abernethy et al, 2006). 
- An understanding of the implications associated with the operation of management control 
practice in hospital contexts also remains lacking. While there is some evidence to suggest 
that resource awareness may permeate clinician decision-making, it is not possible to 
conclusively attribute this outcome to the operation of management control practices. 
Sufficient evidence has not been provided to determine whether activities associated with 
management control practices influence the decision-making processes of key stakeholders 
in hospital settings (Abernethy et al, 2006; Cardinaels and Soderstrom, 2013). 
3.5 Conclusion  
This chapter commenced with a discussion of the nature and importance of the Irish hospital 
sector and the challenges faced by hospitals in adapting management control practices were 
highlighted. Empirical studies that have examined the operation of management control 
practices in a hospital context were reviewed in Section 3.3. This research has demonstrated 
that, while management control practices may lead to harmful side effects in other sectors, 
the unusually complex features of hospital organisations make this a particularly challenging 
context. The next chapter sets out the research objectives of this study along with the 
research methodology, approach and design adopted. 
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4.0 Introduction 
The purpose of Chapter 4 is to present the research objective of the study and to describe and 
justify the research methodology, approach and specific methods adopted. The chapter is 
organised as follows.  The research objective of the study is discussed in Section 4.1. Section 
4.2 reviews the philosophical assumptions underpinning the research approach taken. This 
review will include a discussion of philosophical trends in management accounting research 
and the particular theoretical basis on which this study is founded. Section 4.3 considers the 
research approaches adopted to examine management control issues. In particular, it will 
discuss the calls made for case-study research to be conducted to develop a greater 
understanding of the operation of management control practices. Section 4.4 elucidates and 
justifies the research design employed. Section 4.5 concludes the chapter.  
4.1 Research Objective  
During the first decade of the twenty-first century, a period of economic and fiscal crisis 
constituted a global phenomenon, during which healthcare organisations were subjected to 
increasing pressure, mainly as a result of reduced expenditure and increases in demand for 
healthcare services. Although this situation posed challenges, it also highlighted the need for 
resources to be utilised efficiently and the operation of management control practices 
became a key component of the strategies implemented to ensure sustainability (OECD, 
2013; 2015). However, a number of features of healthcare organisations pose challenges for 
the operation of management control practices. These include: the complexity of their core 
operating processes; the lack of clarity around their objectives; the control by a professional 
dominant group; and the problems in measuring and comparing outputs. 
 
The management control literature demonstrates any control practice to be an imperfect tool 
and, therefore, each must be used in a way that takes account of its limitations and is 
appropriate to the particular circumstances. A failure to do this has been shown to result in 
harmful side effects (Merchant and Van der Stede, 2011). While, the potential for harmful 
side effects exists in all organisations, the specific nature of healthcare organisations renders 
them particularly susceptible (Broadbent et al, 2001; Jacobs, 2005; Jones and Dewing, 1997; 
Nyland and Pettersen, 2004). There is, however, relatively little empirical research exploring 
the operation of management control practices in a healthcare context (Cardinaels and 
Soderstrom, 2013). Furthermore, a number of weakness in prior studies of the healthcare 
setting are evident, many of which reflect similar flaws in the broader management control 
literature (Abernethy et al, 2006). 
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Therefore, based on the recognition of a need to improve the management of healthcare 
resources in addition to a lack of clarity surrounding the operation of management control 
practices in a healthcare context, the research objective of the study was to explore the 
operation of management control practices in a healthcare context during an economic and 
fiscal crisis.  
4.2 Research Methodology  
4.2.0 Introduction  
A research methodology encompasses the epistemological, ontological and methodological 
assumptions that guide the inquiry in a research study (Sauders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2006). 
The purpose of this section is to highlight the philosophical perspectives available in terms 
of the study’s research approach. Luka (2010) argues that the consideration of philosophical 
perspectives is important for several reasons. An awareness of the variety of available 
perspectives helps the researcher to consider additional possibilities in investigating a topic. 
Furthermore, it is argued that being ignorant of or unreflective regarding a study’s 
philosophical underpinnings may help a researcher be efficient ‘inside the box but carries the 
risk of seeing just the trees, not the entire forest’ (Luka, 2010, p. 112). A discussion of the 
philosophical foundations of social science research is provided in Appendix A.  
4.2.1 Philosophical Perspectives of Management Control Research  
To explore the different perspectives adopted by management accounting researchers, it is 
essential to identify the ways in which philosophical perspectives may be categorised.  
Researchers such as Hopper and Powell (1985), Laughlin and Lowe (1990), and Ryan, 
Scapens and Theobald (2002) have used Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) construction of a 
general sociological research framework as a foundation on which to explore alternative 
philosophical perspectives in accounting research. The three main perspectives are regarded 
as: mainstream, interpretivist and critical (Ryan et al, 2002). Management accounting 
research has been identified as predominantly informed by the mainstream philosophical 
perspective (Lukka, 2010). This perspective has been described as normative, in that it 
indicates how management accounting practices should take place and how management 
accounting systems should be structured. Hopper and Powell (1985) contend that the 
mainstream or traditional perspective comprises a number of different research approaches, 
including objectivism, social systems theory and pluralism. Meanwhile, Laughlin (1995) 
categorises the positivist, realist, instrumentalist and conventionalist research approaches as 
deriving from a mainstream perspective. In essence, all of these research approaches fall 
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within the functionalist paradigm, which regards individuals and organisations as external 
realities that are constrained by the environment they inhabit. Thus, mainstream researchers 
adopt a positivist epistemological stance and employ nomothetic research methods.   
 
However, nomothetic research methods have increasingly been regarded as an unsatisfactory 
basis for management accounting research. Chua (1986, p. 601) contends that ‘mainstream 
accounting research possess certain strengthens, but has restricted the range of problems 
studied and the use of research methods’. In support of this assertion, Baker and Bettner 
(1997, p. 293) argue that ‘the type of research prevalent in the mainstream accounting 
journals, which is characterised by a positivist methodological perspective and an emphasis 
on quantitative methods, is incapable of addressing accounting’s complex ramifications’. 
More recently, Lukka (2010, p. 112) has concluded that the current ‘homogenising 
tendencies of management accounting research have inherently limited the scope of 
intellectual activity’. In this regard, while nomothetic research methods enable research to 
detect variations between the elements under investigation, they do not allow for an analysis 
of why such differences and gaps emerge. Furthermore, there has been a tendency by those 
adopting the mainstream approach to discount contrary research findings as anomalous, 
rather than to search for contextual reasons to provide a better understanding of actions and 
events that do not fit the theories or models applied (Lukka, 2010).  
 
As a result, management accounting researchers have called for alternative philosophical 
perspectives to be considered. One such alternative is the critical perspective. This 
perspective seeks to critique the status quo by addressing the broader social order of 
capitalist societies (Bhimani, 2002). According to Laughlin (1987, p. 482), the critical 
perspective holds that ‘the present is not satisfactory, that reality could be better than it is, 
and that critical theory can create this improvement’. Thus, critical research has been 
described as pursuit-oriented, with the overall objective to create ‘a better accounting’ 
(Gallhofer and Haslam, 1997, p. 74).  A second and more prevalent alternative to the 
mainstream approach is the interpretivist perspective. This perspective attempts to describe, 
understand and interpret the meanings that human actors apply to the symbols and structures 
within the settings in which they find themselves (Ahrens and Dent, 1998). In particular, the 
interpretivist perspective does not regard people as behaviourally consistent or as exhibiting 
an invariant rationality that presupposes that responses to particular stimuli will be 
predictable; rather, this perspective seeks to explore how patterns of meaning and diverse 
behaviours emerge through social interactions. The interpretivist philosophical perspective 
does not strictly adopt a positivist or anti-positivist epistemology and it can apply both 
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ideographic and nomothetic research methods in its attempt to seek meaningful results. 
Puxty (1993, p. 70) succinctly explains that ‘an interpretivist approach is one in which a 
better means of understanding the situation is employed but, once this has been achieved, the 
normal rules of science apply, which are that, given the objectivity within the situation itself, 
it must be possible to learn from it for such future situations’. An interpretivist approach to 
accounting research has been argued to ‘straddle paradigms’ in that it combines subjective 
and objective features (Ahrens, 2008).  
 
There are clear similarities between the interpretivist and critical approaches in terms of the 
subjective value of the social world, though interpretivist research focuses on how 
accounting is socially created and how the perceptions attached to it preserve the status quo 
rather than exploring which ideological pressure is influential (Hopper and Powell, 1985). 
Baker and Bettner (1997) argue that the main difference between interpretivist and critical 
research is the willingness of the latter to take a particular stance regarding the nature and 
purpose of research and its political and societal implications, whereas interpretivist research 
purports to maintain a neutral stance.  
4.2.2 Philosophical Perspective of Current Study  
As delineated earlier, the research objective of the study was to examine the operation of 
management control practices in a healthcare context during an economic and fiscal crisis. 
Management control information, which is derived from management control practices, is 
human-made and has no natural existence. Thus, management control information is not 
independent in a physical or positivist sense. Furthermore, management control practices are 
implemented in order to increase the probability that individuals will behave in ways that 
lead to the attainment of organisational goals (Merchant and Van Der Stede, 2011). 
Therefore, any examination of management control requires an understanding of both the 
decision-making process and the responses of individuals. Acquiring this understanding 
entails a consideration of how individuals perceive uncertain future realities and how social 
relations and attitudes affect the process and outcomes of decision making. Consequently, 
the objective of the research study is not achievable without consideration being given to 
individual responses and the perceptions prompting them. It is suggested, therefore, that this 
study falls within the interpretivist paradigm. Such a philosophical paradigm is consistent 
with and supportive of the study’s research objective.  
 
In terms of ontology, the position taken could be identified as ‘reality as a contextual field of 
information’ (Morgan and Smircich, 1980, p. 492), which is midway between the polarities 
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of nominalism and realism. This approach recognises that generalisations about reality are 
possible, though not guaranteed to exist, yet maintains that these will always be ‘skeletal’ 
and require empirical data to make them meaningful (Laughlin, 1995). In terms of 
epistemology, the study, while avoiding a shift towards either of the two extremities, veers 
towards anti-positivism in resisting the pursuit of universal laws and holding that an 
understanding of the social world is best developed by exploring social phenomena through 
the eyes of participants and in their natural contexts. Such ontological and epistemological 
perspectives are argued by Laughlin (1995) to be associated with methodologies that adopt a 
definable approach but remain open to refinement in actual situations. The next section 
presents a detailed account of the study’s research design. 
4.2.3 Summary  
This section has highlighted the merits of choosing an interpretivist position and 
demonstrated the critical support for this selection among researchers in the field, who have 
called for a more interpretivist approach to be taken to management control research. It is 
argued that the interpretivist approach and its theoretical assumptions are capable of 
addressing the limitations identified in the mainstream approach, as well as being aligned 
with the research objective of the current study.  
4.3. Research Approach  
4.3.0 Introduction  
Patton (2002) suggests that consideration should be given to two issues when adopting any 
one research approach. Firstly, attention needs to be given to the research approaches that are 
principally applied in the domain being investigated. Secondly, the overarching objective of 
the study should be carefully considered in order to match it with the most appropriate 
research approach. The following subsections examine these issues in turn. 
4.3.1 Research Approaches in Management Control Studies 
Research findings relevant to the domain of management control have been produced using 
many research approaches - analytical modelling, surveys, archival records and case studies - 
each of which has its own set of advantages and disadvantages (Merchant and Otley, 2006).  
For example, research that has applied an economics-based principal-agent theory has used 
an analytical modelling approach, which involves using mathematical models to search for 
an optimal solution given a particular set of conditions. The advantage of this analytical 
modelling approach resides in the rigour of its argument and this literature has made a 
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significant contribution to identifying variables that should be considered by organisations 
that are designing control systems (e.g. risk aversion or information asymmetry). However, 
this research is often criticised as having failed to sufficiently capture the complexity of the 
setting in order to provide reliable guidance to managers concerned about management 
control issues (Chenhall, 2003; Scapens, 1990; Otley, 1994).  
 
The survey method has been reported to be the most prominent research approach in 
management control research. In fact, Van der Stede, Young and Chen (2005) report that, in 
the period 1982 - 2001, 30 per cent of all published empirical management accounting 
research used surveys. Survey studies have adopted multiple means of distribution (e.g. mail, 
internet and telephone) and have facilitated the collection of information from relatively 
large samples of respondents. Furthermore, surveys have been used to test, refine and 
explain existing theories, as opposed to being used to explore a new topic or issue and, 
accordingly, the survey strategy has usually been associated with the deductive approach. 
Proponents of the survey have argued that it is an appropriate method for testing differences 
in sample subsets (Van der Stede et al, 2005). Furthermore, it has been argued that surveys 
can be used for studies at multiple levels of analysis, from the entire organisation down to 
employees at the lowest level (Noeverman, 2005). However, as most surveys involve cross-
sectional analysis, drawing causal inferences can be difficult (Chenhall, 2007). This research 
approach has also been criticised for not being cumulative in its outcomes, as different 
instruments of measurement have been used in a wide range of different contexts without 
adequate contextual information being given to enable these differences to be recognised 
(Chenhall and Smith, 2011; Otley, 1994).  
 
Researchers have also used archival data to conduct relatively large-scale empirical studies. 
While some studies have employed such data secured from public sources, such as 
regulatory filings, others have used data obtained from within the organisation. Archival 
studies have two main advantages: one is that the data is seen as ‘objective’ and untainted 
by, for example, response, surveyor, interviewer, or cooperating organisation biases; the 
other is that researchers working with archival data are often able to work with large sample 
sizes, which allow the use of more sophisticated statistical methods and more reliable 
generalisation to specific populations of interest (Merchant and Otley, 2006). Because of the 
availability of public disclosures, particularly in the US, the control-related topic area that 
has received the most attention from archival researchers relates to the incentivisation and 
compensation of top management. However, only a small number of researchers (e.g. Ittner 
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and Larcker, 1998) have been successful in gaining access to organisation databases that are 
suitable for studying management control-related topics.  
 
There have been calls for management control researchers to adopt case-based methods 
(Berry et al, 2009; Chenhall, 2007; Berry and Otley, 2004).  These calls to action appeared 
to have a near-immediate effect on research activity. Chenhall and Smith (2011) conducted a 
review of 231 papers published in ten leading management accounting journals between the 
years 1980 and 2009.  An examination of Table 4.1 reveals that, in the period 2000-2009, the 
number of studies using case-based approaches exceeded those employing surveys for the 
first time.  Similarly, a Management Accounting Research Editorial Report (2010) found that 
the number of case studies increased in the second decade, at 40 per cent compared to 24 per 
cent in the first decade. It was, however, argued in the Editorial Review that the distinction 
between case studies and other field studies is rather arbitrary and that a more appropriate 
comparison might be the combination of case studies and other field studies, which 
constituted 39 per cent in the first decade compared to 48 per cent in the second. This 
perceptible increase was explained by a decline in (descriptive) surveys (Scapens and 
Bromwich, 2010).  The most common purpose of case-based management control research 
has been theory development, but researchers have also applied this research approach to 
develop new classification systems (e.g. Simons, 1987) and to develop measures for 
previously identified concepts (e.g. Banker, Datar and Rajan,1987). The utility of these roles 
suggests that case-based research will continue to be important.   
 
In the management control in healthcare literature, the most common research approach used 
is the survey method (Abernethy et al, 2006).  However, Abernethy and Stoelwinder (1990) 
argue that this method is unlikely to capture the richness of this research environment. 
Abernethy and Stoelwinder (1990, p. 23) argue that action research and the use of qualitative 
methodologies, such as case studies, are being called for in both the organisation and 
management control literature in order to help ‘practitioners understand organisations in a 
way that will improve practice’ and ‘contribute to a theoretically and scientifically useful 
body of knowledge about organisations’. It has also been argued that hospitals are complex 
organisations, the study of which requires the researcher to be on the site field ‘to be able to 
understand what is going on’ (Mintzberg, 1997, p. 12).  Abernethy et al, (2006, p. 823) 
advocate a need for diversity in research approach. They argue that case studies have the 
potential to ‘offer fruitful insights into both the design and use’ of management control 
practices in the context of healthcare ‘as they permit answers to be sought to explain 
questions as to why and how particular management control phenomena are observed’.  
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Table 4.1:  Research Approaches within Management Control Studies  
 Editorial 
Review 
(2001) 
Chenhall and 
Smith (2011) 
Editorial 
Review 
(2010) 
Chenhall and 
Smith (2011) 
Journals 
 
 
MAR AAAJ, 
AOS, AF, 
BRIA CAR, 
JAE, JAR, 
JMAR, 
MAR TAR 
MAR AAAJ, AOS, 
AF, BRIA 
CAR, JAE, 
JAR, 
JMAR, 
MAR TAR 
Time period 1990 -1999 1990-1999 2000-2009  2000-2009  
Number of papers 178 78 196 121 
Analytical: mathematical 13% 1% 30% 0% 
Analytical: discussion 14% 5% 11% 2% 
Behavioural experiments 4% 13% 2% 10% 
Case studies 24% 14% 40% 37% 
Other field studies  15% 1% 8% 0% 
Surveys 15% 45% 4% 31% 
Financial  analysis 1% 0% 2% 0% 
Historical/archival analysis 6% 1% 1% 2% 
Literature review 8% 15% 1% 12% 
Multiple methods 0% 5% 0% 6% 
 100% 100% 100% 100% 
MAR = Management Accounting Research, AOS = Accounting, Organizations and Society, TAR = 
The Accounting Review, CAR = Contemporary Accounting Research, JAE = Journal of Accounting 
and Economics, JAR = Journal of Accounting Research, JMAR = Journal of Management 
Accounting Research, and EAR = European Accounting Review. 
Source: Editorial Review (2010);  Chenhall and Smith (2011)  
4.3.2 Research Approach Selected for the Current Study  
The management of healthcare expenditure needs to become more efficient. Otherwise 
healthcare demands will undermine public finances. The recent economic crisis and its 
impact on fiscal budgets have heightened pressure and made the issue more urgent (Section 
3.1.1).  With this in mind, the research objective of the study was to explore the operation of 
management control practices in a healthcare context during an economic and fiscal crisis. 
To achieve this, the Irish hospital sector was selected as an appropriate setting (Section 1.3). 
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As little was known about management control practices in an Irish hospital context, a 
preliminary phase of investigation was conducted. Utilising Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) 
Performance Management Control framework, the preliminary phase of the study aimed to 
develop an understanding of the type of management control practices that were operational 
in the research context being studied and to acquire a broad understanding of the factors 
influencing the operation of these practices.  These objectives were achieved by exploring 
the perceptions, thoughts and encounters of four individuals at distinct hierarchical levels in 
a large, acute, public teaching hospital (Sections 4.3.4 and 4.3.5). The preliminary phase 
provided valuable insights into the operation of management control practices in the Irish 
hospital sector and a number of issues that could be further explored were highlighted 
(Section 5.1). 
 
Following the preliminary investigation, consideration was provided to each of the research 
approaches applied in the management control research.  Particular attention was given to 
the merits of conducting a cross-sectional quantitative survey. However, following careful 
reflection and analysis of the preliminary findings, the decision was made that the most 
appropriate means of conducting further investigation was to use a qualitative case- study 
based research approach. A number of factors informed this decision. Firstly, the preliminary 
phase highlighted particular issues that could not be further explained through quantitative 
investigation, as the issues lacked adequate understanding and definition. Secondly, it was 
believed that undertaking an in-depth qualitative enquiry would provide a better 
understanding of the key issues that had emerged from the preliminary phase of the research, 
as well as allowing new issues to emerge. Finally, most management accounting research 
that has investigated the operation of management control practices has used cross-sectional 
survey research methods. Hartmann (2000, p. 478) argues that, while the cross-sectional 
research method is well documented in the methodological literature, its use in research 
seeking to explore attitudes and responses associated with the operation of management 
control practices ‘often does not seem the outcome of a deliberate choice, but rather a result 
of mere conservatism’. Moreover, as discussed earlier in Section 4.3, the existing 
management accounting studies in healthcare have, in the main, employed quantitative 
survey-based research methods and it has been suggested that there is, therefore, a need to 
use additional qualitative evidence to explore the operation of management control practices 
in a healthcare context (Abernethy and Stoelwinder, 1990; Abernethy et al, 2006).  For these 
reasons, the researcher was convinced that the case-based research approach was both 
sufficiently powerful and flexible to allow the researcher to make a significant contribution. 
While it was certainly accepted that there was a place for other research approaches, on 
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balance it was believed that a case based research approach would best address the research 
objective of the study. Furthermore, it was concluded that the concerns associated with this 
approach could be minimised by developing a robust research design.  
4.3.3 Merits of Case Study Research  
Case studies, as a key pillar of research design, offer a number of benefits that have 
relevance to this study. Firstly, this approach has the potential to provide a holistic 
perspective on the phenomenon under investigation, thus enabling the development of a rich 
description of events and leading to a greater understanding of them (Otley and Berry, 1994). 
Secondly, it facilitates the gathering of data from a number of different sources within the 
same case organisation, thus allowing the researcher to analyse corroboratory and 
contradictory evidence as it is presented (Yin, 2009). Thirdly, it offers the opportunity to step 
backward and forward, for example, refining the research objectives(s) and/or collecting 
additional evidence (Ryan et al, 2002). Fourthly, case studies have the potential to lend 
themselves to early, exploratory investigations where the variables are still unknown and the 
phenomenon is not fully understood (Cooper and Morgan, 2008). Finally, case studies allow 
much more meaningful research questions to be posed concerning ‘how’ and ‘why’, rather 
than just ‘what’ and ‘how’, which may be answered based on a fuller understanding of the 
nature and complexity of the complete phenomenon (Merchant and Van der Stede, 2006). 
 4.3.4 Challenges of Case Study Research   
Despite their usefulness, case studies have often been criticised. For example, they have been 
challenged on the specific bases of lack of scientific rigour, poor implementation, the scope 
for bias and limited scope for generalisation and, more generally, the approach has been 
condemned as a time-consuming activity that produces voluminous, illegible documents 
(Bryman, 2004; Yin, 2009). Scapens (1990) suggests three common problem areas of case 
research: 1) the challenge of mapping the perimeter of the case in terms of the number of 
cases, or in a longitudinal sense; 2) the potential for bias through the presence of the 
researcher; and 3) the principles of the researcher, for example, confidentiality issues inside 
and outside the research setting. In this study, it was, therefore, considered important to 
minimise these potential drawbacks through the development of a robust research design.  
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4.3.5 Summary  
This section described the process of selecting an appropriate research approach. 
Consideration was given to the research approaches applied in the management control 
research as well as the research objective of this study prior to a case-based approach being 
selected.  
4.4 Research Design 
4.4.0 Introduction 
‘A research design is the logic that links the data to be collected and the conclusions to be 
drawn to the initial objective of a study’ (Yin, 2009, p. 18). The purpose of this section is to 
elucidate and justify the research design employed. Consideration is given to the merits and 
inherent limitations associated with the various research methods employed. In addition, 
related issues such as site selection and access are discussed. Finally, this section highlights 
the most important data collection and analysis issues of the study.  
4.4.1 Case Study Design 
A key aim when undertaking case-study research is the matching of the research objective 
and the study design. Marshall and Rossman (1999) outline four possible research purposes 
for a given study (i.e. exploratory, explanatory, predictive and descriptive) and suggest the 
most appropriate research design for each type.  As little was known about the operation of 
management control practices in a healthcare context, the researcher decided that the 
research objective would be best addressed by conducting an exploratory case study.  
 
A further fundamental decision, in terms of case-study research design, is whether to adopt a 
single or multiple-case based approach. The decision was made after careful deliberation. 
Eisenhardt (1989, p. 545) advocates that multiple case sites are required and that, where 
fewer than four case sites are used, both the theory emerging and the empirical findings may 
be ‘unconvincing’. In contrast, Dyer and Wilkins (1991, p. 614) argue that ‘it is the careful 
study of a single case that leads researchers to seek new theoretical relationships and 
question old ones’. An alternative perspective is proposed by Yin (2009, p. 42), who 
suggests that there are five circumstances in which the adoption of a single case study could 
be considered a robust research design. These are presented in Table 4.2 below. 
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Table 4.2: Rationale for Single-Case Design 
Critical case Where the single case represents a critical case within which to 
test a well-formulated theory and to confirm that this theory is 
either correct or can be the subject of alternative explanations. 
Extreme case Where the single case is either a unique or extreme case and hence 
no patterns are able to be established. 
Representative case Where the case is a representative or typical case and where the 
aim is to capture the conditions of a situation and hence to be 
informed about the experiences of the average organisation or 
individuals within it. 
Revelatory case Where the case is a revelatory case in that the phenomenon has 
been previously inaccessible to study. 
Longitudinal case Where the case is worthy of longitudinal study through 
examination at two or more different stages/points in time. 
Source: Yin (2009, p. 42)  
 
In relation to this study, the justification for the adoption of a single-case research design 
was that the case organisation would be revelatory in that the phenomenon has not been 
previously studied. Prior studies of the Irish hospital setting were conducted prior to the 
implementation of the Health Service Reform Programme (2003) and the establishment of 
the HSE. Consequently, the study was considered exploratory and revelatory in nature.   
 
A final decision in defining the design for the case study is to determine the level of analysis. 
Yin (2009, p. 14) distinguishes between holistic and embedded cases; a holistic case 
investigates the phenomena from a global perspective, while an embedded case investigates 
multiple units of analysis.  Of particular importance to this study is an argument by Ryan et 
al, (2002) that, if management accounting researchers want to exploit the full potential of 
case-study methods to understand the nature of accounting, they must be prepared to study 
accounting practices at various levels within the organisation and the relationships between 
various groups of managers. The implication of this argument for management accounting 
research is that case studies should explore the day-to-day accounting practices of real 
people and attempt to study the context in which they work. As this study sought to examine 
the operation of management control practices at various organisational levels, it is argued 
that this case has an embedded nature, with multiple levels of analysis. Therefore, the case-
study research design can be characterised as an exploratory, revelatory, single-case study 
with embedded units of analysis. 
4.4.2 Case Site Selection  
Hospital services in Ireland are delivered in both public and private hospitals. There are 48 
public hospitals in Ireland, 34 of which are owned and operated by the HSE, with the 
remainder being voluntary hospitals providing hospital services to the HSE under service-
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level agreements (Section 3.1.3.3). Given the researcher’s aim of examining the operation of 
the management control practices in public hospitals, the potential sample was, therefore, 34. 
However, it was anticipated that a sample comprising only the larger, multifaceted hospitals, 
which deliver a diverse range of hospital services, would best address the study’s research 
objective. Accordingly, a potential sample of eight hospitals was complied. The selection 
was based upon the HSE’s classification of ‘Teaching’ (eight hospitals), ‘Non-Teaching’ (21 
hospitals), ‘Paediatric’ (two hospitals) and Maternity (three hospitals) (Section 3.3.3.4). On 
this basis, it was concluded that each or all of the eight teaching hospitals had the potential to 
inform the empirical investigation. However, as set out in Section 4.3, a single-case based 
study was determined to be the most appropriate research approach.  
 
By its very nature, case-study research cannot be effectively conducted without adequate 
organisational co-operation. Ferreira and Merchant (1992, p. 19) suggest that, with an 
effective ‘sales pitch’ and the use of as many contacts as possible that can facilitate access, 
case-study researchers can expect a success rate of 50 per cent. This means that a researcher 
needs to contact two organisations to have the expectation of securing the co-operation of 
one. On this recommendation, the researcher selected two of the eight teaching hospitals.  
Chua (1996, p. 221) suggests that researchers should seek approval ‘as high up the 
organisational hierarchy as possible’ to minimise future access restrictions, while being 
mindful that the researcher is not viewed as an undercover detective hence undermining 
trust. In the first hospital, a document outlining its organisational structure was obtained 
from a general administrator within it by means of a phone call. In view of Chua’s (1996) 
guidance, and based on an examination of this document, an email was then sent to the 
Finance Manager outlining the overall scope of the research and requesting an opportunity to 
have an informal discussion in respect of it. Subsequently, a follow-up phone call was also 
made and a meeting was arranged with both the Finance Manager and his superior, the 
Financial Controller. Both individuals were supportive of the research study, providing 
valuable insights that contributed to the researcher’s understanding of the healthcare context. 
However, the interviewees did not have the authority to grant approval of the study and so 
referred the researcher to the Hospital’s Managing Director who, unfortunately, was leaving 
his current role to move to a HSE role and the researcher was unsuccessful in her attempts to 
gain access to the incoming Managing Director. 
 
With regard to the second hospital, the organisational structure was once more assessed to 
select an appropriate initial contact. A phone call was also made to a personal contact to 
establish who in the organisation may be predisposed to engage with the research study. The 
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same email used previously was sent to the organisation’s Deputy General Manager and, in a 
follow-up phone call, arrangements were made for an informal meeting, during which the 
researcher outlined the overall scope of the research and explained its requirements. The 
Deputy General Manager then granted approval for the study to be conducted. In the 
following weeks, this was confirmed formally by a written letter. The Deputy General 
Manager consequently became a ‘gatekeeper’ of the research process, described by Burgress 
(2002, p. 48) as ‘those individuals who control and have power to grant access within the 
research context’.  The study’s research design was also approved by the Dublin City 
University Research Ethics Committee. 
4.4.3 Case Organisation  
The case organisation, Woodford, is a large, acute, publicly-funded, teaching hospital in 
Ireland. Woodford is pseudonym used for confidentiality reasons. The Hospital serves the 
local population but also acts as a regional centre for a range of medical and surgical 
specialisations. The population served by Woodford has increased dramatically over the past 
two decades with the latest census data showing it to have grown by 31 per cent during the 
period 1981 to 2011. Furthermore, the number of people over the age of 65 in the region has 
increased by 43 per cent (Central Statistics Office, 2014). Accordingly, the intensity of 
demand for hospital services within the region has increased in recent years. Woodford has 
760 beds, of which 685 are inpatient beds and 75 are day-beds. The Hospital currently 
employs 3,660 staff of which 68 per cent are employed in its clinical services and 32 per cent 
work in support services. In relation to the latter, 41 per cent of support-service staff work in 
management and administrative roles. Woodford is also affiliated with a medical school in 
Ireland as a teaching hospital and is part of the national medical rotation training scheme.   
 
The need for a robust strategic planning process that results in the formulation of a clear 
organisational mission was articulated as an important prerequisite for the successful 
operation of management control practices in Section 2.1.3.  Woodford’s mission statement, 
delineated in its Service Plan (2011), was stated as follows: ‘to provide high quality care for 
those we service with a focus on clinical excellence, patient safety and continuous 
improvement through clinical education and research’. This mission was reinforced by a 
vision statement, which articulated the following four organisational goals:  
 
- Woodford Hospital will strive to value its expertise in the provision of quality acute 
healthcare services and to have a positive impact on the lives of those it encounters.  
- We aim to build a work environment where each person is valued and respected. 
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- We aim to continue our focus on education through building on the formal affiliations with 
educational institutions, facilitating learning and continuous performance improvement 
within the organisation. 
- We will promote active participation in research and innovation, leading to improved 
health outcomes for patients. 
                                                                                            Woodford Service Plan (2011, p. 6) 
 
Significantly, the vision statement focuses on issues of enhancing healthcare delivery, the 
work environment and the development of the Hospital’s teaching and research programmes. 
In contrast with the HSE’s vision statement (discussed in Section 3.1.3.1), reference is not 
made to issues of equality, accountability or the co-ordination of services.  
 
An examination of the organisational arrangement revealed that the Hospital has three core 
management levels: ‘Woodford Management’ (WM), ‘Senior Management’ (SM) and 
‘Clinician Management’ (CM). There are three members of WM at the Hospital: a CEO, a 
Director of Nursing and a Clinician Director. At the next level down in the organisational 
structure, there are seven members of SM including an Operations Manager, a Director of 
Midwifery, a Business Manager Representative, an Information Technology Manager, a 
Human Resource Manager, a Medical Manpower Manager and a Finance Manager. The 
purpose of SM is to report to WM on matters of finance, service delivery, human resources, 
information technology and hospital quality programmes.SM is supported by a Service 
Management Group (SMG) and a Support Service Board (SSB). The SMG consists of 
managers of support and clinical services and provides a forum for review of issues relating 
to clinical practice or hospital management that are of common concern. The SSB comprises 
managers from a range of support services, which provide care and support to patients. The 
main function of the SSB is to provide a forum for members to share information and seek 
input or advice from other disciplines or functions in relation to developments in their own 
disciplines and to co-ordinate inputs from individual units into the annual service plan. CM 
in the organisation is categorised into 15 CM divisions. The divisions are based on grouping 
specialisations with their related service and resource requirements. Each CM division is 
comprised of three members: a Division Chair (DC), a Business Manager (BM) and a Nurse 
Service Manager (NSM). The DC is appointed by the CEO for a term of two years.  
Nominations for appointment as DC are made from within the divisions. The DC is 
accountable to WM.  
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An important adjustment was made to the organisational arrangements during the study 
period. A Cost Containment Board (CCB) was established to monitor and track budget 
control in 2012. The CCB had five members: the CEO, the Director of Nursing, a Clinical 
Director, the Finance Manager and the Operations Manager.  In order to facilitate the 
discussion of the interview findings, in subsequent chapters, Woodford Management 
(acronym ‘WM’) will be used to describe the five members of the CCB. The circumstances 
and outcomes associated with the establishment of the CCB will be discussed in Section 
6.1.1. 
4.4.4 Conducting the Interviews 
Interviews generally fall into one of three established categories: structured, semi-structured 
and unstructured (Yin, 2009). Structured interviews require that similar questions are asked 
of different people and that comparable information is obtained. In contrast, the semi-
structured interview allows the researcher flexibility to pursue new themes as they arise and 
thereby explore emerging lines of enquiry. Furthermore, in the semi-structured interview, the 
researcher has a broad framework on which to base the questions asked, meaning that similar 
issues are discussed with a number of different people but there remains sufficient flexibility 
to explore the issues in depth and to ask follow-up questions tailored to the responses given 
by particular interviewees. Finally, unstructured interviews are informal and are used to 
conduct a deep exploration of an area of interest. Semi-structured interviews were considered 
the most appropriate form of interview for this study because they allowed the researcher to 
probe the meaning attached by interviewees to control issues and to explore how these issues 
influenced the operation of management control practices. This supported the study’s overall 
research aim of exploring how management control practices operate in a healthcare context 
during an economic and fiscal crisis. 
 
Patton (2002) outlines a number of benefits associated with the interview research method. 
He suggests that interviews allow issues to be examined in depth without predetermining 
categories of responses. This method also allows the interviewer to develop a rapport with 
the interviewee and can encourage them to describe and reflect on personal experiences. 
Furthermore, Patton (2002) suggests that interviews allow complex topics to be addressed 
and greater control over the presentation of questions, thereby providing more opportunities 
for in-depth probing of issues while facilitating the observation of the interviewee and his or 
her emotional reactions. A further benefit of the interview method is that it allows the 
interviewer to seek clarification on, and engage more deeply with, issues that arise during the 
discourse. However, in selecting the interview as an appropriate research method, the 
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researcher was also cognisant of its limitations. Becker and Geer (1957) identify three 
limitations associated with the interview as a research method. Essentially, these aspects 
arise from the fact that the interviewee gives an account of actions that occurred elsewhere in 
time and space. In this context, the first issue is that the interviewer may not fully understand 
the language that is specific to the particular field under examination. This factor was 
particular relevant in the current study as the connotations of certain healthcare terms were 
not immediately apparent to the researcher. Secondly, for a variety of reasons the 
interviewee may omit important details. This may be due to a difficulty in expressing certain 
issues or because they appear to the interviewee to be impolite, insensitive or inappropriate. 
Thirdly, an interviewee may have a distorted perception of a situation and, hence, provide an 
account that is misleading yet is not open to checking or verification. With these limitations 
in mind and maintaining an awareness of the potential problems that could arise, the 
researcher made every effort to mitigate the effects of these factors when conducting the 
interviews.  
 
As delineated earlier, the Irish hospital sector was selected as an appropriate setting in which 
to explore the operation of management control practices during an economic and fiscal 
crisis. As little was known about management control in an Irish hospital context, a 
preliminary phase of investigation was conducted. Utilising Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) 
Performance Management Control framework, the preliminary phase of the study aimed to 
develop an understanding of the type of management control practices that were operational 
in the research context being studied and to acquire a broad understanding of the factors 
influencing the operation of these practices. An interview guide informed by the 
Performance Management and Control framework of Ferreira and Otley (2009) was created 
in advance of conducting the preliminary interviews. The primary areas covered in the 
interview guide used in the preliminary phase are set out below: 
 
- Background information: e.g. job title, responsibilities and organisational position.  
- Management control practices in general: what management control practices are used and 
how these practices are generated, adapted and communicated. 
- Design attributes of goals to achieve: e.g. vision and mission, key success factors, key 
performance indicators and target setting.  
- Design attributes of means used: e.g. organisational structure, strategies and plans and 
performance evaluation and reward systems. 
- Factors influencing the use of management control practices: identifying the strengths, 
changes or adaptations that should be made to the management control practices.  
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- Consequences of management control practices: the rewards (financial or non-financial) 
for achieving or penalties for failing to achieve performance targets. 
- Flow of management control information: information flow up and down the organisation. 
- External influences on management control practices: exploration of changes to 
management control practices as a result of any external factors or influences.  
- Management control practice linkages: discussion of how strong and coherent the links are 
between the different management control practices.  
 
A copy of the full interview guide used in the preliminary phase is included in Appendix B.  
 
These preliminary interviews proved to be a critical phase of the study. From a research 
design perspective, careful analysis of and reflection on the preliminary findings, combined 
with a critical review of the empirical literature helped to shape the design of the main phase 
of empirical work. With respect to conducting the interviews in the main phase, the 
questions posed emerged primarily from the analysis of data gathered in the preliminary 
phase of the study, as well as from existing research. Consequently, the researcher returned 
to the case site with an interview guide designed with due consideration of both the prior 
literature and the context of the study itself.  The major areas covered in the interview guide 
used in the main phase of the empirical investigation included:  
 
- Background information: e.g. Length of time working in the Irish hospital sector, length of 
time working in Woodford Hospital, length of time in current position and brief 
description of training and educational background.  
- Individual involvement: e.g. Nature of involvement with management control practices, 
job activities requiring involvement with management control practices and extent and 
purpose of involvement with management control practices.  
- Individual factors affecting involvement: e.g. professional orientation, personality, 
participation, training and education and other individual issues having an impact on 
involvement. 
- Organisational factors affecting involvement: e.g. the HSE, communication processes and 
other organisational issues influencing involvement. 
- External factors: political interference, environmental uncertainty and other external issues 
affecting involvement. 
- Management control factors: e.g. target setting, task uncertainty, performance evaluation 
and other issues associated with the control practices that have an impact on involvement. 
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- Improve involvement: measures that could be implemented to improve involvement with 
management control practices. 
- Decision making: changes in the decision-making process associated with the operation of 
management control practices.  
- Behaviour: changes in behaviour associated with the operation of management control 
practices. 
 
A copy of the full interview guide used in the main phase is included in Appendix C.  
 
It is important to note that the interview guides employed in both phases of the empirical 
investigation were adapted to meet the needs of each individual interviewee’s areas of 
responsibility. Furthermore, the interview guides were used in a flexible manner in order to 
allow emerging issues to be explored and illustrations to be provided. The researcher’s 
approach to the interviews was naturalistic in orientation and efforts were made to ensure 
interviewees felt comfortable and free to discuss the issues openly. In this regard, at the 
beginning of each interview the researcher briefly explained her background and outlined the 
research objectives of the study. The interviewees were also reassured that, while the case 
organisation was facilitating the study, it was an independent research project. The 
researcher was particularly careful to help participants to feel comfortable when discussing 
their concerns about the operation of management control practices. The researcher also 
brought a copy of the Hospital’s Service Plan and a HealthStat Report to each interview as a 
reference aid in the main phase of the study.   
 
In terms of obtaining consent from individuals, the researcher contacted both Woodford and 
Senior Management on an individual basis via email and a follow-up phone call if necessary. 
For Clinician Management, the researcher contacted and interviewed the Business Managers 
of the respective Clinician Divisions initially and sought their assistance in gaining access to 
the selected clinicians in their division. The preliminary-phase interviews took place between 
February and May 2011. The main-phase interviews took place between mid-July and mid-
October 2012. Each interview, on average, lasted between 50 and 60 minutes. The location 
of the interviews varied but the majority took place at the offices of the participants. The 
interview with the Senior Consultant in the Emergency Division took place in a patient 
waiting area and that with the Chair of Cardiac Division was conducted in the corridor 
outside of an operating theatre. In the latter case, the individual’s daily schedule was running 
late and the interview was conducted while a patient was being prepared for surgery. 
Permission was granted for the recording of all interviews. During each interview, additional 
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notes were taken to record aspects such as setting, body language and the rapport existing 
between the interviewer and interviewee.  Immediately after each interview, the quality of 
the data collected was reviewed. Each audio file was checked to ensure that the interview has 
been properly recorded. In addition, notes taken during the interview were reviewed to 
ensure that they would be fully comprehensible to the researcher at a later point in the 
research process. A research diary was also kept to reflect the researcher’s thoughts and 
feelings about the organisation and issues raised during each visit. 
4.4.5 Selection of Interviewees 
The objective of the interviews was to enrich understanding with regard to the operation of 
management control practices in a healthcare context during an economic and fiscal crisis. 
Consequently, a purposive sampling approach was adopted. Patton (2005, p. 91) defines 
purposive sampling as ‘the process of identifying a population of interest and developing a 
systematic way of selecting individuals that is not based on advanced knowledge of how the 
outcomes would appear’.  This approach was considered appropriate as the purpose of the 
interviews was to gain a sense of how the management control practices had evolved into 
their current form and no attempt will be made to generalise the findings of these interviews. 
In addition, the selection of participants interviewed was informed by Ferreira and Otley’s 
(2009) suggestion that the full use of their Performance Management and Control framework 
requires participants at various hierarchical levels to be interviewed. They argue that, to gain 
a full understanding of the overall effects of a management control system, it is necessary to 
gather evidence about the patterns of usage and behaviour at each level so as to understand 
the overall effects of the management control system. Furthermore, the researcher believed 
that exploring the operation of management control practices at various hierarchal levels 
would make a valuable contribution to the existing literature, which has tended to adopt a 
narrow focus, whereby the management control literature concentrates on top-management 
usage, while the management accounting in healthcare literature has directed its attention 
towards clinician management.  
 
As highlighted in Section 4.3.3, Woodford has three core management levels: ‘WM’, ‘SM 
‘Woodford Management’, ‘Senior Management and ‘Clinician Management’.  At the 
Woodford Management level, interviews were conducted with five individuals: the CEO, the 
Director of Nursing, the Clinical Director, the Finance Manager and the Operations 
Manager. At the Senior Management level, interviews were conducted with five individuals: 
the Services Manager, the Support Services Manager, the Deputy General Manager, the Bed 
Manager and the Business Manager to the Clinical Director. One individual at the Service 
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Manager Group level (the Bed Manager) was highlighted as being of specific relevance to 
this study. At the Clinician Management level, the 15 clinical divisions were examined, from 
which the three selected were: Cardiac Services, Emergency Services and Oncology. The 
researcher felt that the selection of three clinical divisions would balance the need for an in-
depth enquiry into each clinical division with the need for meaningful comparative analysis, 
while also being mindful of resource constraints. Within each of the clinical divisions, four 
roles were targeted: (i) Chair; (ii) Business Manager; (iii) Nurse Service Manager; and (iv) 
Senior Consultant. Consequently, in terms of sample size, the researcher conducted 24 
interviews across three management groups. Table 4.3 sets out the details of the individuals 
interviewed in the study. 
 
In order to facilitate the discussion of the interviews in subsequent chapters, a lettering 
system will be used. For Woodford Management, the acronym ‘WM’ is used. For Senior 
Management, the acronym ‘SM’ is used. Finally, as three Clinician Divisions were involved, 
a double lettering system is also used to differentiate between them. The first letter indicates 
in which of the three Clinician Divisions the interviewee is located (e.g. ‘E’ for the 
Emergency Division, ‘O’ for the Oncology Division and ‘C’ for the Cardiac Division. 
Secondly, an acronym is used to allow the findings to differentiate between the four roles in 
each of the three Clinician Divisions: ‘BM’ indicates the interviewee is a Business Manager; 
‘Consul’ denotes a Consultant; ‘NSM’ denotes a Nurse Service Manager and ‘Chair’ 
indicates the interviewee is the Chair of the Clinician Division. Thus, for example, ‘CNSM’ 
is a Nurse Service Manager in the Cardiac Clinician Division.  
4.4.6 Organisational Documentation  
Documentary evidence is a common component of qualitative enquiry and provides a rich 
source of insight into the interactions and communications occurring between individuals 
and groups at all levels in an organisation (Bryman and Bell, 2015). One of the most 
important functions of documentary evidence is to corroborate and strengthen other data 
sources (Yin, 2009). In this study, organisational documentation was used in both the 
preliminary and main phases of the study in order to gain an understanding of how 
management control practices had been designed and implemented in the case organisation. 
Furthermore, organisational documents were used to build up a description of the 
organisation and its history (Bryman and Bell, 2015). Finally, organisational documentation 
was used in order to elicit greater detail and depth during the interviews and when probing 
interviewee responses.  
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Table 4.3: Interview Sample Details 
 Date Ref 
Woodford Management 
Chief Executive Officer  * 02/02/2011 WM1 
Director of Nursing  01/10/2012 WM2 
Clinical Director  03/10/2012 WM3 
Finance Manager  10/07/2012 WM4 
Operations Manager  20/07/2012 WM5 
Senior Management   
Deputy General Manager * 21/04/2011 SM1 
Services Manager  11/07/2012 SM2 
IT Manager  17/07/2012 SM3 
Support Services Manger  21/07/2012 SM4 
Business Manager to Clinical Director  10/08/2012 SM5 
Service Management Group 
Bed Manager * 14/05/2011 SMG1 
Clinician Management - Oncology Division  
Chair of Oncology Unit  28/08/2012 OChair 
Nurse Service Manager in Oncology Unit 18/09/2012 ONSM 
Business Manager in Oncology Unit  26/08/2012 OBM 
Senior Consultant in Oncology Unit  12/10/2012 OConsul 
Clinician Management - Cardiac Division  
Chair of Cardiac Unit  02/09/2012 CChair 
Nurse Service Manager in Cardiac Unit ** 21/05/2011 
05/09/2012 
CNSM 
Business Manager in Cardiac Unit  28/08/2012 CBM 
Senior Consultant in Cardiac Unit  20/08/2012 CConsul 
Clinician Management - Emergency Division  
Chair of Emergency Unit  05/10/2012 EChair 
Nurse Service Manager in Emergency Unit 21/08/2012 ENSM 
Business Manager in Emergency Unit  15/07/2012 EBM 
Senior Consultant in Emergency Unit 05/10/2012 EConsul 
* Individuals who participated in the preliminary phase  
** Individual who participated in the preliminary and main phase 
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4.4.7 Archival Data  
Archival data was also used to develop a complete understanding of the case context. Moers 
(2007, p. 400) defines archival data as ‘data for which the original purpose for gathering it 
was not academic research’. According to Hageman (2008), archival records perform an 
important function in enhancing a research study through the triangulation of evidence 
collected within the overall research context. It should be noted that Hageman (2008) 
cautions that the use of archival records alone limits a researcher’s understanding of a 
phenomenon but that triangulating this method using other qualitative research methods 
leads to a more profound and nuanced insight into the topic of study. In this study, 
triangulation was achieved by using archival records in conjunction with organisational 
documentation and interviews. Yin (2009) recommends the use of a case study database. 
The researcher maintained a database of all case study documentation. The content of the 
case study database, is detailed in Appendix D. 
4.4.8 Data Analysis 
The analysis of evidence has been identified as the most complex element of case-study 
research (Miles and Huberman, 1994) both because of the significant amount of data 
generated at the collection stage and as a result of its descriptive, narrative-based nature.  
Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 26) describe qualitative data as an ‘attractive nuisance’ 
because of the appeal of its richness but the simultaneous difficulty of finding clear analytic 
paths to interpret it. The objective of the analysis was the same in both phases of the study 
and sought to interpret and gain insight, creating a coherent, credible narrative. The 
transcripts of the recordings were typed and then read and re-read, with initial notes made in 
a wide right-hand margin on the transcript. The interviews were also listened to repeatedly 
and interview notes and summaries were continuously consulted and judgments noted.   
 
The process of data reduction commenced after initial reflections had been made and 
involved data coding. Coding required reducing the data by assigning signposts and flags to 
extracts of text that could be used to illuminate aspects of interest in terms of the research 
objectives and which could also be used to illustrate themes when presenting the research 
findings. Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 56) define a code as ‘tags or labels for assigning 
units of meaning to the descriptive or inferential information compiled during a study. Codes 
are usually attached to [chunks] of varying size - words, phrases, sentences or whole 
paragraphs’. The coding process used in this study was guided by the Template Analysis 
approach. This approach to data analysis emerged in America in the 1990s and gained 
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credibility in the UK through the work of King (2012) in the health and sociology fields. 
King (2012) argues that, although Template Analysis makes use of codes, it is not as 
unfastened as Grounded Theory or as prescriptive as Content Analysis. In Content Analysis, 
codes are pre-determined prior to data analysis, whereas there is no consideration of codes 
before the data is reviewed in Grounded Theory. King (2012) suggests that Template 
Analysis lies between these two extreme positions. In addition, he proposes that Template 
Analysis can be used within a range of epistemological positions and thus can be useful to a 
large number of researchers. Thus, based on the management control and healthcare 
literature, the researcher was cognisant of possible themes or codes that may apply to the 
context but was also open to new themes and codes emerging from the interviews. The data 
from the preliminary phase was coded manually and extracted for presentation in a tabular 
format in a Word document. In contrast, after completing the initial analysis of the 
transcripts in the main phase, these transcripts were imported into Nvivo10® for coding 
purposes. The lists of codes developed during this stage of the data analysis are presented in 
Appendix D.  
4.4.9 Reliability and Validity  
It is essential to ensure that the findings from an empirical investigation are deemed credible 
and rigorous. Silverman (2013) states that important concepts relevant to the credibility of 
research findings are reliability and validity. Validity addresses whether the research 
explains that which the researcher set out to explain or understand (Punch, 2005); it is often 
categorised as internal or external validity. Internal validity relates to the establishment of 
causal relationships in the research findings between events and conditions and looks at the 
degree to which those findings accurately map the phenomenon in question. External 
validity, on the other hand, relates to the extent to which the study’s findings are 
generalisable. The concepts of reliability and validity have their roots in the positivistic 
perspective, which underpins the quantitative approach in the natural sciences. Many 
qualitative researchers have, however, preferred to use different terminology to distance 
themselves from this perspective.  
 
One such researcher, Golafshani (2003, p. 397 - 444), contends that it is inappropriate to 
evaluate the research process and findings of qualitative studies using conventional measures 
employed within the quantitative approach. Instead, he argues that the credibility of 
qualitative studies should be reviewed by considering the issues of ‘credibility, 
transferability, dependability and conformability’. Credibility may be achieved by ‘member 
checking’, which involves the researcher presenting the findings to the interviewees for 
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verification purposes. Transferability may be achieved through capturing the richness in 
describing the contextual situation or circumstances in order to permit transferability 
judgements to be made by others who may wish to apply the study to their own context. 
Dependability involves ensuring that the qualitative process and the judgments made during 
it are amenable to audit by external reviewers. Conformability is attained through ensuring 
that ‘data can be tracked to their sources and that the logic used to assemble the 
interpretations into structurally coherent and corroborating wholes is both explicit and 
implicit in the narrative of the case study’. It is imperative that these issues are considered 
when designing, conducting, analysing and communicating the findings of qualitative 
research studies. Therefore, as the researcher was cognisant of the challenges inherent in 
establishing the reliability and validity of an empirical study, the following measures were 
employed in this study:    
 
- Tactics to ensure honesty of interviewees: It was ensured that interviewees participating in 
the study understood its objectives and purpose. They were also encouraged to be frank 
from the outset and the researcher established a rapport in the opening moments by 
indicating that there were no right answers to the questions posed. In addition, the 
independent status of the researcher was emphasised. 
 
- Triangulation: Supporting data were obtained from documents, where possible, to provide 
a background to and help explain the attitudes and perceptions of the individuals in 
question, as well as to verify details that interviewees had supplied. Furthermore, the 
individual viewpoints and experiences shared were discussed with other individuals in 
order to construct a more holistic understanding of the context. 
 
- Debriefing sessions: Frequent debriefing sessions between the researcher and the study’s 
supervisors ensured that the vision of the researcher was broadened. Furthermore, these 
provided a sounding board for the researcher to test developing ideas and interpretations.  
 
- Reflective commentary: Maintaining a research journal allowed the researcher to reflect on 
the effectiveness of the techniques employed. This was also used to record the researcher’s 
initial impressions of each data collection session, the patterns appearing to emerge in the 
data collected and the theories generated.  
 
  
103 
 
- Data checks: The recording of all interviews, as permitted by interviewees, ensured that the 
expression of views was accurately captured.  
4.4.10 Summary 
Ferreira and Merchant (1992, p. 21) contend that ‘a common issue in case-based 
management control research is an excessive focus on the conclusions, which causes a 
failure to adequately describe the research method used or the data on which the conclusions 
are based’. They argue that such descriptions are necessary to provide the reader with a basis 
on which to assess whether the researcher understood the territory being studied and whether 
he or she studied the case site in sufficient depth. The purpose of this section was, therefore, 
to outline the research design employed in this study. 
4.5 Conclusion  
This chapter set out each of the study’s objectives and the philosophical assumptions that 
underpin the study as a whole. In addition, the research approach and methods selected were 
discussed. Finally, it presented an overview of the study’s research design. In this way, the 
chapter demonstrated that, in the objectives and overall design of this study, a rigorous 
approach has been adopted that responds to calls made in the management control and 
management accounting in healthcare literature. The next chapter presents the findings from 
the preliminary phase of the empirical study.  
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CHAPTER 5: THE PRELIMINARY PHASE OF THE EMPIRICAL 
STUDY 
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5.0 Introduction  
The purpose of Chapter 5 is to provide a brief synopsis of the key issues that emerged in the 
preliminary phase of the study and shaped the design and focus of the main phase of the 
empirical work, which will be presented in the following chapter. 
5.1 The Management Control Context   
5.1.0 Introduction 
The preliminary phase of the empirical study aimed to develop an understanding of the type 
of management control practices that were operational in the healthcare context being 
studied and to acquire a broad understanding of the factors influencing the operation of these 
practices.  
5.1.1 The Management Control Practices  
In order to gain an understanding of the management control practices in operation in the 
research context, organisational and archival records were utilised. As highlighted in Section 
3.1.3.2, the National Service Plan (NSP), an annual agreement between the HSE and the 
DoH for the type and volume of services to be delivered in return for the funds provided by 
Government, was a crucial element in the HSE’s annual planning and control process.  In 
order to monitor and report on the progression of an individual organisation’s (in this case 
Woodford’s) performance towards the NSP, three management control practices were found 
to be operational: (i) budget control, (ii) activity control and (iii) operational control. The 
following subsections provide a description of each management control practice.  
 
5.1.1.1 Budget Control Practice 
As set out in Section 3.1.3.4, the HSE prepares an annual budget document known as the 
Statement of Revenue Requirements. Following this process, each public hospital receives 
an annual budget grant allocation. The preliminary findings confirmed that the bulk of 
Woodford’s budget is determined on a historic basis, with modifications made for items such 
as public pay adjustments or other new developments. The findings also confirmed that the 
Casemix budget allocation practice, discussed in Section 3.1.3.4, had been operational at 
Woodford since January 2007. However, only a small proportion of Woodford’s budget 
(approximately 10 per cent) was allocated using the Casemix allocation process.  
 
Although the hospital’s budget increased significantly over the previous decade, in 2010 and 
2011 Woodford’s budget was cut by 12 per cent (36 million) and seven per cent (18 million) 
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respectively. This was a direct consequence of the economic and fiscal crisis, which caused 
annual expenditure in the Irish healthcare system to contract by over €1.85 billion (approx. 
12 per cent) in 2013 relative to 2007 (discussed in Section 3.1.3). In 2011, approximately 70 
per cent of the budget assigned was allocated to pay and 30 per cent to non-pay expenditure. 
Table 5.1 provides details of how Woodford’s budget was formulated in 2011.  
 
Table 5.1:  Budget Control Practice  
Headings: Total: €’000 
2010 Budget  
Less 2010 Adjusted Once - Offs xxx 
Add 2010 Reinstated Once - Offs  xxx 
Casemix Adjustment xxx 
Recruitment Moratorium xxx 
Drugs Cut xxx 
Agency Reduction xxx 
Procurement National Savings xxx 
Internal HSE Adjustments xxx 
Strategic Priorities xxx 
2011 Budget  xxx 
Source: Annual Service Plan (2011)   
 
5.1.1.2 Activity Control Practice 
Under the Health Act (2004), the HSE is required to prepare a strategic plan every three 
years, referred to as the Corporate Plan (discussed in Section 3.1.3.2).  In addition, each year, 
a NSP is prepared which translates the Corporate Plan into a set of Key Result Areas 
(KRAs). Simultaneously, Regional Service Plans (RSPs) are prepared by each of the four 
Regional Directors of Operations (RDOs). It was found that, during the formulation of the 
RSP, negotiations take place between Woodford and the RDO, taking into account the 
planning parameters set out in the NSP. Based on these discussions, Woodford prepares a 
Local Service Plan (LSP) that is aligned with the NSP. For example, the NSP 2011 set a 
national target of a 2 per cent reduction in inpatient activity, which was to be offset by a 3 
per cent increase in day cases. Table 5.2 outlines how this NSP target was translated into 
deliverable actions at Woodford Hospital. Activity control information was provided to the 
researcher but, for confidentiality reasons, is not provided in this thesis. 
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Table 5.2: Activity Control Practice  
 Inpatients Day cases Out Patient Days 
(OPDs) 
 2010 
Activity 
2011 
Target  
2010 
Activity 
2011 
Target  
2010 
Activity 
2011 
Target  
Woodford Hospital xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 
Cardiology xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 
Oncology xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 
Emergency xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 
 
5.1.1.3 Operational Control Practice  
A Balanced Scorecard control practice, referred to as ‘HealthStat’, was implemented by the 
HSE in 2009. From its inception, metrics were organised around three perspectives: (i) 
access, which sought to evaluate waiting times for healthcare services; (ii) integration, which 
sought to assess if service delivery was patient-centred; and (iii) resources, which sought to 
determine how resources were being used. Performance measures and targets were 
developed for each of these perspectives and are set out in Appendix E.  
 
Three types of performance targets were established. Where international targets were 
available, these were used in the first instance. If international targets were not available or 
were unrealistic, then national targets based on government policy were used. Where neither 
international nor national targets were available, a ‘best in class’ process was adopted. This 
was calculated by using the average figure derived from the top three performing hospitals 
for the performance measure. Performance was displayed by means of a ‘dashboard’, which 
was a collection of graphics illustrating the extent to which a hospital has met its targets. A 
system of ‘traffic lights’ was used as shorthand for presenting performance and these were 
assigned according to closeness to target. In this way, a green traffic light indicated that the 
performance measured was within target, an amber traffic light indicated that it was outside 
its target, and therefore of concern, and a red traffic light showed that it was significantly 
outside its target and, hence, of serious concern. These were used to generate a traffic light 
for each of the three perspectives (access, integration and resources) and, finally, for overall 
performance. The management control information acquired for HealthStat was discussed at 
a quarterly meeting referred to as the ‘HealthStat Forum’. At the Forum, the HSE was 
represented by the CEO, the Performance Management Advisor and the National Directors 
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of Finance and HR. The Hospital was represented by the Regional Director of Operations, 
the Integrated Services Director and Woodford Management. 
 
Accordingly, the preliminary findings established that budget, activity and operational 
control practices had been implemented in order to monitor and report on the progression of 
an individual organisation’s (in this case, Woodford’s) performance. As discussed in Section 
2.2.1, an appropriate degree of integration is an important characteristic influencing the 
operation of such practices. In this way, the activity control practice ought to provide a link 
between activity and expenditure and, in so doing, it should be possible to link budget and 
activity control targets by adapting the budget according to targeted / actual activity levels. 
Moreover, it should be possible to evaluate budget and operational performance ex-post, 
taking actual activity levels into account. The degree of integration among the management 
control practices will be explored in the empirical investigation. 
5.1.2 The Complexities of Woodford Hospital  
The management accounting literature relates specific features of management control 
practices to the particular contexts in which they are found (Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2). In this 
section, a brief summary of the contextual factors emerging from the preliminary interviews 
is provided.   
 
The significant role played by the HSE in the strategic management of Woodford emerged as 
an important issue. While Woodford had its own mission, vision and goals, the findings 
illustrated that Woodford Management did not determine the specific objectives and targets 
for a period; instead, these were imposed by the HSE and Woodford Management was 
charged with achieving them, as Senior Manager 1 (SM1) explained:  
 
‘We take our lead from the HSE. We report to the Integrated Service Area 
Manager who reports to the Regional Director of Operations. We have certain 
budget, service and operational targets to meet.’                                           (SM1) 
 
The SM1 expressed the view that the HSE’s role in strategy formation resulted in improved 
performance and asserted that ‘the links are much stronger under the new system than the 
old system as we all have a better understanding of where we are going and how we are 
going to get there’. In particular, she suggested that the ISD role helped to ensure better 
cooperation and coordination between the hospital and primary care services. 
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A second issue addressed in the preliminary interviews related to the difficulties of preparing 
accurate management control information due to the many complex operating processes 
involved in the provision of healthcare services and their many mutually influential 
interconnected elements. The Service Group Manager 1 (SGM1) explained that providing 
healthcare relies on the collaboration of a variety of different service providers.  For example, 
she explained that the performance of Woodford was dependent on its affiliation with 
primary care service providers in the locality. She argued that operating management control 
practices in such circumstances was cumbersome as these practices encouraged service 
providers to pursue their own performance criteria at the expense of joint outcomes. She 
commented:  
 
‘We are being traded off against each other.  There is a bottleneck. We need to get 
them out but there are no home-help hours available because there is no budget 
for it.  If they stay here, then we have someone on a trolley that needs that bed. 
Community targets are fine. Alternatively, I’m forcing them out because I’m way 
over budget.  Home-help hours are taken off someone else who ends up back in 
hospital. It’s a vicious circle’.                                                                        (SGM1)  
 
Furthermore, she stressed the importance of recognising that healthcare is not a standardised 
commodity as the production process is distinct in terms of degree of routine, task variety and 
the lack of a clear relationship between means and ends. She articulated this fundamental 
difference in the following way: 
 
‘We are not making cars or running banks, we are treating patients. The 
difference in healthcare is your supplier is your patient, your inputs are the 
patient, the processes are the patient, your output is the patient and your patient is 
still your consumer’.                                                                                   (SGM1) 
 
The high task uncertainty associated with delivery of hospital services was also perceived as 
problematic. The SM1 explained that Woodford was a Level One Trauma Centre, meaning 
that ‘70 per cent of the services provided are demand led. It is very difficult to say you can’t 
take the person with the next MI [Myocardial Infraction] because we have treated our ten 
patients for the day’. 
 
The professional orientation of clinicians also emerged as an important issue in seeking to 
gain an understanding of the research context under investigation. Woodford Manager 1 
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(WM1) recognised this issue, remarking that clinicians were primarily oriented towards the 
effective clinical care of individual patients, while Woodford Management were oriented 
towards the effective use of resources for all patients. The WM1 described the significance 
of professional orientation in the following manner: 
 
‘There is a discernible difference between what is of interest to us and what is of 
interest to clinicians. What is of interest to us is often to do with metrics which 
have to do with organisational performance. What is of interest to clinicians is 
much closer to what an individual patient needs or what an individual patient 
might need’.                                                                                       (WM1) 
 
The WM1’s perception was that clinicians tended not to have ‘trust’ in how management 
control information was compiled. He observed, ‘the first thing they will say to you is that 
the data is inaccurate even though it is their own data…they disown Casemix data even 
though it is their own data’.  In relation to this issue, the SM1 commented that clinician 
managers often saw ‘themselves as being more patient focused and more compassionate’. 
She further noted that clinicians frequently articulated that ’the patient is the centre. I keep 
saying it is for all of us. However, I suppose we don’t get as passionate about the patient’. 
The age profile of clinicians was linked to their professional orientation. The SM1 noted that 
younger clinicians who had experience of working abroad were more predisposed to 
managerial roles. She attributed this willingness to the experience these clinicians had gained 
while working in other countries. 
 
A further feature perceived to pose a challenge for the operation of management control 
practice manifested in the multiple and often conflicting goal sets imposed on the 
organisation by external stakeholders. For example, political interference was noted in terms 
of decisions being made based on political considerations. The WM1 reflected on his own 
personal knowledge of the healthcare system in Germany where, he explained, the number of 
hospitals had been reduced substantially and activity had been consolidated. He drew a 
comparison with the Irish healthcare system and, in particular, the reconfiguration of cancer 
services, remarking:  
 
‘If you contrast that with the nonsense that goes on in this country, you have 
people out parading the streets and politicians on the back of lorries and 
disagreeing about this and that. If decisions are based on data it is very difficult 
for politics to interfere to the extent that it can change a decision, whereas if it is 
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just based on where the constituency of that minister is it has to stay there, which 
is historically what has happened’.                                                        (WM1) 
 
The influence of media scrutiny was also recognised. For example, the SM1 was frustrated 
by the media’s continued focus on ‘bad’ news stories and their refusal to accept possible 
explanations.  With regard to emergency department waiting times, she commented:  
 
‘No matter how many times you get a media query and you say “we have had so 
many admissions in the last three days. Of those three quarters needed to be 
admitted. They couldn’t go anywhere else.” They don’t want to hear the 
explanation. It doesn’t sell the story. It’s frustrating’.                                     (SM1) 
 
Furthermore, the WM1 was exasperated by the impact media attention had on how he was 
perceived by the general public. He commented, ‘I can go down to the pub and the fellas in 
the pub are able to tell me from the paper we are in the red. It’s crazy’.  
 
The SM1 also suggested that public perception of the Hospital was an important 
consideration. With regard to the operation of the HealthStat control practice, which was 
publicised, she expressed the following opinion: 
 
‘People are saying the dashboard is like a soccer table or league table. 
Someone said to me - it is like the premiership and you are in the bottom 
division. I’m not going to be treated there.’                                              (SM1) 
 
A final important issue to emerge from the preliminary findings was the individual and 
organisational reward mechanism in situ. The lack of a formal individual performance 
evaluation system was viewed as a problem. The SM1 explained that there were no control 
practices in place that set individual performance targets and, as a result, there was no system 
for rewarding good performance or for punishing bad performance. The SGM1 also 
suggested that the vague job descriptions given to front-line staff and ambiguous lines of 
accountability hampered the operation of management control practices. The reward 
mechanisms at an organisational level were also perceived as problematic. The view 
articulated was that the achievement of a control target simply resulted in the setting of a 
more challenging target.  In contrast, failure to achieve a control target would result in the 
provision of additional resources to support its achievement. In relation to budget control 
targets, the SM1 commented:  
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‘Even though you come in on target we are further penalised, whereas we felt 
other institutions, that didn’t come in under target, they are seen to be in dire 
straits, and in need of further support. You manage and you perform but you 
don’t get any credit for it. You are never rewarded. But you’re looking at 
someone who didn’t and their budget isn’t cut as much as ours is.’    (SM1)  
 
The WM1 also mentioned performance evaluation in the context of the management control 
practice and he provided evidence to suggest that management style was an important factor 
influencing superior-subordinate relationships and, hence, the operation of management 
control practices. The WM1 differentiated between the managerial styles of two HSE 
managers with regard to the HealthStat management control practice. He explained that, in 
the past, the management control practice had been used in an inflexible manner but a recent 
change in HSE management had resulted in a more flexible use of performance information. 
The WM1 suggested that a previous CEO of the HSE had used performance information in a 
rigid way and reasonable explanations of failures to meet targets were unlikely to be 
accepted. In contrast, the new CEO, while still considering it an important indicator of good 
performance, adopted a more flexible approach to the use of this information. Evidence to 
support this assertion was provided by the SM1 who remarked: 
 
‘We would have found previously with the former HSE manager that he looked at 
it and used it in a very dictatorial manner. You went down through it 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. 
You were told you haven’t, you haven’t, you haven’t / you didn’t, you didn’t, you 
didn’t, you’re red, you’re red. Whereas with this new HSE manager he might say -
Yes you’re amber. Where are your problem areas? What can be done to bring you 
up?’                                                                                                               (SM1) 
 
The preliminary findings provided evidence that the rigid use of HealthStat information was 
perceived as associated with causing resistance and low motivation. In contrast, a more 
flexible use of such information was perceived to foster participation and a sense of honesty 
between Woodford and HSE management.  
  
In this way, the findings pointed to a range of contextual issues influencing the operation of 
the management control practices under investigation. These included: the role of the HSE, 
the complexity of the core operating process, the professional orientation of clinicians, the 
multiple and often conflicting goal sets and the performance evaluation processes in situ.  
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5.1.3 The Role of Management Control Practices  
Management control practices are designed to help an organisation to adapt to the 
environment in which it is set and to deliver the key results desired by its stakeholder groups 
(Section 2.1.1). The purpose of this section is to review the preliminary findings to explore 
the role of management control practices in ensuring organisational objectives were achieved 
at Woodford. 
 
The preliminary evidence suggested that management control information affected the 
SM1’s decision-making processes. She explained that an essential control target for the HSE 
was the ‘colonoscopy waiting times’. She was very conscious of this control target and 
would personally monitor the waiting list to ensure that individual patients did not exceed 
the waiting-time target of three months. The SM1 also expressed the belief that management 
control information could be used by the Hospital to influence HSE decision making. She 
explained that, in the context of the HealthStat control practice and discussions between 
Woodford and HSE management, management control information could be used to 
highlight a problem area (i.e. where targets were not being achieved) in order to secure 
additional resources. The SM1 remarked:  
 
‘We might say we can do a waiting-list incentive but we will need some additional 
resources to put on the incentive because we are going to have to ask staff to come 
in on their off-duty to put on an extra theatre. He might say “ok, there is your 4 
grand but you are going to be green on this the next time you come up.’        (SM1)  
 
In contrast, the evidence suggested that management control information had little impact on 
the decision making of the Cardiac Nurse Service Manager (CNSM). Although the CNSM 
did recognise that the increased need to be more resource conscious had permeated her 
decision making, she believed that this was attributable to the fiscal problems affecting the 
public sector in Ireland, rather than the operation of management control practices. She 
remarked:  
 
‘You would have, in the past, had a culture of “well that is not my responsibility 
and that is their responsibility over in finance department”. I think that is slowly 
changing and that is being driven on by the economic situation over the last three 
years. Now everyone knows we have to, we are being paid by Germany. People 
are frightened because of that’.                                                                     (CNSM) 
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The CNSM mentioned a meeting she was scheduled to have later in the day with the CEO to 
discuss a key budget control target: nursing agency costs. She explained that the HSE had 
put in place a target of a 30 per cent reduction in annual agency costs; however, to date, the 
Hospital had already spent almost 70 per cent of the previous year’s budget. The perception 
of the CNSM was that the control target established was ‘completely unrealistic’. 
Furthermore, it was her opinion that the HSE did not understand the operational 
ramifications of setting such targets, which would ultimately result in the closure of services. 
She also asserted that clinician responsibility was the dominating premise for decision 
making and appeared to rely on professional guidelines of care as a defence against 
management control practices, noting ‘we are under pressure to produce a standard of care, 
with professional guidelines and recommendations on the ratio of staff to patients.  Thank 
God they are there, because if they weren’t’. The following comment from the CNSM 
member summarised her attitude towards the operation of management control and revealed 
her view on how these practices affected the day-to-day functioning of the Hospital:  
 
 ‘I think the HSE is a very good organisation for ticking boxes. How we 
translate that on a day-to-day basis is very different. We have all the 
business words, like vision, mission and KPI’s, [Key Performance 
Measures] etc. However, I think if you went out to any clinician or staff 
nurse on a ward they wouldn’t know anything about them, because they are 
struggling to look after patients’.                                                (CNSM) 
 
With regard to improved organisational planning and control, the WM1 believed that the 
operation of management control practices had resulted in the organisation becoming more 
data driven and thus more able to utilise this data to improve organisational control. He 
remarked: ‘It is fair to say that, as an organisation, we have become much more data driven 
and much more focused on epidemiology and on the analysis of trends in terms of 
presentations to the Hospital’. He illustrated this assertion by providing an example of how a 
recent study of emergency activity at Woodford had revealed that the division’s busiest 
period was contrary to expectations. He explained:  
 
‘For example there are a lot of anecdotes about the winter time is the busiest 
time of the year in A&E and that weekends are the busiest time of the week. In 
fact, we did a big study and we found that that the summer time is the busiest 
with accidents on farms and sports etc. While Monday was actually the busiest 
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day of the week because patients go to their GPs on a Monday and their GPs 
send them in here. So the use of data is incredible important.’                 (WM1) 
 
It was also suggested by the SM1 that management control information provided an impetus 
for closer cooperation with other hospitals and primary healthcare providers. She pointed 
out that, recently, the Hospital had received a ‘red’ indicator for paediatric waiting times. 
An investigation of this target had revealed that Woodford had a significant number of child 
patients who had been waiting over three years for a particular straightforward procedure 
related to a urology issue that required patients to be circumcised. The SM1 explained that 
this procedure should normally be performed in a public hospital but that this waiting list 
had increased dramatically because of the need for paediatric anaesthetists. However, based 
on research conducted by Woodford in collaboration with the National Treatment Patient 
Fund, it had managed to make arrangements for these procedures to be completed in the 
private hospital. The SM1 concluded: ‘performance measures are therefore useful; they 
highlight the issue and help make the argument.’  
 
In contrast, the SGM1 and CNSM believed that management control practices had failed to 
improve organisational planning control. The SGM1 supported her view by referring to the 
HSE’s strategy of reconfiguring acute hospital services, which had resulted in Woodford 
admitting 20 per cent more patients each year. The SGM1 was frustrated, as she considered 
that the Hospital’s budget allocation had not been adjusted in accordance with this strategy.  
The reconfiguration of acute hospital services was also discussed by the CNSM who argued 
that, although the strategy itself is founded on good principles, there was a lack of planning 
around how these would be implemented. It was the CNSM’s opinion that, although 
Woodford had received a significant number of new consultant appointments in recent years, 
there had been a failure to sufficiently plan how these positions would work. The CNSM 
remarked, ‘in the last few years, we have had 35 to 45 new consultant appointments. We 
don’t have operating theatres, we don’t have outpatient rooms, and we don’t have offices. 
We have people but nowhere to put them.  On top of that when you bring in new 
appointments, you also bring in new procedures.  Then there are additional costs. It’s a lack 
of planning.’ 
 
The management control targets established by the HSE were also viewed as being difficult 
to achieve given the complex operating processes prevalent in the organisation. In particular, 
the CNSM asked ‘what is the point in setting targets that are completely unrealistic?’ The 
perception of the CNSM was that the HSE’s role was ineffective. A similar view was 
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expressed by the SGM1 who indicated her belief that ‘the HSE is developing targets 
centrally at a national level with no input from the ground’. The SGM1 suggested that the 
target-setting process would benefit from greater participation of clinicians. She illustrated 
her view with the following example:   
 
‘I sit on the National Group for measures for the A&E department.  For the first 
time they have set up a group that involves the clinicians. The HSE are beginning 
to recognise that the people on the ground know the answers, we are the experts 
and we have to be involved in the setting of performance targets’.              (SGM1) 
5.1.4 Summary 
Utilising Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) framework to frame the preliminary phase allowed an 
overview and appreciation of the management control practices that were operational in the 
research context to be achieved.  In addition, it enabled a broad understanding of the key 
issues influencing these practices to be acquired, to be achieved which helped to inform both 
the scope and design of the main phase of empirical investigation.  
5.2 Analysis of the Preliminary Findings   
The findings from this preliminary phase provided valuable insights. In particular, the 
preliminary findings established that three management control practices were operational in 
Woodford: (i) budget control, (ii) activity control and (iii) operational control. The 
preliminary findings also revealed that the operation of these management control practices 
had mixed implications. Although the perceptions of each interviewee were fundamentally 
consistent regarding the complex nature of the Irish hospital context, the findings suggested 
that attitudes and responses towards the operation of management control practices differed. 
The WM1 and SM1 were primarily concerned with the overall performance of Woodford 
and viewed management control information as an important means of evaluation. In 
contrast, the findings suggested that the SGM1 and the CNSM did not regard management 
control information as important in decision making. Instead, clinical responsibility was 
perceived to be the dominating basis for these individuals and their focus was on patient care 
and meeting clinical standards.  
 
Empirical research examining how hospital management responds to the operation of budget 
control practices suggests that organisational performance is enhanced if these practices are 
used interactively (Abernethy and Brownell, 1999; King et al, 2010; Naranjo and Hartmann, 
2007). While the preliminary findings provided support for this assertion, it should be noted 
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that the attitudes and responses of hospital management to the operation of management 
control practices are important issues that have not, as yet, received much empirical 
attention. The management control literature demonstrates that any management control 
practice is an imperfect tool and, therefore, must be used in a way that takes account of its 
limitations and is appropriate to the particular circumstances (Merchant and Van der Stede, 
2011). Consequently, the preliminary findings depicted a much less precarious situation than 
might have been anticipated given the complexities associated with the hospital context, and 
it would be beneficial to explore these issues further with a broader sample of hospital 
managers in the main phase of the empirical investigation.  
 
In the ongoing debate around the attitudes and responses of clinicians, overall, it has been 
found that they are antagonistic towards the operation of management control practices. 
These practices have been perceived as a fundamental threat to the values of the medical 
profession and, consequently, have been resisted (Jacobs, 2005; Jones and Dewing, 1997; 
Nyland and Pettersen, 2004). However, studies have also reported clinicians to be accepting 
of the need for management control (Kurunmaki, 2004; Llewellyn, 2001). This research 
demonstrates a certain willingness amongst clinicians to accept greater responsibility and to 
become centrally involved with management control issues. Therefore, while the 
management accounting in healthcare literature provides some insights into the attitudes and 
responses of clinicians, the evidence is mixed and somewhat ad hoc in its approach. Further 
research is warranted.  
 
A further important avenue for further consideration is the relationship between hospital 
management and clinicians. It has been suggested that the operation of management control 
practices has increased the awareness of management regarding medical practices and thus 
enabled them to exercise greater control over healthcare activities (Broadbent et al, 2001; 
Kurunmaki, 1999), resulting in conflict and poor working relationships between 
management and clinicians. The preliminary evidence pointed to this being an important 
issue at Woodford. While existing studies have identified this issue as a factor impeding 
clinicians from engaging with management control practices, studies have failed to fully 
explore the implications of the relationship between management and clinicians. 
 
Finally, the preliminary findings provided support for the merits of the framework as ‘a tool 
which researchers can employ to describe the structure and use of the ‘package’ of controls 
deployed by management’ (Ferreira and Otley, 2009, p. 278). However, in the context of this 
study, where organisational objectives, strategies, key success factors, performance measures 
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and targets were formulated by an external stakeholder, the relevance and validity of 
Questions 1 to 5 of the framework were found to be marginal. Consequently, it is suggested 
that, where management control practices are implemented in order to monitor and report on 
the progress of an individual subunit’s performance, it may be advantageous to reduce the 
emphasis on questions related to the formulation of objectives (e.g. vision, mission, key 
success factors, key performance measures, strategies and plans and target setting) and 
prioritise questions relating to the means by which these goals should be achieved (e.g. 
performance evaluation, reward systems, usage and information flows). This issue is 
highlighted as providing a potential contribution to management control theory in Section 
8.2. 
 
Consequently, a number of key issues emerged from the preliminary phase of the study 
which informed both the scope and design of the main phase of empirical investigation. With 
respect to the scope of the main phase, following careful analysis of the preliminary findings 
and a critical review of the empirical literature, it was decided that the study’s research 
objective could be best achieved by exploring how contextual factors associated with a 
hospital context were perceived to influence the perceptions, attitudes and responses of 
individuals towards the operation of the management control practices in place. In terms of 
the design of the main phase, the key issues deriving from the preliminary phase were as 
follows: 
  
- The preliminary findings demonstrated that three management control practices were 
operating at Woodford: (i) budget control, (ii) activity control and (iii) operational control. 
The researcher decided to examine the operation of all three management control practices 
in the main phase of the empirical investigation. It was considered that this would address 
deficiencies in previous studies that have tended to focus on the operation of individual 
management control practices. 
 
- The management control in healthcare literature has primarily focused on clinicians and it 
was, therefore, deemed important to gain an understanding of management attitudes and 
responses to the operation of management control practices through their inclusion. It was 
also believed that incorporating both management and clinicians would allow the 
development of an understanding of how the relationship between these cohorts influences 
the operation of management control practices. 
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- It was believed that exploring the operation of management control practices at various 
hierarchal levels would provide an important contribution to the existing literature, which 
has tended to adopt a narrow focus, with the management control literature concentrating 
on top-management usage and the healthcare literature directing its attention towards 
clinician management.  
 
- A number of key issues that influenced perceptions and responses to the operation of 
management control practices were identified. The main phase aimed to achieve a deeper 
understanding of these issues; however, it was anticipated that supplementary issues would 
also emerge and it was, therefore, important that the main phase of the investigation was 
designed to facilitate their exploration. Consequently, the researcher decided that an in-
depth, qualitative, case-based investigation would be the most appropriate research 
approach (see Section 4.3.2 for further discussion). The researcher’s decision was also 
informed by Woodford’s willingness to participate and co-operate with the study. 
5.3 Conclusion  
This chapter has described and analysed the findings from the preliminary phase of this 
study. The findings from the preliminary phase informed the design of the main phase of the 
study, which conducted a deeper investigation of the topic.  Specifically, the main phase of 
the study, presented in Chapter 6, drew on the understandings gained from the preliminary 
phase to examine more thoroughly how management control practices operate in a 
healthcare context during an economic and fiscal crisis.  
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6.0 Introduction  
The preliminary phase of the empirical investigation was exploratory and was conducted in 
order to develop an understanding of the type of management control practice that were in 
operation and to acquire a broad understanding of the factors influencing the operation of 
these practices. The findings, reported in Chapter 5, demonstrate that the research context 
being investigated is complex and a number of issues that required further investigation were 
uncovered. The purpose of Chapter 6 is to present the findings from the main phase of the 
empirical investigation, which sought to extend understanding about the operation of 
management control practices in a healthcare context during an economic and fiscal crisis.  
6.1 The Management Control Context 
6.1.0 Introduction  
The purpose of this section is to examine the organisational context during the main phase of 
the empirical study. The section commences by highlighting key issues affecting the 
organisational context. The section goes on to provide a description of how each of the 
management control practices operated during the main phase of the empirical study, with 
modifications occurring since the preliminary phase emphasised. These contextual details 
were obtained from interviews conducted in the main phase of the study, in combination 
with a review of relevant HSE reports, service plans, external reports and other internal 
organisational documentation.   
6.1.1 The Organisational Context  
In the discussion of the Irish healthcare context (Section 3.1.1), it was explained that the 
Irish economy collapsed in 2007/2008 when the international financial crisis and the 
resulting restriction of credit exposed the insolvency of Irish banks and the unsustainable 
levels of public spending. In November 2010 due to collapsed revenues and an inability to 
finance bank recapitalisation and day-to-day spending, the Irish government negotiated an 
€85 billion loan from the European Union (EU), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), together known as the Troika. This resulted in a loss of 
economic sovereignty and further accelerated a programme of austerity measures that had 
been initiated in 2008, in order to ensure that the targets set by the Troika in respect of the 
government deficit would be achieved.  
 
The Troika identified the public sector and, in particular, the healthcare sector as having 
considerable potential to achieve savings for government and, therefore, advised extensions 
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of initiatives already in place. A moratorium on recruitment was implemented and salaries 
were cut both directly and through the introduction of a pension levy.  A new government 
department of Public Expenditure and Reform was established, which set out a range of 
commitments in its Public Sector Reform Plan that included initiatives aimed at improving 
customer care, reducing costs through the introduction of shared services for HR, payroll, 
salaries, procurement services, reform of organisational structures and new ways of working 
(Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, 2011). Throughout 2012, the government 
emphasised that the scale of consolidation required could only be achieved through further 
contributions from all the major components of expenditure. A figure of €8.5 billion 
emerged as the saving that needed to be made from the budget over the three-year period 
2013 - 2016 if annual deficit targets were to be achieved (Department of Finance, 2012). The 
healthcare sector, as the second largest consumer of public funds, was again identified as a 
key area where savings could be achieved. 
 
Consequently, Irish public hospitals, including Woodford, continued to work within 
unprecedented budget constraints in 2012. The HSE’s budget provision for the delivery of 
healthcare services in 2012 was €12,237 million. This represented a total quantifiable cost 
reduction target of €750 million. This budget reduction followed two years, unparalleled in 
the history of healthcare, in which the total budget reduction amounted to €1.85 billion. 
Moreover, the National Service Plan (NSP) was published on the 13th of January 2012. At its 
publication, the HSE CEO, Mr Cathal Magee, noted:  
 
‘2012 will be a very challenging year for the health services. In the last two years, 
reductions in health expenditure have been achieved largely through a 
combination of procurement efficiencies, successive drug price reductions and 
staff costs. A key driver of cost reductions for 2012 will be the exit of a further 
3,000 staff from the health services. Together with a budget reduction of €750m, 
the challenge will be to accelerate the implementation of the National Clinical 
Programmes and the new models of care and continue to drive efficiencies in 
order to offset the impacts on frontline services’.    
                                                                                     HSE CEO, Mr Cathal Magee 
 
The NSP estimated that, on average, hospital budgets would drop by 4.4 per cent of the 
previous year’s allocation. Significantly, hospitals were also expected to address any 
underlying deficits from 2011. It was estimated that this would require an expenditure 
reduction of 7.8 per cent across the hospital sector. In order to ensure that this challenge was 
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achieved, each of the four HSE Regions formulated a Cost Containment Plan (CCP) that 
identified cost containment actions required to deliver their service plan targets within the 
allocated budgets. Subsequently, CCPs were prepared for individual subunits. Individual 
hospitals (including Woodford) designed a CCP, outlining how it would bridge the gap 
between its 2011 and 2012 budgets. Further details of Woodford’s CCP are provided in 
Section 6.2.2.1.  
 
However, uncertainty surrounded the effectiveness of the CCPs. In May 2012, the 
Department of Health (DoH) commissioned a confidential review to investigate the 
probability of the budget target being achieved. The review, led by Mark Ogden, was 
conducted in June 2012 and highlighted a wide range of problems associated with all aspects 
of the budget control practice. It was reported in the Irish Independent (June 2012) that on 
the basis of the expenditure figures in April 2012, the projected deficit would be in excess of 
€500 million by the end of the year.  This projected deficit was viewed as having far-
reaching and significant consequences for the Irish economy, as the Troika identified the 
exchequer deficit as a significant issue influencing Ireland’s ability to exit from the bailout 
programme. 
 
Furthermore, uncertainty also existed regarding the future management and delivery of 
healthcare services. In July 2012, the DoH published the Governance Bill, which outlined a 
major restructuring of the HSE, and set out milestones to achieve a single-tier health service 
supported by Universal Health Insurance (UHI) by 2016. Under the proposed changes, it was 
planned that the HSE would initially be reorganised into six new directorates to manage 
different areas, including separate directorates for mental health and primary care for the first 
time. Furthermore, it was envisaged in the Governance Bill that the HSE would eventually 
be abolished and replaced with new structures but it was unclear as to what would replace it 
under these plans. In the week following the publication of the Governance Bill, the HSE’s 
CEO, Cathal Magee, resigned. Media reports suggested that there were considerable tensions 
between the DoH and the HSE over the current management of the organisation and that the 
DoH was arguing that savings could be achieved through greater efficiencies in the delivery 
of healthcare services so that applying bed reductions as a cutback measure was unnecessary. 
The HSE, for its part, argued that many of the required savings, for example in overtime 
allowances, staff rostering, generic drug prescribing and increasing private income 
insurance, required action at Government level. Irrespective of the validity of these media 
claims of tension and conflict, the further uncertainty existing with respect to the governance 
and organisational arrangements created further inconsistency in the Irish hospital sector.   
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This section set out the economic and political background to the study in order to illuminate 
the findings from the main phase interviews. While other external changes occurred during 
2011 - 2012, the two main changes highlighted in this section, the budget position and the 
Governance Bill were among the key changes that influenced the context under examination.  
6.1.2 The Management Control Practices  
The preliminary phase of the study established that three management control practices were 
operational in Woodford: (i) budget control, (ii) activity control and (iii) operational control. 
Section 5.2 provided a brief description of how each of these control practices operated. The 
purpose of this section is to build upon this work by describing how each of these 
management control practices functioned during the main phase of the empirical study. 
 
6.1.2.1 Budget Control Practice 
Woodford’s budget is determined on a historic basis. Comparisons between the 2011 and 
2012 budgets are problematic as a number of funding streams had been reorganised. 
However, additional funding of approximately 5 percent of the total annual budget had been 
provided to the Hospital. The majority of this additional funding was associated with transfer 
of cardiology services to Woodford and, in addition, it was provided to facilitate the targeted 
recruitment of individuals in priority areas. The Hospital also received a minor funding 
efficiency award as a result of the Casemix funding model. However, deductions of 11 
percent of the total annual budget were imposed on the Hospital. The non-replacement of 
staff accounted for 22% of this deduction, while improvements in efficiency accounted for 
18%. Moreover, it was explained that patient income from private healthcare insurance 
companies was estimated to increase by 10 percent.  When the budget is adjusted for these 
figures, the budget reduction for Woodford in 2012 amounted to 4.7%. In addition, the 
underlying deficit from 2011 also needed to be addressed. Therefore, Woodford’s total 
resource challenge for 2012 was a budget reduction of 5.5%. 
 
Within Woodford, the Finance Department was responsible for the operation of the budget 
control. The Finance Manager presents a budget report to senior management on a monthly 
basis. The format of this report remains constant and essentially involves monitoring each 
cost object every month in order to facilitate comparisons of actual performance with the 
budget for the current month and a cumulative year-to-date comparison is also made. 
 
A copy of the June 2012 report was provided to the researcher but, for confidentiality 
reasons, is not provided in this thesis. However, examination of the report revealed that on a 
  
125 
 
monthly basis, three main budget categories are monitored: (i) pay, (ii) non-pay and (iii) 
income. These three budget categories are subdivided and performance is tracked in order to 
compare actual performance with the budget set for the current period and on a cumulative 
year-to-date basis. These subcategories and their relative percentages are presented below: 
-  Pay accounts for 70% of the gross budget and was sub-divided into six areas:  medical 
(31%), nursing (36%), paramedical (14%), housekeeping (5%), catering (2%), portering 
(2.7%) and administration (9.3%). 
-   Non-Pay accounts for 30% of the gross budget and was subdivided into 21 cost objects: 
medicines (19%), medical and surgical devices (29%), blood (10%), medical gases 
(0.4%), medical equipment (2.4%) , radiology (4%), catering (0.3,%), cleaning  and waste 
(0.4%), laundry (1.97%), energy (4%), bedding/clothing (0.6%), furniture (0.16%), 
pathology (12.4%), maintenance (0.65%), transport/ staff travel (1.6%), office expenses 
(1.8%), telecommunications (0.5%), computer (1%), administrative expenses (3.6%)  and 
staff recruitment and training (0.7%).  
- Income is subdivided into five categories: patient income (85%), sales (2%), recoups and 
refunds (1%), income from car park (8%) and superannuation (4%).  
 
It is notable from the report that the most significant unfavourable variances in the pay 
category were nursing and paramedical costs. In the non-pay budget category, these were 
medicines and medical and surgical equipment. In the income category, patient income was 
performing favourably, with a positive variance reported. A limited number of key 
performance indicators are also contained in the report: bed occupancy percentages and the 
number of and value of consultant claims.  
  
The Finance Department is also responsible for monitoring the performance of the Hospital’s 
CCP.  Essentially, the CCP outlined the actions needed in order to ensure that the required 
saving of €18,977 million was achieved. Woodford’s CCP contained 19 initiatives, 
categorised according to pay, non-pay and income. The CCP pay category accounted for 
41% of the total saving required, with initiatives such as the non-replacement of clinical staff 
and reduction in medical and nursing agency costs being the most significant. The CCP non-
pay category accounted for 33% of the total saving required, with initiatives focusing on 
improving efficiencies in radiology and pathology being the most significant. However, 
many of the other non-pay initiatives were vague in nature e.g.  time-related savings and 
non-pay reductions. The CCP income category accounted for 26% of the total shortfall 
required. Initiatives included increasing patient income by increasing charges for private 
beds and ensuring that all private bed charges were processed.  For each initiative, a cost 
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scenario plan was established that set out the following: (i) initiative summary; (ii) 
background and rationale for proposal; (iii) implications for clients and services; (v) 
implications for staff; and (vi) costing associated with the initiative. A Cost Containment 
Board (CCB) was established to track and monitor the progress of the CCP. The CCB has 
five members: the CEO, the Finance Manager, the Clinical Director, the Director of Nursing 
and the Operations Manager. The CCB is accountable to the Regional Director of 
Operations. The CCB meets with the RDO and senior members of the HSE management 
team on a monthly basis to order to discuss the progress of the CCP.  At an organisational 
level, the CCB meets on a weekly basis to discuss the CCP.  Consequently, the volume and 
detail of budget control information intensified and greater attention was being directed 
towards the budget control practice.  
 
6.1.2.2 Activity Control Practice 
As highlighted in Sections 3.1.1 and 6.1.1, the Irish healthcare sector has been under 
considerable budget pressure since 2008. However, despite reductions in funding and 
staffing levels, Irish hospital activity levels increased. According to HIPE (Hospital-in-
Patient Enquiry) statistics published in 2013, 1,554,290 discharges were reported by acute 
public hospitals, representing a mean annual increase of 2.5 percent over the period 2009-
2013 and an increase of less than 1 percent over the period 2012-2013. The number of 
inpatients has increased from 590,160 in 2009 to 622,217 in 2013, a mean annual increase of 
1.4 percent, with a decrease of less than 1 percent between 2012 and 2013.  With respect to 
patient profile, the 65 years and over age groups accounted for the largest proportion of total 
discharges in 2013 (34.1 percent), this represented a mean annual increase of 4.1 percent for 
this age group between 2009 and 2013. Table 6.1 provides details of activity levels at 
Woodford during the study period. 
Table 6.1: Activity Levels 2008 -2013 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Inpatient Discharges 25,720 26,520 26,636 29,546 32,445 33,514 
Day case Discharges 69,282 73,505 81,033 78,163 77,619 80,740 
Emergency 
Attendances 
52,751 51,941 51,803 52,296 60,632 63,122 
Outpatient 128,594 132,105 136,067 158,638 159,749 162,478 
Source: McNamara (2015) 
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6.1.2.3 Operational Control Practice 
The operational control practice, ‘HealthStat’, continued to operate from January to May 
2012, with its performance reports published on the HSE website. However, the HealthStat 
forums ceased in May 2012 in advance of the establishment of a new operational control 
practice: ‘CompStat’. CompStat was described as a web-enabled operational control practice 
based on similar principles to HealthStat. CompStat results were to be discussed at monthly 
CompStat Forum meetings, chaired by the RDO, and were to be published on the HSE 
website in 2013. However, inspection of the website revealed that this publication never 
occurred. The researcher was unable to gain access to a CompStat Report but was informed 
that CompStat measures were the same as the KPIs set out in the NSP 2014.  Significantly, it 
was explained that operational control results were no longer discussed at a national level as 
had occurred during the preliminary phase (Section 5.2.2.3).  The prominence attached to the 
operational control practice was perceived to have declined, which was attributed to the 
increased attention paid to the budget control practice. 
6.1.3 Summary 
The purpose of this section was to describe how each of these management control practices 
functioned during the main phase of the empirical study. 
6.2 Contextual Factors Influencing Attitudes and Responses 
6.2.0 Introduction  
This section presents the interview findings from the main phase of the empirical 
investigation. It focuses on the contextual factors perceived to influence attitudes and 
perceptions relating to the operation of management control practices. The contextual factors 
are grouped into four classifications: organisational factors; factors external to the 
organisation; management control factors; and individual factors.  
6.2.1 Organisational Factors 
Organisational factors refer to the contextual factors that exist within the organisation (in this 
case Woodford). The findings relating to organisational factors are presented within the 
following themes: (i) organisational structure, (ii) accountability arrangements, and (iii) 
authority structures.  
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6.2.1.1 Organisational Structure 
The structure of the organisation was perceived to influence responses to the operation of 
management control practices. An important adjustment was made to the organisational 
arrangements during the study period. A Cost Containment Board (CCB) was established to 
monitor and track budget control in early 2012. The CCB had five members: the CEO, the 
Director of Nursing, a Clinical Director, the Finance Manager and the Operations Managers. 
In order to facilitate the discussion of the interview findings, Woodford Management 
(acronym ‘WM’) will be used to describe the five members of the CCB.  These 
organisational arrangements were perceived as an influence in determining the responses of 
individuals to activities associated with the operation of management control practices. The 
findings suggested that each member of WM felt a sense of obligation towards the 
management control practices and were motivated to work together to achieve control 
targets; as noted by the WM5, ‘everything we do is in some way related to control’.  In 
addition, the finding suggested that WM had become increasing involved with budget 
control information as a result of the fiscal crisis. The effect of the fiscal crisis is discussed 
further in Section 6.3.2.1.  However, it was evident that WM were experiencing stress and 
work related tension as a result of their increased engagement with management control 
practices. The WM2 commented: 
 
‘Every one of us [Woodford Management] is stressed at the moment. Last week 
was the first time that I could actually feel it was really getting to me’.         (WM2) 
 
The WM4 also suggested that increased involvement with budget control information was 
causing increasing job-related tension. He remarked:  
 
I think the levels of stress are through the roof. People say to me; I don’t know 
how you do your job. I wonder myself at times. I don’t go over to the canteen 
anymore. Because people will me and say “Now that I have you, I need to replace 
X or Y”. Whereas, if they don’t see you, they may forget’.                             (WM4) 
 
In contrast, the findings suggested that the Senior Management (SM) were demotivated by 
the organisational arrangements. The findings indicate that SM did not engage with activities 
associated with the operation of management control practices. The WM4 explained that SM 
meet on a monthly basis. During this meeting, the WM4 presents a report on the Hospital’s 
finances. However, the WM4 felt that the SM gave this little attention, preferring to 
concentrate on their own areas of interest. The WM4 remarked:  
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‘I make a finance presentation and we provide a pack, it’s about 30 pages.  I find 
by the time you get to the third or fourth page, you are losing their interest. We try 
to highlight the important things. Because you get 10, 15 minutes on this and you 
have lost them.  There are other things on the agenda ….and they are looking 
ahead, where are my particular areas and when are they going to come up. 
There’s not a huge level of engagement’.                                                (WM4) 
 
The evidence provided by the SMs supported the views of WM4. For example, when the 
SM2 was asked about budget control, her response was:  
 
‘I am sure the finance people will definitely fill you in on that. That wouldn’t be up 
for me to enlighten you.  There are good presentations delivered on a regular 
basis from the Finance Manager. However, my areas of responsibility would be 
different.  There isn’t much overlap between all of us’.                         (SM2) 
 
Moreover, SM3 believed that the implications of management control were not broadly 
understood by senior managers.  SM3 commented: 
 
‘It’s very hard to determine what the key issues are.  Even if you could understand 
what the key issues were, it is difficult to know what it means in terms of the 
service changes that I need to make on the ground. That’s the piece that’s missing.  
I am not saying the information is wrong or that it’s badly presented.  I just think 
that there is a lack of understanding’.                                       (SM3) 
 
With regard to Clinician Management (CM), the interviewees explained that the clinician 
divisional structure had been established in 1999, following the CIM initiative (discussed in 
Section 3.1.3.2). The general opinion among interviewees was that the clinical division 
structure had been beneficial and had improved organisational performance. However, it was 
felt that, following the DoH’s endorsement of a Clinical Directorate structure in 2009, there 
had been considerable uncertainty with respect to the operation of the clinician divisional 
structure. The OChair remarked: 
 
‘The problem with the current divisional structure is that there’s a limbo about it. 
We are supposed to have moved into directorships. That hasn’t happened.  As a 
  
130 
 
result, the divisional structure has slid, because people were expecting the 
changeover. I think that has affected behaviour’.                     (OChair)  
 
The above comment suggests that the anticipated establishment of a directorate structure had 
resulted in the divisional structure failing to operate effectively. However, the WM5 believed 
that the uncertainty surrounding the divisional structure was employed as an excuse. The 
WM5 suggested that the reason clinician divisions were not functioning was as a result of 
changes made to their autonomy arrangements. The WM5 remarked: 
 
‘While I think the directorate model is a very good model it also gives people an 
excuse and an opportunity. I know that divisions have not been operating as 
divisions in the true sense of the word. Maybe because of the directorate model, 
but also because any degree of autonomy they had has been taken place centrally 
in recent years’.                                                                                               (WM5)  
 
The issue of autonomy is discussed further in Section 6.2.1.3.  Irrespective of the reason 
underlying it, the general opinion was that  Clinician Divisions were not functioning in the 
manner envisaged and that this was perceived as influencing responses to the operation of 
management control practices. During an interview, the OChair printed out and presented a 
document detailing the responsibilities of Clinical Chairs and Clinician Divisions. Samples 
of the identified responsibilities outlined in this document are set in Appendix F.  
 
This shows that many of the activities and responsibilities set out are associated with the 
operation of management control practices. However, numerous examples were also 
provided to demonstrate that the responsibilities contained in this document were not being 
carried out as prescribed. For example, responsibility (iv) involved organising and chairing a 
divisional meeting. The OChair described the divisional meeting as:  
 
‘A process - I attend the meeting because I am chairing, but attendance wouldn’t 
be great. Often the meetings are a moaning and groaning session…just moan, 
moan, moan, groan, groan, groan’.                                                             (OChair) 
 
The OChair also felt that the role of Divisional Chair was ineffective. The OChair remarked:  
 
‘I think it’s an ineffective role. We have a meeting. I Chair the meeting. If there 
are jobs to be done, such as writing letters, I will do that. For example, we need a 
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dietitian, so I have written a few letters about that. I would see it [Divisional 
Chair] as being a fairly powerless sort of letter-writing role’.       (OChair) 
 
Responsibility (v) for the development of a bi-monthly report was also discussed. While 
sceptical of the outcomes from this reporting process, the OChair felt that it was beneficial, 
commenting ‘it’s a nice thing to do in that you do that certain things have happened and the 
major problems are highlighted. However, there’s also a real sense that there’s a process 
going on and that nothing happens at the end of it’. Significantly, it was explained that this 
reporting process had not taken place since 2009.  
 
The EChair explained that divisional meetings were convened on a weekly basis in the past 
but ‘might now take place every couple of weeks’.  The EChair also debated the significance 
of these meetings, given the lack of autonomy held by the Business Manager. The EChair 
commented:  
 
‘We found we were meeting every week and we were discussing the same old stuff. 
There are two big sections to our divisional meeting.  One is the operational issues 
such as, letting home a patient that we shouldn’t have let home, or there’s a 
complaint…that kind of thing.  But, the Business Manager and the Nurse Service 
Manager coming down formally…we probably only do that every couple of weeks 
maybe.  We did have it billed for every week.  And more often than not we were 
rehashing the same conversation. There’s no money. Do you know the CEO is 
looking at every invoice over €500 now?’                                                    (EChair)  
 
The above comment suggested that divisional business managers no longer had the 
autonomy to make budget decisions, which was perceived to have had an impact on the 
attitudes and responses of clinicians. This issue is further discussed in Section 6.3.1.3.  
 
In this way, the evidence presented demonstrated that Woodford’s structural arrangements 
were perceived to influence the operation of management control practices. The general 
opinion was that the Clinician Divisional structure was not functioning effectively since 
2009, which was perceived to have had a negative impact on attitudes towards the operation 
of management control practices. Moreover, it was maintained that only a small cohort of 
individuals (i.e. WM) were engaged with activities associated with the operation of 
management control practices. These managers with responsibility were engaged in and felt 
a sense of obligation to management control practices. However, the remaining individuals 
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concentrated on their own areas of interest with little or no reference to these practices. The 
implications associated with the organisational arrangements are discussed further in Section 
7.3.1. 
 
6.2.1.2 Accountability Structures  
A strong emphasis was placed on accountability as a factor influencing attitudes towards the 
operation of management control practices. The findings indicated that WM were held 
accountable for organisational performance. The WM2 believed that the obligation to answer 
questions regarding the financial, activity and operational performance of Woodford 
remained with this cohort of individuals. The WM2 remarked: 
 
‘At the moment, the only accountability is at the top.  It has to come down. We 
have a no blame culture. I don’t want to go around blaming everyone, but if 
someone makes a mistake they need to learn. At the end of the day someone has to 
be held accountable’.                                                                               (WM2) 
 
The comments of WM2 suggested that she believed that a lack of accountability influenced 
responses to the operation of management control practices. Some interviewees suggested 
that a lack of financial accountability among clinicians was a particularly pertinent issue. 
The CBM maintained that clinicians were not obliged to answer questions regarding their 
decisions and/ or actions that had resulted in their disregard of management control issues. 
The CBM commented: ‘consultants need to be more accountable’. We only spoke about this 
issue at a meeting yesterday’.  
 
The OChair also discussed the issue of clinician accountability. It was her contention that 
failure to hold clinicians financially accountable hampered the organisation’s ability to 
control activities. Furthermore, she felt that clinicians exploited the lack of accountability in 
order to prioritise their own professional objectives. The OChair commented: 
 
‘There is a lack of accountability here. Clinicians can say in ‘my clinical 
judgement this person needs to be treated as an emergency’. But it not an 
emergency and the patient is being treated at top dollar.  Also, maybe someone 
should have treated a patient on a Friday, but because the person was not efficient 
enough, it gets pushed until the weekend.  That person then gets paid overtime at 
the weekend. I think that happens a lot too’.                               (OChair)                    
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The effects of clinician professional orientation are discussed further in Section 6.3.4.1.  
 
The absence of divisional budgets and the inability to hold divisions financially accountable 
were also perceived to be important factors influencing attitudes and perceptions. As 
explained by WM5: 
 
‘On a monthly basis we get a report as to how each expense category is 
performing.  But no individual manager has a budget for his or her department 
that includes the pay for the staff, the overtime, the non-pay.  What happens is the 
management team [WM] get the report.  We see what’s going up, what’s going 
down.  So we don’t devolve …. they are not held accountable per se for spending 
in their area’.                                                                                     (WM5) 
 
As delineated in Section 6.2.2, expenditure was monitored according to two main categories: 
(i) Pay and (ii) Non-Pay.  Therefore, the budget control practice did not facilitate Clinician 
Divisions being held accountable for their expenditure because it did not monitor 
expenditure at a divisional level. The appropriateness of management control information is 
discussed in further detail in Section 6.3.3.1.  
 
Many interviewees believed that the budgets needed to be devolved so that Clinician 
Divisions would be held accountable. In the absence of this step, they felt that activity 
planning was meaningless.  The SM3 felt that, coupled with the need to make individuals 
more financially accountable, was the need to ensure that they had the authority to make 
decisions.  She remarked: 
 
‘The HSE is a business. People talk about healthcare being a service.  However, 
when you are spending €13 billion a year, you need to run it on a more 
commercial basis. You need to get people more accountable.  The problem I would 
have found is that you can hold people accountable but you also need to give them 
some level of authority as well, where they can exercise that accountability’.        
                                                                                           (SM3)  
The issue of autonomy is discussed further in Section 6.3.2.3. However, the participants’ 
views discussed in this section suggest that a lack of accountability was resulting in a 
growing apathy towards the operation of management control practices.  The implications 
associated with this issue are discussed further in Sections 7.2.2, 7.2.3 and 7.3.1. 
 
  
134 
 
6.2.1.3 Authority Arrangements 
The authority or freedom to make decisions was considered to be an important factor 
influencing responses to the operation of management control practices. Many interviewees 
believe that only a select cohort of individuals (i.e. WM) had the autonomy to make 
management control decisions. The WM5 explained that, in the past, Business Managers in 
the Clinician Divisions had the authority to approve non-pay expenditure items but that, 
following the fiscal crisis, this authority had been removed. Instead, all non-routine 
expenditure was referred to the CCB (WM) for authorisation. The WM5 explained:  
 
‘We vet every request on a weekly basis from a clinical and administrative 
perspective. We say yes or no to that request. In the last year, because of the 
financial situation, the answer has been mostly no’.                                      (WM5) 
 
The implications of this decision were exemplified by the EConsul who explained that the 
replacement of a light bulb in a teaching room had been refused so many times that one 
clinician out of sheer frustration had personally purchased the light bulb.   
 
The WM5 did not believe the removal of autonomy was an appropriate course of action but 
was the only option available in the circumstances. He commented: 
 
‘It has affected things within the Hospital in the most brutal way. We just took 
back authority from division managers and centralised back. This was the wrong 
way. Devolving is the way to go. But when you are firefighting in the current 
financial crisis, you don’t have time for hand holding and doing things the right 
way’.                                                                                                             (WM5) 
 
This style of usage by WM was, however, not reported to be customary and the variation 
was attributed to the economic and fiscal crisis. The implications associated with this style of 
usage are examined in Section 7.3.3. 
 
The lack of autonomy to make management control decisions at a clinician level was viewed 
by most interviewees as a significant issue. For example, the WM2 felt that if clinician 
divisions were granted the authority to make budget decisions, attitudes would change 
rapidly. Her opinion was founded on her experience in the UK where budget autonomy had 
been implemented in the 1980s. She noted: 
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‘In the UK, we had devolved budgeting in the 1980s. It changed the organisation 
in an 18-month period - Because I knew exactly what my budget was. If somebody 
asked me what my budget was in this Hospital, I would have to say I don’t have 
one. How can you manage a budget you don’t have? Whereas, when I was in the 
UK I knew what my budget was.  If stuff arrived on the ward, if it wasn’t ordered, 
it went straight back and I made sure it was refunded back into my account. If staff 
went out sick, I only replaced three hours instead of 12 hours. You just did things 
differently’.                                                                                                    (WM2) 
 
There were repeated demands from clinicians for budget control to be ‘devolved’ to the 
divisional level. The following comment is indicative of attitudes expressed:  
 
‘The biggest change would be to devolve budgets. We need to have budgetary 
control. There needs to be some real effort put into devolving - budgets primarily - 
but we need to have the autonomy in other issues as well. We need to be able to 
make decisions within the division’.                                             (OChair)  
 
The WM4 recognised that individuals were frustrated by the lack of authority to make 
decisions; however, it was also felt that many of those demanding authority did not 
understand that with authority came accountability. The WM4 commented: 
 
‘Clinicians and other people love the whole thought of having the authority to 
make decisions, especially in the current climate. But they need to take 
accountability with that.  At the moment, there is nothing which can be done to 
hold them accountable, except maybe a rap on the knuckles or a letter.  It is my 
opinion that they wouldn’t sit down every week to make those decisions.’   (WM4) 
 
While most clinicians were exasperated by the lack of authority to manage their divisional 
budgets, some clinicians maintained that, often, they were allowed too much autonomy. In 
the view of the OChair, clinicians were allowed to authorise expensive procedures and tests 
without providing any justification for their actions. The OChair remarked:   
 
‘I am surprised at times, that people can say I want to do X, which is going to cost 
a fortune.  I think there is too much autonomy to be honest. I would prefer it to be 
tighter - you can only authorise that test in the following circumstances’.  
                 (OChair)  
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The WM2 also addressed this issue, commenting:  
 
‘From a clinician perspective this is a great place to work. They get everything 
they want. They have free choice to order whatever tests they want; whatever 
devices they wish to use. They love working here. They openly admit that. Whereas 
in the UK, they get the generic and that’s it’.                     (WM2) 
 
However, the WM2 acknowledged that removing this autonomy was problematic. It was 
believed that, in the UK where clinician autonomy had been reduced, many clinicians were 
unwilling to provide additional services. The WM2 added ‘in the UK, many clinicians are 
not willing to do the extra bit. They worked their 35 hours, full stop’.  In contrast, she felt 
that the majority of clinicians in Woodford worked ‘far in excess of their contracted work 
hours. They work above and beyond the call of duty’.  
 
It was recognised that, while the WM had the authority to grant/ refuse non-routine-pay 
expenditure items, this was in fact of minor significance in respect of the total budget. 
Instead, the perception was that it was HSE management, directed by the DoH that had the 
real authority to make significant decisions. The WM3 maintained that, while a select cohort 
of managers (including him) was responsible for the performance of the Hospital, they did 
not have the authority to make many significant decisions influencing its performance. The 
WM3 commented, ‘I have the responsibility but not the authority. I am not even talking 
about just me.  I am talking about the CEO of the Hospital’. The evidence presented 
suggested that the DoH, via the HSE, had the authority to make those decisions that were of 
significance. This opinion was vividly expressed by the WM5 in the following remark: 
 
‘I am the Operations Manager. However, I am no more a manager. I am what I 
would call an ‘implemenistrator’. I coined that phase myself.  I implement the 
decisions made by others. Management in the current climate, where you have got 
a national top-down structure, you have no authority to spend money, because 
there’s none there. You have no authority to hire because of the moratorium. 
Where’s the management in that?  Instead, you manage a change programme. We 
become impleministrators and counsellors - someone for people to vent their 
frustrations at’.                                                     (WM5) 
 
The SM4 believed that the centralisation of decision making at a HSE level was the principal 
issue influencing attitudes.  She commented:  
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‘The HSE has become a centralised organisation, with a lot of decision-making 
being taken centrally without reference to the people at the coalface. Decision-
making is too centralised and, because of that, the people that are making 
decisions are divorced from the service delivery component and people who are in 
charge of the service delivery component cannot make decisions. Therefore you 
have decision-makers who have no responsibility for service delivery and people 
who have responsibility for service delivery but can’t make decisions’     (SM4) 
 
The SM4 illustrated her opinion by reference to the recruitment process. She explained that 
following the establishment of the HSE, the recruitment process had been centralised 
nationally and, while it was acknowledged that this change could enhance efficiency in terms 
of administrative costs, it she also felt that it failed to recognise the importance of personal 
and social issues. She remarked: 
 
So now they recruit nationally, but I don’t want somebody working in here that I 
have never met, I have no idea whether they will fit in with my team or not. You 
don’t want somebody coming in who is going to rock the whole place and that I 
spend my time having issues with, and that my colleagues are coming to me 
saying, in the name of the Lord, where did you go wrong with this.  It’s out of my 
hands.  It has an impact.                                                                       (SM4) 
 
The implications associated with these issues are further discussed in Sections 7.1.4. 
 
It seems then that the perception among interviewees was that a small cohort of individuals 
(i.e. WM) had the authority to make decisions. However, the findings also indicated that 
HSE management retained a significant amount of the authority. In reality, Woodford 
Management felt that they were responsible for implementing the decisions taken by HSE 
management. The reduction of divisional autonomy, in terms of the ability of Business 
Managers to authorise expenditure, was suggested to have generated feelings of resentment, 
which had a detrimental effect on attitudes to the operation of management control practices. 
However, a closer analysis of the issue suggests that, while having an important impact on 
individual attitudes and responses, the removal of autonomy may have had only a minor 
effect on organisational control. For example, clinicians continue to have considerable 
autonomy in terms of medicine, test and device usage. The implications associated with 
these issues are further discussed in Sections 7.2.3 and 7.3.1.     
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6.2.1.4 Structural Issues   
The findings showed that structural differences between the Clinician Divisions influenced 
responses to the operation of management control practices. This issue was of specific 
relevance to the Emergency Division. The EChair explained that many general practitioners 
were directing their patients to their department too hastily and this had a sequential impact 
on the division’s ability to meet management control targets, as it was very difficult for these 
patients to be discharged. The EChair remarked: 
 
‘A factor which has had a big impact has been that the GPs have completely 
changed practice.  Sorry, that’s not true.  Some GPs are outstanding…and 
genuinely manage patients very well, do the best they can to keep them out of 
hospital.  Some other GPs, a minority, they just don’t understand what a big step it 
is to send somebody in…when really they know …in their gut feeling it’s not 
necessary.  But once they get into the system it’s very difficult for us to discharge 
them’.                                                                                        (EChair) 
 
Interviewees also maintained that the ability to achieve management control targets was 
dependant on the cooperation of other Clinician Divisions. However, it was felt that the 
management control practices did not provide any incentive to encourage collaboration but, 
rather, caused divisions to impede the effective delivery of healthcare services. This issue 
was again found to be of specific relevance to the Emergency Division. The EConsul 
explained: 
 
‘If I happen to be an in-patient team, I will come down here [Emergency Division] 
and if I admit a patient, I have avoided any risk.  I have done the easy thing of 
admitting the patient.  I have left them in the corridor …in other words me, the 
Emergency Division… The emergency department consultants, the nursing staff, 
and portering is expected to come in, run around, and take care of them, in the 
space that isn’t there. We are discharging 90 per cent of the patients we see.  
Whereas in-patient teams admit 90 per cent of the patients.  They have a vested 
interest in them admitting them, and thereby clogging up the whole system.  
Because they get paid.  And more importantly, it’s not just the money…it really 
isn’t the money.  It’s the fact that they have avoided risk’.                       (EConsul) 
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Further evidence that the difficulties associated with forecasting the demand for healthcare 
services was an important factor influencing responses to the operation of management 
control practices was also provided by the SM3 who remarked: 
 
‘I think in-patient activity was supposed to be 33,000 for the year, but I think after 
six months they were 20 per cent ahead. It’s a demand-led service. You can’t 
control it.  If you were doing a service plan properly, you would come to the 
middle of October and you would close the door and say, we have done our 
procedures for the year. That doesn’t happen.  It can give you a rough prediction. 
But things change. For example, we had the bird flu a couple of years ago and 
everything got skewed. Or you could get a serious influenza’.          (SM3)  
 
The SM1 also maintained that Woodford Hospital’s position, as the only Level One trauma 
centre in the region, affected its ability to control activity. Unlike many voluntary hospitals 
in the region, it could not ‘close its doors’. The SM4 also addressed this issue. She 
maintained that the organisation could not select the type of healthcare services it wished to 
provide; rather, the Hospital had to accept ‘whatever comes in the door’. The SM4 observed: 
 
‘Most of our admissions are emergency trauma admissions.  If you get someone 
who needs ten consultants to manage their condition, you have to treat the patient. 
We can’t pick and choose and say, “You are very expensive this week, and we 
don’t have the money to keep you this week, so go away please. This patient could 
be having a myocardial infraction,” It is simply not possible to rationalise’. (SM4) 
 
The repercussions of not providing healthcare services were particularly significant in the 
Oncology Division. This view was vividly expressed by the OConsul in the following 
remark: 
 
‘If someone pitches up with leukaemia on a Friday, they have to come in for 
treatment, regardless of resources or activity or whatever. They will be dead by 
Monday otherwise. We simply have no choice. We are constantly being asked to 
pull back on activity. But it’s not that we are doing elective surgeries, where you 
can have a waiting list. People would be dead on Monday if we didn’t treat them’ 
                                                      (OConsul) 
 
The implications of these issues are explored in more detail in Section 7.3.1.    
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6.2.2 External Factors 
The main phase findings indicated that there were a number of external factors that 
influenced responses to the operation of management control practices. The interview data 
relating to external factors was categorised into environmental developments, public scrutiny 
and political interference.  
 
6.2.2.1 Environmental Developments 
The majority of interviewees noted that external environmental factors such as economic 
conditions and technological advancements affected attitudes to the operation of 
management control practices.  In particular, the interviewees emphasised the fiscal 
problems affecting the public sector in Ireland as having an impact. The WM3 maintained 
that fiscal issues had increased the significance of management control practices. He 
commented:  
 
‘The reality is that the control practices have really grown in the last three to five 
years.  They weren’t a big part of healthcare management prior to that. What 
fascinates me is that they weren’t there originally, when I came back in 2001/2002 
I was fascinated at how little management knew about what was happening in 
terms of our inputs and outputs’.                                     (WM3) 
 
This observation suggested that WM were more cognisant of management control practices 
as a result of the budget position.  This view was supported by the WM4 who remarked: 
 
‘I find the CEO has a lot more grasp of the finances than he had a few years ago.  
He would be far more clued in to those figures than he would have been a few 
years ago. But yet again we didn’t have problems back then.  But we have such a 
serious problem here now and that he has to be more interested and more on top 
of it.  The other members [WM] would be same’.                (WM4)  
 
WM were also required to formulate CCPs that identified cost containment initiatives to 
ensure that activity control targets were achieved within the newly allocated budgets 
(Section 6.1.1). Furthermore, it was suggested that the importance of budget control 
information in the evaluation of organisational performance was amplified.  The WM5 
remarked: 
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‘We have the boys [HSE Management] watching us morning, noon and night and 
holding us accountable all of the time.   But at the same time we are sensible, 
pragmatic, committed people who put people first.  And at the end of the day it’s 
all very well for the boys in Dublin to be saying, do it this way and do it that way 
and do the other, they are not here at the coal face watching what’s coming in and 
out’                                                   (WM5) 
 
WM also perceived that explanations for budget variances were unlikely to be accepted. The 
WM2 commented:   
 
‘I suppose it’s been made very clear to us from the people that we report to that 
this is the budget you have to work with and…it’s to try and stretch it as far as 
possible.  This year we are finding it almost impossible.  We are really struggling 
this year. We thought last year was bad at the time.  But this year it’s a lot worse. 
However, HSE Management don’t want to listen to excuses.                     (WM2)   
 
The WM4 also explained that meetings were being arranged with HSE Management meeting 
on a daily basis to discussed budget control issues. The WM5 maintained that, while the 
Hospital’s budget had been reduced each year for the last four years, it was the budget 
reduction in 2012 that was going to have the biggest impact in terms of influencing attitudes. 
He commented:  
 
‘The low-hanging fruit is gone.  The juice is all squeezed.  All the proverbs and 
analogies you want to use.  It’s really going to start hitting us this year.  And yet 
this year is the biggest cut we have got over the last four years.  We have never 
discharged so many patients in 2011 in the history of 32 years as a hospital.  We 
have never seen so many out-patients.  And we have never seen so many people in 
A&E with €80m less. What price or consequence is that coming at? So Christ, we 
were very comfortable up to then’.                       (WM5) 
 
The WM2 believed that anxiety had increased as a result of the fiscal problems: 
‘The way the Troika are operating at the moment, we don’t know what’s going to 
come down the track for staff….or you know the cuts and the salary freezes and all 
that.  The financial implications for all of us going home at the end of the week 
you know, do you have a job and all that…you know.  That has influenced 
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behaviour, probably in a positive way in relation to control issues though’. (WM2)
  
The following example was provided by the WM2 to describe how the fiscal uncertainty had 
influenced her own attitudes. 
  
‘It’s out there in black and white that the country is in such dire straits, you 
know….I suppose everybody has a part to play.  And signing off on that overtime 
sheet I am not going to do so quickly anymore.                             (WM2) 
 
However, the findings suggest that there was a limit to the extent to which increased budget 
emphasis would lead to improved performance.  The implications of this issue will be 
discussed further in Sections 7.1.1 and 7.1.2. 
 
The SM3 felt the impact of the economic crisis on individuals would differ depending on the 
age profile of the individual. It was believed that older individuals who had worked in 
healthcare during the 1980s would react more positively. The SM3 commented: 
 
‘It depends how long you have been in the service. I’m in the service quite a long 
time so I remember the late 1980’s when the old adage was you couldn’t buy a 
pack of paper clips if you wanted to. Then we moved on from that and it changed 
and we moved on to the good times. Money was spent on ridiculous things. The 
people that were there in the 1980s understand what this new reality is.’    (SM3) 
 
Thus, the findings suggested that the fiscal problems affecting the public sector in Ireland 
were causing management in Woodford to be increasingly cognisant of the activities 
associated with the operation of budget control practices. The implications of this issue will 
be discussed further in Sections 7.1.1 and 7.1.2. 
 
It was also noted in a small number of interviews that the increasing demand for hospital 
services and continued advancements in medical treatments and philosophies had influenced 
the operation of budget control practices.  The EChair explained this in the context of stroke 
treatment: 
‘Technology is increasing. Twenty years ago if you had a stroke that was tough. 
Whereas now, we can do all sorts of things. That’s the joy of the job. But the 
budget doesn’t necessarily reflect these changes’.              (EChair) 
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This comment suggests that management control practices must reflect changes in the 
delivery of healthcare services if individuals are to respond favourably to their operation.   
 
6.2.2.2 Public Scrutiny  
The use made of management control information by the local and national media was 
perceived as having a significant impact on responses to the operation of the related 
practices.  Many interviewees, across the different management groups, were frustrated by 
the media’s continued focus on ‘bad’ news stories and the HSE’s failure to defend its 
employees.  The EConsul commented:  
 
‘Somebody to fire half of RTE would be very nice, because they give such biased 
reports.  They just forever give negative stories. Nobody takes the media to task.  
That would make a big difference, straight away’.                   (EConsul) 
 
The SM5 also addressed this issue. She felt that the HSE needed to be more proactive in 
communicating positive developments.  
 
‘The HSE should be more proactive in terms of their communications about what 
actually has been done and accomplished, you will always hear about the 
negative.                                                                (SM5) 
Although the WM4 did not believe that media scrutiny directly influenced his own attitude, 
he found it discouraging that media pressure could result in the political system altering a 
stated intention. He remarked:  
 
‘The frustration…. say somebody goes to the media with an issue and suddenly a 
solution is found. That’s very frustrating.  You are there trying to hold the line 
saying, this is the budget we have got and we have to live within it.  And then an 
external pressure comes on, a politician or media or somebody… and you are 
made to look fairly foolish. You are completely undermined.  It’s very difficult to 
come back the next week.’                                (WM4)
           
The issue of increased public scrutiny as a result of the fiscal pressure the country was 
experiencing was also found to affect attitudes. The general opinion was that the public had 
lost confidence in the hospital sector’s ability to manage its operation.  An example of how 
this issue had influenced the public responses was provided by the ONSM, who explained:  
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‘And you know they are the patients, they are the people that come through the 
service.  So everybody is vigilant.  And they are watching… they are on the radio 
every day and they are saying, well you know now there was three people at that 
reception desk, I didn’t see  them doing anything….what are they doing’.  (ONSM) 
 
Media scrutiny and public expectations were suggested to have a positive effect on attitudes 
to management control practices in terms of determining the extent of attention paid to 
management control practices. While interviewees were critical of the HSE’s inability to 
communicate positive developments, it was noted that media attention was unlikely to 
improve individual attitudes. Furthermore, it was suggested that the public expectations of 
greater accountability and efficiency were likely to have a positive impact on responses to 
the operation of management control practices.  
 
6.2.2.3 Political Interference  
Political interference was perceived as an influence in terms of decisions being made based 
on political considerations rather than management control information. The general opinion 
was that the advancement of political agendas rather than hospital objectives generated 
feelings of frustration, which resulted in individuals becoming uninterested in the operation 
of management control practices. For example, the CConsul explained that DoH had 
sanctioned a treatment, of dubious merit, that would take approximately €5 million from the 
healthcare budget. He viewed this decision as absurd in the context of his mandate to reduce 
activity. Furthermore, several interviewees believed that the DoH were often critical of the 
HSE and also that the DoH restricted the HSE’s authority. For example WM3 maintained 
that the DoH needed to assume one role and not both and, if it wanted to retain the authority 
to make decisions, it needed to accept the responsibility. Alternatively, it could delegate the 
authority to the HSE and hold it accountable. The WM3 asserted:  
 
‘I think there is far too much interplay of the political system with healthcare 
management. I don’t have an issue with that as long as we stand up and say that’s 
the case.  But I have a real issue with the fact that the politicians can complain 
about the HSE. But on the other level they can influence it on the basis that we 
can’t make decisions unless it’s agreed right through to the top’.                  (WM3) 
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Overall, the interviews suggested that political interference was having a detrimental effect 
on attitudes to management control practices and that it generated a sense of infuriation, 
which resulted in both clinicians and managers becoming apathetic to activities associated 
with the operation of management control practices. The implications of this issue are 
discussed in Section 7.1.5 
6.2.3 Management Control Factors 
The preliminary findings indicated that the HSE was responsible for the design of 
management control practices. Furthermore, they showed that features of the management 
control practices, including the appropriateness of management control information, and 
performance evaluation processes, were perceived to influence attitudes to the operation of 
these practices. The main phase interviews sought to further explore this issue by examining 
how the appropriateness of the management control information was perceived to have 
affected attitudes and responses. 
 
6.2.3.1 Appropriateness of Management Control Information  
The preliminary findings pointed to the difficulties associated with providing appropriate 
management control information. With respect to budget control, it was delineated in Section 
6.1.1 that the Finance Department is responsible for providing budget control information. 
The three main budget categories reported were: (i) pay, (ii) non-pay and (iii) income. This 
method of monitoring expenditure and income was perceived by many interviewees as 
inadequate. The WM3 remarked:  
 
‘When the Hospital talks about a budget, it talks about what we spend. It doesn’t 
really talk about budgeting. It talks about income and expenditure estimates. It 
doesn’t talk about budgeting or planning for the next period’.                      (WM3) 
 
It was believed among interviewees that prevailing budget information did not facilitate 
divisional accountability and autonomy (Section 6.2.1.2 and 6.2.1.3) and they, therefore, 
suggested that departmental budget information was required. The EConsul remarked:  
 
‘You cannot run a department if you don’t know what the budget is.  You need the 
information. You need a coherent budget.  While I was Chair of this division, 
which was over a ten-year period, I never once saw a departmental budget. That is 
  
146 
 
simply ridiculous. How can you control something, if you don’t have the 
information?’                                                                                     (EConsul) 
 
The WM5 explained that WM would closely monitor budget control information in order to 
prevent and, correct unfavourable deviations from the budget. He explained: 
 
‘On a monthly basis we get a report as to how each expense category is 
performing.  But no individual manager has a budget for his department. What 
happens is that WM get the report.  We note what’s going up, what’s going down.  
We go after a particular division or department line manager….        (WM5) 
 
In addition, it was argued that the provision of activity-based budget control information 
would be more appropriate, given the complexity of the core operating process. The 
following example was provided by the WM3 to illustrate how activity-based budget control 
information could be utilised.  
 
‘If I go to a consultant and say, we only have this much of a budget, therefore you 
can perform X number of these procedures this year.  You can choose which ones 
you do. If I can do that, then the reality is, they will be unhappy, but at least they 
will know. They don’t want to be told in September, you can only do ten more 
before the end of the year.                               (WM3) 
 
However, the WM3 believed that the Irish hospital system was ‘light years away from being 
able to provide that type of information’.  The provision of individual cost information was 
also suggested to be deficient. The WM3 said that, on returning to work in the Irish system 
in 2001, he was fascinated by the limited individual cost information that could be provided.  
This issue was also addressed by other interviewees who believed that the provision of 
budget information was restricted by the Finance Department. For example, the SM4 
remarked: 
 
‘Even if you consider some basic examples, if you had a range of dressings on the 
ward, if you put the price up next to each dressing then somebody could say, “I 
didn’t realise that.  I can use A instead of B.”  At the moment, you are not able to 
do that. However, if you give them the information, at least they can make an 
informed decision’.                                   (SM3) 
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The implications of this issue are further highlighted in Sections 7.2.2 and 7.3.3. 
 
The appropriateness of operational control information was also discussed and a number of 
different issues were addressed. Firstly, it was thought that most operational control 
information was generated in order to meet the reporting requirements of the HSE.  The 
EChair remarked: 
 
‘Yes we have more information now.  I get a weekly report to tell me how many 
people have come through, what their triage categories were, how long they 
waited. But that’s all because it’s being asked for centrally.  More is necessary. I 
would like a data control purpose of my own, so I could know what’s happening 
on a day-to-day basis as opposed to being told about it a month later.   (EChair)           
 
Secondly, interviewees believed that there was a lack of appropriate operational control 
information provided that was relevant to Woodford was an important issue. In this regard, it 
was suggested that achieving management control was cumbersome because the information 
required was not available. The following example was provided by the WM2 to illustrate 
the issue: 
 
‘If I wanted to look at what Professor X has done in surgery, I have no way of 
getting that information other than going down to the theatre book and manually 
working my way back through it’.                                                                (WM3) 
 
The WM3 also provided an example of where the provision of operational control 
information had improved organisation control. Recently, the Hospital had implemented a 
system of reporting ‘average length of stay’ information. It was explained that, in the past, it 
was difficult to assess the performance of an individual clinician’s ‘average length of stay’ 
rates as the control information was not available. Although clinicians were initially 
concerned about the provision of this information, following its publication, the majority 
were pleased with the development.   
Lastly, the provision of appropriate operational control information relevant to clinical 
decisions was not available. Interviewees in Emergency Division were particularly vexed by 
this issue, with the EConsul asserting:   
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‘You can’t run a department without data.  And you can’t run it, except for going 
around and visually seeing things, which is great…which is management on the 
shop floor.  But I can’t improve anything.                                    (EConsul)      
 
The EConsul maintained that the lack of operational control information available was as a 
consequence of the ‘HSE’s bad attitude to data’. He also suggested that it was a 
consequence of having ‘no carrot and no stick’, referring to a lack of reasons for inputting 
management control information and consequences of not doing so.  
 
In contrast, interviewees from Cardiac Division were more positive in their perceptions 
regarding the appropriateness of the operational control information. While acknowledging 
that the provision of appropriate control information was a ‘huge elephant in the healthcare 
system in Ireland’, the CChair indicated that his division was ‘fortunate to have robust 
information’. He remarked: 
 
‘We have fantastic data on our length of stay, per condition, etc. It feeds back to 
the entire team what we are doing well on, and what we have to work on.  So I 
think information is critically important to be properly informed’.        (CChair)  
 
Finally, the appropriateness of activity control information was addressed. The general 
opinion was that the provision of activity control information should, in theory, be useful. 
However, the demand-led nature of providing services meant that activity planning 
information was of little benefit.  The following is an example of a typical interviewee 
comment:  
 
‘Academically…or in any business management book, activity planning is 
reported as a good idea. However, to be honest because of the practicalities of 
running a hospital and managing a hospital and working in a hospital, it doesn’t 
get the attention sometimes you would think it should get.  There are no weekly or 
monthly plans per se…. and decisions made as a consequence of being…. or 
seeing too many patients this month.’                                                             (WM2) 
Therefore, the findings highlighted the inability of the activity control practice to manage the 
complexity of the core operating processes as influencing attitudes and perceptions. This 
issue is further discussed in Section 7.3.3. 
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6.2.3.2 Performance Evaluation 
The preliminary phase pointed to performance evaluation being an important issue. The 
general opinion was that there were no consequences, favourable or adverse, associated with 
the operation of management control practices. The main phase interviews sought to 
investigate this issue further. The findings suggested that performance evaluation was having 
an impact on individual, group and organisational responses. At an individual level, the 
ONSM explained that many individuals (e.g. nurse managers and consultants) had the 
authority to sanction additional work hours. It was her view that, if an audit was conducted, 
it would be found that very little verification of the work being completed was being carried 
out.  
 
‘There should be repercussions. I can sign off on anything right now. It’s down to 
myself and my own integrity. It’s down to the individual taking it seriously. In the 
private sector you would be fired’.                             (ONSM) 
 
This comment by the ONSM provides further support for the suggestion made in Section 
6.2.1.2 that a lack of accountability was perceived to be an important issue influencing 
responses to the operation of management control practices. The ONSM believed that a lack 
of consequences resulted in apathetic behaviour.  She maintained that, until penalties for 
inappropriate behaviour were introduced, it was going to be difficult to ensure that 
individuals behaved in a manner consistent with the objectives of management control 
practices.  
The WM2 cited ‘security of tenure’ as another important factor influencing responses to the 
operation of these practices. It was the WM2’s opinion that, when an individual was 
performing below the level of the ‘status quo’ [level of performance expected], it would be 
decided to move him or her to a different section of the organisation, rather than dealing with 
the poor performance. The WM3 reported that failure to meet performance targets had no 
repercussions for individuals at any level in the Hospital. This was contrasted with other 
healthcare sectors, where failure to achieve such targets could result in job losses. However, 
the WM2 remarked, ‘it’s no secret that our jobs were threatened last year if we didn’t sort 
our budget’, which would suggest a number of individuals had been advised that failure to 
meet control targets would have individual consequences.  
 
The SM3 suggested that a lack of repercussions for an individual under-performing could 
influence both the response of the individual in question and also the responses of others. 
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The SM3 commented, ‘if you get people who are underperforming and somebody works very 
hard next to them, they end up with the same salary, the same benefits and that can 
disincentivise people’. In this way, the findings suggested that a lack of repercussions 
influenced individual responses to the operation of management control practices. While 
acknowledging that, unlike the private sector, it was not possible to give extrinsic rewards, 
some interviewees suggested that the Hospital could do more to intrinsically reward 
individuals. The CBM commented: 
 
‘I think a lot can be achieved by closing the loop and acknowledging people. 
Sharing and celebrating success is also important. Give people just a little leeway, 
be compassionate. I say thank you all of the time, that’s all I can do, but I am 
acknowledged here for saying it’.                         (CBM) 
 
However, the EChair did not agree that fostering a positive working environment would 
result in individuals engaging with activities associated with the operation of management 
control practices. Rather, he maintained that tangible benefits that appealed to the vocational 
aspirations of individuals were of far greater motivational importance. The EChair 
commented: 
‘Staff should be rewarded when they do well. Not financial rewarded.  Staffs 
aren’t looking be to financially rewarded. They are not even looking for a box of 
chocolates at the end of the month.  And it’s not a thank you, because that’s all 
derogatory ****.’                                           (EChair)  
 
The implications of this issue are further examined in Section 7.2.3. 
 
At an organisational level, the findings suggested that there were no incentives in place to 
encourage Clinician Divisions to engage with management control practices.  For example, 
the OChair noted that there was no impetus for divisions to reduce expenditure because any 
saving achieved could not be reinvested in the division. The OChair remarked: 
 
‘We might try to save money in one area, if you thought you could invest in 
another area.  You could do that in the UK. Here you don’t control the budget.’  
                                      (OChair)  
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Interviewees mentioned a reward process that had operated from 2009 to 2011. The WM2 
explained that, in order to increase the amount of private income generated, the Finance 
Department had implemented an evaluation process, which would reward divisions that 
maximised their private income. The EM1 explained that, where income increased, 2 per 
cent of the extra income was given to the Nurse Service Managers. The WM2 explained how 
the money had been used: ‘they would use it for buying equipment, or buying new curtains 
or getting some painting done. They would really use it to brighten up their wards or do 
something for their patients’. The WM2 recalled how difficult it was to award the funding in 
2011: 
 
‘At this time last year it was difficult. We were overrun on the budget. We had 
managers saying “you said you would give us the money”. I said “we have to give 
them the money. We will lose kudos.” Christ we were struggling to save money 
left, right and centre. But we made a promise earlier in the year that if you 
increase income we would reward.                                                         (WM2)  
 
Significantly, the decision was made in 2012 not to allocate the funding. In reference to this 
decision, the WM2 remarked:  
 
‘Every ward I go into; I get “why should we be bothered”. You go right back on 
your word. Now it’s gone into the pot of money. If we are seen to spend a penny 
more than what we are meant to be spending, we will be murdered.  I think it was 
the wrong decision’.                                                           (WM2) 
 
The WM2’s comment suggested that failure to follow through with the performance process 
had generated a feeling of disillusionment, which was likely to have a negative impact upon 
responses to the operation of management control practices. Furthermore, it was perceived 
that the reason for not rewarding performance was the fear that HSE management would 
disapprove. The implications of this issue are further discussed in Section 7.1.4. 
 
HSE evaluation processes were found to have an impact. As cited in the preliminary 
findings, the view articulated by interviewees was that the achievement of a control target 
resulted in a more challenging target being set. In contrast, if a control target was not 
achieved; additional resources would be provided to support its attainment.  The implications 
of this issue were articulated by the SM3, who suggested: 
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‘Historically the view from a budget perspective was the organisation who over-
spent the budget got more the next year and the organisation who under-spent 
their budget got almost penalised. So there is no incentive not to spend money. 
Whereas it should work the other way around. The organisation that makes real 
efforts to reduce costs should get some tangible benefit’.               (SM3) 
 
This failure to put in place penalties for not meeting management control targets was 
suggested to have resulted in individuals losing respect for the budgeting process.  The WM4 
noted: 
 
‘One of the problems is that last year, we did go over budget. But there was money 
found somewhere. Probably this year is the first year, when there might be a 
penalty.  At least that what’s being said. But the problem is when I ask if more 
money will be found.  I haven’t got a categorical “no, there’s no more money.”  
That’s a problem for local managers.  If we cut and then there’s money found we 
will look like complete idiots’.                                                                       (WM4)  
 
The WM4 also explained that in an effort to strengthen discussions with HSE management 
and to relieve tensions associated with the inflexible approach adopted, the Director of 
Nursing (WM2) and the Clinical Director (WM3) of Woodford had begun to attend 
performance evaluation meetings.  
 
‘We find it very good for Director of Nursing and Clinical Director to come with 
us to these meetings.  Because they can talk from the coal face… HSE 
management are only administrators and they can’t argue with a Clinical 
Director. We could be talking forever about this, but they pay attention to a 
Director of Nursing’.                                                                                       (WM4) 
 
The findings suggested that this approach had been advantageous as it facilitated a better 
understanding of the operational repercussions of budget targets and was, therefore, more 
likely to be accepted by HSE management.  The implications of the organisational reward 
processes are further examined in Section 7.1.3. 
 
6.2.3.3 Communication of Management Control Information 
Overall, the communication of management control information was perceived as an 
important issue influencing responses to the operation of management control practices. The 
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WM2 discussed the communication of management control information between the HSE 
and Woodford Management. He made reference to the HSE’s organogram (presented in 
Appendix B) and gave his view that, in theory, the communication of control information 
between HSE and Woodford Management was candid but, in reality, at the various 
hierarchical levels, individual managers were not concerned with telling their superior 
managers their real issues, preferring instead to tell them ‘what they want to hear, rather 
than what the truth is’. He suggested that this skewed communication of control information 
had an injurious impact upon responses to the operation of management control practices. He 
commented: 
 
‘I think if you look at the organogram of the HSE, it looks like it should work very 
effectively.  I think one of the problems is that, there is a lack of honesty in 
communication. I think, very often, local managers are concerned about telling 
HSE managers what their real concerns or issues are.  The same goes on up to the 
national managers and on up into the political system. People get told what they 
want to hear, rather than what the truth is’.                                       (WM2) 
 
The WM2 also provided the following example to illustrate the significance of this issue. 
 
‘In August the whole thing about hospitals being €250m over budget and they are 
going to be €500m over by the end of the year.  Suddenly we are told we have to 
fix it.  So you get into a process of planning what you are going to do to achieve 
that.  So you put together a plan.  But there’s a discomfort with that plan because 
it’s going to affect services more than we really want them to be affected.  And 
maybe that’s going to be difficult to communicate publicly.  So we spend quite a 
bit of time being told, no, that’s not agreed yet ‘.                   (WM2) 
 
Evidence was also provided to suggest that WM did not know what would happen in the 
final months of 2012. While, on the one hand, they hoped that additional resources would be 
provided in order to ensure that services could be delivered, the findings also suggest that 
they would be frustrated if this had occurred, as they had consistently been asserting the need 
for financial austerity to be implemented within the Hospital. The WM3 commented: 
 
‘One of the problems that we had last year is that we really did go over budget.  
But there was money found somewhere in the system. The problem is that, for us 
as managers we are in that grey area that we don’t know…like we really feel we 
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need to really cut out this and cut out this. But if we cut them out, and then there’s 
money found we will look like complete idiots’.                                     (WM3) 
 
Notably, the phase ‘complete idiots’ was also used by WM4, suggesting that this issue may 
have already being discussed amongst Woodford Management.  The implications of this 
issue are further examined in Section 7.1.3.  
 
The communication of management control information within Woodford was also 
suggested to influence responses to the operation of management control practices.  Many 
interviewees felt that management control information was not effectively communicated. 
The SM2 explained that organisational arrangements had been established in order to ensure 
that managers at each level in the organisation received management control information; 
however, he believed that if an audit of the control information were to be conducted, it 
would find that very little management control information was being disseminated.  The 
following comment by the WM2 suggested that the concerns of the SM3 were correct:  
 
‘If people knew costs, if people knew the implications, it would make a huge 
difference.  People don’t.  They haven’t a clue.  We are probably at fault for that 
one’.                                                                                                       (WM2)  
 
The perception among interviewees was that the communication of management control 
information within Woodford was poor. Management control information was only available 
to individuals at the apex of the organisation. Reasons suggested for explaining this problem 
included the prioritisation of patient care and an overreliance on email. The SM1 explained 
that, as a result of budget constraints, clinician managers were increasingly prioritising the 
delivery of healthcare services, which had an impact on attendance at meetings where 
management control information was discussed.  
 
Many interviewees suggested that the Hospital had become over-reliant on email as a form 
of communication. It was maintained that email was an ineffective form of communication 
and there was a need to increase face-to-face communication across the entire organisation.  
 
Ultimately, it was indicated that the inability to communicate pertinent management control 
information was a problem. The SM2 remarked:  
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‘Now people will say that the people on the ground have no interest. But I think 
that people have an interest, everybody talks about, being €250m over budget at 
the end of July.  That’s a very notional figure… you need to get down to an 
individual level, otherwise it just flows off people’s tongues…and people don’t 
know whether they are talking about millions or billions ‘.                          (SM2) 
 
In this way, the interview data suggest that individuals need to be more aware of what the 
management control measures are, why they have been chosen and how they are calculated. 
The greater the transparency in the communication of management control information, the 
greater the satisfaction levels of individuals, which will have a direct effect on their attitudes 
and responses. The implications of this issue are further examined in Sections 7.1.5 and 
7.3.4. 
 
6.2.3.4 Establishment of Performance Measures and Targets  
The selection of performance measures was perceived to be an important factor influencing 
responses to the operation of management control practices. The SM4 felt that an excess of 
performance measures were being captured and that there was a discrepancy in the 
measurement processes. The WM3 also addressed this aspect, maintaining that the excessive 
number of performance measures was causing individuals to lose focus. The WM3 
remarked: 
 
‘There are too many measures at the moment, which don’t necessarily align. 
There needs to be some rationalising of the performance measures because the 
amount of work that goes into collecting this information is significant. Also, 
people lose focus when there are too many different measures’.          (WM3) 
 
The WM4 suggested that the collection of management control information was also an 
important issue, highlighting that the majority of information was collated by HSE 
management. The WM4 commented: 
 
‘We would very much rely on the HSE Region for our reports. Everything comes 
from them. So they actually see it before we do. Whereas in other industries, I have 
worked in, you could look at the information during a period and see how things 
are going. I can’t do that at present. You don’t get it until the end of the month. So 
the systems are very limited’.                            (WM4) 
 
  
156 
 
The implications of this issue will be discussed in Sections 7.1.5. 
 
The performance measures selected were perceived by some interviewees as uncontrollable. 
For example, the WM5 explained that it was difficult to hold individuals accountable for 
them, as often they did not have control over them. The following example was provided by 
the WM5: 
 
‘We hold pathologists accountable for re-agent spend. However, when I discuss it 
with them, they will argue, we don’t ask for the test, the consultants do. Why am I 
responsible for the re-agent spend of €6 million? I buy it, I use it, but Jesus I am 
not drinking it. I am using it because someone else asked for it. Therefore, I do 
think it is difficult to hold them accountable for something they have no control 
over’.                                                                   (WM5) 
 
This issue of controllability was also related to the high task uncertainty associated with the 
healthcare context (discussed in Section 6.3.2.4). Many interviewees felt that the demand-led 
nature of the healthcare services influenced the Hospital’s ability to meet management 
control targets. The OBM remarked: 
 
‘And there’s very little of that that we can control. We have to treat emergencies, 
which is 80 per cent of what’s coming through the door.  You have to treat cancer, 
cardiac. Thus there is very little we can control’.                (OBM) 
 
A final issue influencing the appropriateness of performance measures was the Hospital’s 
inability to adjust a weighty portion of its total budget. The WM3 maintained ‘the biggest 
problem with the health budget is that realistically 70 per cent of it we can’t touch because 
it’s salaries. Therefore, we have been making the big savings in areas such as non-pay and 
eventually that starts to impact on patient care’.  
 
Thus, many of the performance measures selected were perceived as uncontrollable, given 
the complexity associated with the core operating process. Perceptions of uncontrollability 
were suggested to generate feelings of unfairness, which have a detrimental effect on 
responses to the operation of management control practices. The implications of this issue 
are further discussed in Section 7.3.3.  
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6.2.4 Individual Factors 
The findings indicated that there were a number of individual factors influencing the 
operation of management control practices. The findings regarding individual factors broadly 
focused on understanding how the relationship between clinician and management 
influenced responses to the operation of management control practices. These results are 
discussed under four headings: (i) professional orientation, (ii) participation, (iii) personality 
and (iv) working relationships.  
 
6.2.4.1 Professional Orientation 
The majority of interviewees believed that an individual’s professional orientation 
influenced their responses to the operation of management control practices. The data 
suggested that the goals of the management control practices, which were to improve 
efficiency, were often in conflict with the professional objectives of clinicians. The WM3 
felt that clinician reluctance to accept management control practices was related to their 
inability to identify with efficiency-related goals. The WM3 commented:  
 
‘It goes back to the clinician wanting to treat his/her patients and control 
practices trying to manage the available budget to treat all patients. And if the 
expectation of the clinician is that they can treat what walks through the door, 
without concern for budget or otherwise, then that’s their expectation.  If we have 
to put controls in place then that’s inevitably a hamper on what they want to 
achieve.  So there’s an automatic conflict there.                           (WM3)  
 
In this regard, the WM3’s perception was that these conflicts of interest between clinicians 
and management control practices were spontaneous and based on the professional 
objectives of clinicians, in that clinicians were focused on the needs of individual patients, 
while management control practices focused on organisational objectives. Nevertheless, it 
was suggested that improved communication was essential in order to ensure that 
dysfunctional outcomes did not occur. The WM3 added, ‘it was only in recent years, due to 
the recession, that this was becoming an important issue’.  
 
The OConsul maintained that the primary role of a clinician was to be a patient advocate. 
She summarised her position on clinician involvement with management control practices as 
follows: 
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‘We are there for the patients.  That is first and foremost. We have had incidents 
whereby we have had to fight really hard to get drugs for people. We would never 
accept being told, sorry, there’s no money for drug x…., you keep going …. until 
you get it.  I didn’t go into medicine to limit the service’.                       (OConsul) 
 
The OConsul went on to acknowledge that, on many occasions, she used the line, ‘in my 
clinical judgement’. However, it was felt that this argument was becoming increasing 
difficult to win. The OConsul noted, ‘now they want proof’.  When asked how she had dealt 
with the request for evidence, she responded:  
 
‘Occasionally we have had to push at kind of national level if we feel that… 
something is worth prescribing and it’s very expensive. We have always got it’.     
                                      (OConsul) 
 
The OConsul’s remark provides further support for the importance of political 
interference in decision-making (discussed in Section 6.2.2.3). Moreover, it suggested 
that clinicians had achieved their objectives every time. The OConsul also believed that 
that not all clinicians wanted to be involved in the management of healthcare resources. 
She suggested that clinicians should be given the option to become involved or not. She 
indicated that those who did not wish to have a managerial role were either opposed to it 
because they did not want to cut back on their clinical practice or because they feel they 
would be unsuited to the role. She expressed the following view:  
 
‘The problem is that most people go into medicine to be doctors.  If you gave me a 
choice I would do more clinical work and far less administrative work.  I think 
most of the clinicians would be like that.  I think you are being pulled into 
healthcare management ….. I think you should be given maybe a choice. Also 
some clinicians don’t have the skills necessary to undertake these roles’.          
                                      (OConsul) 
 
The issue of clinicians having the necessary skills and attributes required to effectively 
engage with management control practices was discussed with the WM3. He identified the 
four most important attributes that will influence a clinician’s ability to engage with 
management control practices as follows:  
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‘First, they have to have an interest in actually managing healthcare.  Two, that 
they are not afraid to challenge their colleagues.  Three, an understanding of the 
limited resources with which we work.  Finally, you need a broad understanding 
of medicine’.                                    (WM3)  
 
Some interviewees suggested that the sensitivity of clinicians to the goals of efficiency were 
changing. The WM2 attributed this change to the reduction in autonomy. She observed:  
 
‘In the last number of months, I have seen a huge change in them, they [clinicians] 
are becoming more reasonable and they understand now.  Whereas they were very 
aloof, they didn’t come to the meetings.  We do have them more engaged now.’                     
                                         (WM2) 
 
Other interviewees did not agree with this view, but rather suggested that clinicians 
continued to remain reluctant to accept efficiency-related goals. The OBM suggested that 
clinicians relied upon their professional knowledge and freedom to guard against the 
operation of management control practices. He commented: 
 
‘I have sat in meetings …. where I said “look our capacity to treat here is 
limited.”  We are running at dangerously high levels.  There are ways that we can 
reduce our activity by using different treatment modalities but then the three words 
can be mentioned. My clinical judgement.  That’s it…. once those three words 
come out…I am done.  My authority has been wiped out…with three words’. 
(OBM) 
 
The WM4 also considered that his ability to challenge the decisions of clinicians was 
restricted. He explained that when clinicians are asked to change the medical device used, 
they will often refuse, arguing that the device suggested would not produce the same results, 
and he felt that he did not have the medical expertise to challenge this point.  
 
This perception of clinicians exploiting their professional expertise was also addressed by 
the OChair. It was her belief that clinicians regularly put forward an argument based on 
medical expertise that was fallacious. The OChair commented: 
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‘People can say “in my clinical judgement this person needs to be treated as an 
emergency.”  It happens all the time here.  And it’s not an emergency.  I have seen 
people argue things that I know are not true’.                         (OChair)  
 
Therefore, the findings suggest variation in perceptions between interviewees with regard to 
whether or not clinician reluctance is weakening. The WM3 suggested that there was an 
increasing need for management to be supported by clinicians when implementing 
management control practices. In Woodford Hospital, the Clinical Director and the Director 
of Nursing were viewed as instrumental in enabling clinician control to be achieved.  
Similarly, the WM2 provided an example of where she was able to utilise her clinical 
knowledge to help clinicians understand the consequences of their apathetic responses to the 
operation of management control practices. She commented:  
 
I am able to argue it, because I have clinical knowledge.  I would say, hang on 
now a second, you know, this is the situation, this is the patient, this is what’s 
happened.                                                                                       (WM2) 
 
The CBM suggested that there were ‘methods’ which could be used to ensure that clinicians 
cooperated with management control practices. She explained that, in order to ensure that 
clinicians in her department engaged with management control practices, she would 
‘negotiate with them’. She commented: 
 
‘A big bug bear at the moment is the non-compliance with the private health 
insurance claims.  There are about €5 million of unprocessed claims at the 
moment.  So if they want anything, they are told, your claims aren’t cleared. There 
has to be give and take’.                                                      (CBM) 
 
Clinicians also suggested that they were highly competitive by nature and argued that, if 
management control practices could exploit these characteristics, this would lead to greater 
clinician involvement. The OConsul remarked:  
 
‘I think if you put a little bit of competition into most things it gives people a bit 
more focus.  Because…you know you mightn’t be best in class but nobody wants to 
be bottom of the pile, I think it does drive performance …. A little bit of pride 
comes into it’.                                               (OConsul) 
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Some interviewees suggested that the influence of professional orientation differed 
depending on the background and experience of the individual clinician. It was maintained 
that younger clinicians who had experience of working in other healthcare systems were 
much more likely to respond favourably to the operation of management control practices.   
 
Therefore, the evidence points to the professional orientation of individuals constituting an 
important factor influencing responses to the operation of management control practices. In 
particular, it was found that the professional goals of clinicians can often be in conflict with 
the objectives of management control practices. The implications of the issues addressed in 
this section are further examined in Sections 7.3.1 and 7.3.2.   
 
6.2.4.2 Participation and Education  
Many clinicians were sceptical about the commitment of management to involving 
clinicians. Examples were provided of decisions being taken by WM without any attempt to 
obtain clinician views and opinions. For example, the EChair explained that the WM had 
recently decided to stop ordering a particularly expensive drug used to prevent chemotherapy 
patients from vomiting. While recognising that this may have been a good decision, as a 
cheaper alternative was available, he also stressed that, in this context, it should be 
recognised that the ‘law of unintended consequences was huge’. He explained that the drug 
was also used to treat children who were suffering from gastroenteritis and, if the drug was 
given to such children, they could be monitored for a couple of hours and then discharged. 
However, the EChair had noticed a large number of children being admitted; when he 
questioned why, he discovered that the children were being admitted because the drug was 
no longer available. The EChair remarked:  
 
‘So I have had to go and make the case. Which when I explain it, will make sense. 
But it will take me a week or two to fix it.  But that decision was taken remotely.  
And I understand it.  It’s nothing personal.  You know it wasn’t “let’s screw that 
department”. But it’s the unwieldy centralised nature of things that I find very 
frustrating’.                                  (EChair) 
 
This example given by the EChair provides further support for the suggestion made in 
Sections 6.2.1.1 and 6.2.3.3 that the structural arrangements prevalent in Woodford are not 
fostering effective communication between management and clinicians. The implications of 
these issues will be discussed further in Section 7.3.4. 
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In addition, several clinicians referred to the frustration they felt due to the sense of being 
distant from the decisions-makers in the Hospital. Their perception was that most decisions 
were taken by WM and that there was a real need for greater participation at a clinician 
divisional level. The OConsul commented, ‘if they even said, “we are under enormous 
pressure, please help!! Please engage.” Instead we have a cloak and dagger approach. They 
are very distant from people on the ground’. It thus emerged that clinicians seemed to value 
visibility and dialogue and to feel that they should have more contact with Woodford 
Management. Furthermore, the EConsul believed that WM only interacted with clinicians 
when there was a specific issue or problem that needed to be resolved. The EConsul 
remarked:  
‘I think the level of engagement has been poor – up to the point where the hospital 
is starting to struggle from a financial point of view.  You are never really made 
aware of the bigger picture.  You are made aware of it when it’s a problem or 
when you go looking for something, you know, they will say there’s no money for 
that’.                                        (EConsul) 
     
An example of how WM could foster greater participation from Clinician Management was 
also given by the WM2, who reflected: 
 
‘Why do all the meetings have to be to suit the manager?  Why can’t the meetings 
be in their (clinician) area? You would get a lot more involvement and a lot more 
participation if you actually move down to meet them.                (WM2) 
 
The WM2 also believed that greater participation could be fostered by investing time in 
getting to know individuals and their role in the organisation. She commented: 
 
‘Participation is a huge thing and working with the team.  You know, knowing 
who the team is…. I know it’s a big time waster sometimes, but at the end of the 
day you won’t go very far if nobody is buying in, you know’.                      (WM2) 
 
Some clinicians recognised that an attempt had been made to foster greater participation 
from clinicians. The WM4 explained that, in the past year, a monthly ‘forum’ had been 
established whereby the Clinical Director (a member of Woodford Management) would meet 
with clinicians to discuss ‘management related issues’. 
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However, many interviewees felt that clinicians were reluctant to participate with 
management control practices because of the absence of effective communication channels 
to provide updates and feedback on progress. The OChair reflected: 
 
‘I think also people have got quite cheesed off with certain things.  Like one of my 
colleagues, he got into the reconfiguration for the region. He worked very hard on, 
you know, how oncology could fit into reconfiguration. He wrote a letter saying, 
you know, could he have some feedback.  He still hasn’t heard anything.  I think he 
was fairly cheesed off after all his efforts’                   (OChair) 
 
Thus, it was suggested that the more clinicians were allowed to participate in the operation 
of management control practices, the more likely it was that they would respond favourably. 
This issue of clinician participation will be explored in further detail in Section 7.3.4. 
Interviewees also suggested that clinicians were slow to participate because of their pre-
existing ineffective working relationships with Woodford Management. This issue will be 
discussed in detail in Section 6.3.4.4.   
 
The issue of training and education was also discussed. Some interviewees suggested that 
clinician training and education encouraged them to work as individuals. They argued that, 
through their training, clinicians had learnt to be independent and competitive; therefore, 
engaging with management control practices that expect individuals to share responsibility 
with others was difficult. The CChair also recognised that clinicians needed to increasingly 
work as ‘teams’. However, he believed that this did not occur naturally and that management 
control practices and structural arrangements needed to encourage this to take place.  
 
With regard to the provision of training and education, the opinions expressed were mixed. 
The WM2 believed that the managerial training provided was more than adequate but that 
the ability of an individual to apply their training within the organisation was an issue. She 
commented: 
 
‘Managers were trained…but it was a case of learning.  I would say we have 
spent a huge amount on education.  I am not popular for saying it.  And I will 
say it at any meeting, we haven’t got the payback for the amount of money we 
have spent on education and training.’                       (WM2)  
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The ONSM believed that it was difficult to get clinicians to participate in managerial 
training. Reflecting on the provision of training on management control practices, he 
commented: 
 
‘Training and education, there is nothing.  Plus you will find this with clinicians - 
I have just been through a project with some of the clinicians - they don’t have the 
time for training.  Now if it can be done in an hour they will say to you, “grand 
“but most training cannot be done in an hour’.                                            (ONSM) 
 
Furthermore, it was also suggested that clinicians gained valuable experience working with 
management control practices in other countries but that, upon returning to Ireland, they 
found their experience was not utilised. Therefore, it was suggested that, in order to 
overcome the difficulties associated with professional orientation, it was important that 
clinicians were educated about the need for management control practices. This issue is 
examined further in Section 7.3.2. 
 
6.2.4.3 Personality 
The personality of individual managers was also suggested to influence responses to the 
operation of management control practices. The WM2 highlighted this issue by means of an 
example. She explained that there were two diabetic clinicians working at the hospital, one 
of whom she characterised as ‘dynamic and forward thinking’, the other as ‘worlds apart’ in 
contrast. The WM2 suggested that the differing personalities caused ‘the waiting list for one 
is huge while the other one is flying through his waiting lists’. She concluded that the first 
clinician had implemented a range of procedures and policies that changed the delivery of 
services but, while she attempted to encourage the other clinician to partake, progress was 
slow.  
 
The SM4 also referred to the issue of personality, suggesting that the personality types of 
individual managers influenced the responses of subordinates working in their departments. 
She remarked:  
 
‘Some clinicians become managers and don’t do the jobs that come with being a 
manager.  As a result, some departments don’t have a culture of engagement, 
don’t have a culture of open communication, of teamwork and team building. 
Whereas I don’t do a lot of clinical work anymore, because that’s just not my job 
anymore’. (SM4) 
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The ability of managers to be effective leaders was also suggested to influence responses to 
the operation of management control practices. As the SM2 noted: 
 
‘If you have a very good leader in a group then everything rises.  If you have a 
poor leader in a group that will filter across. If you get somebody who is energised 
and positive, respects their staff, gets them on board, acknowledges their good 
work, then you create a positive attitude and that ripples out’.                (SM2) 
 
6.2.4.4 Working Relationships 
The findings suggested that the working relationship between WM and clinicians influenced 
responses to the operation of management control practices.  WM were perceived by the 
majority of clinicians to be inaccessible. As highlighted in Section 6.3.4.2, clinicians 
emphasised their difficulties in obtaining responses to their queries from WM. The OConsul 
commented:  
 
‘There is a complete lack of feedback from management. Sometimes it is an 
accomplishment to get a ‘No’ response. Too often you don’t get any response or 
worse you get “we’ll see how things go”.’                                                 OConsul) 
 
Other interviewees expressed concern that they did not know the direction WM was taking 
with regard to organisational issues. They believed that Woodford Management were 
unaware of their workloads and the pressurised pace of their work. In particular, it was 
mentioned that WM did not adopt a long-term perspective. The WM3 recognised that 
clinicians were frustrated by the inability of Woodford Management to make decisions.  The 
WM3 provided the following example:  
 
‘One great example is dealing with varicose vein treatment.  We currently do a lot 
of it in theatre. We could take it out of theatre and instead of having three nurses, 
an anaesthetist and everybody else doing it; you have one nurse specialist, the 
consultant and an administrator who will just check the patient in, check the 
patient out.  What we need for it is an appropriate room and the problem is we 
don’t have that kind of space.  We don’t have the capital funding to actually build 
or change an area. That creates frustration’.                                              (WM3) 
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Several consultants noted that the history of the relationship between WM and clinicians has 
not been a good one. In this context, they identified a lack of trust and were sceptical about 
management’s ability to overcome the issues involved. The OConsul commented:  
 
‘Management don’t have the tools or the abilities to be able to reconcile the 
tensions that are within the system. Clinicians invariably if they have been here 
long enough to develop extraordinary levels of frustration and ultimately acute 
allergy to managers within the Irish healthcare system’.           (OConsul) 
 
The OConsul also believed that WM did not do enough to ensure that Hospital achieved 
sufficient resources. The OConsul commented: 
 
‘Maybe it is that they [Woodford Management] don’t have the power to execute 
change, I suspect that they are capped.  But I would argue equally that it is their 
job to go out and fight for it.  You will see Dublin hospitals and they seem to be 
very good at putting themselves out there, asking for things.  I always felt here that 
we have a very small voice’. (OConsul) 
 
The EConsul debated if management had the appropriate training and education to overcome 
the issues that Woodford needed to confront.  
 
‘Very few managers have worked outside of the HSE. They have been promoted 
because they are here the longest - it is expected you will be promoted from grade 
5 to grade 6 or whatever. ‘To get appointed to my consultant role I had to work 
very hard, completing post-qualification courses and have a strong research 
record. Management get appointed to senior roles based on their length of 
service’                                      (EConsul) 
 
Thus, the evidence presented suggested that clinicians had a pervading sense of distrust 
regarding the ability of Woodford and HSE management to manage the organisation. The 
implications of this issue are further examined in Section 7.3.4.  
6.2.5 Summary  
In this section, a description of the contextual factors perceived to influence attitudes and 
responses to the operation of management control practices was provided. The discussion 
focused on four main areas: the organisational context in which the management control 
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practices operate; the nature of the external environment; the appropriateness of the 
management control practices themselves; and the attributes and features of the individuals 
themselves. The findings of this research reveal attitudes and responses of individuals to the 
operation of management control practices are part of a complex and contextually dependant 
process. Furthermore, the findings indicate that each of the themes identified cannot be 
considered in isolation as they are all highly interrelated. The main themes and the 
subcategories identified are presented in Figure 6.1. 
 
Figure 6.1:  Summary of Key Findings  
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6.3 Conclusion  
The existing literature and the preliminary findings suggested that the healthcare context was 
multidimensional and complex. Understanding how this complexity influences the operation 
of management control practices is important given the potential for harmful side-effects to 
occur when these practices are designed and used inappropriately. The findings from this 
study contributed to the attainment of an improved understanding of the topic. Chapter 7 
draws together the findings from both phases of the empirical work to examine how 
management control practices operate in the research context being considered. 
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
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7.0 Introduction 
The objective of the study was to explore the operation of management control practices in a 
healthcare context during an economic and fiscal crisis. To achieve this, an in-depth case 
study of a large, acute, public hospital in Ireland was conducted. The purpose of Chapter 7 is 
to draw together the study’s findings. The chapter is structured around three key themes. 
Although each theme is presented separately for discussion purposes, it is important to 
recognise that, in reality, the research context is complex and multifaceted. As a result, there 
are important linkages between each of the three themes, which will be made explicit during 
the course of the discussion. The primary issues associated with the structure of the Irish 
hospital sector will be addressed in Section 7.1. The purpose of this section is to discuss how 
national management and organisational issues were perceived to influence the operation of 
management control practices in the study setting. Section 7.2 provides a discussion of the 
organisational arrangements within Woodford. The emphasis in this section is on examining 
how interrelated issues of organisational structure, accountability and authority influenced 
the operation of management control practices. Section 7.3 explores the fundamental issue of 
how conflicts of interest between clinicians and control objectives influenced the operation 
of management control practices. The purpose of this section is to discuss the key factors 
perceived to influence the attitudes and responses of clinicians to the operation of 
management control practices at Woodford. Section 7.4 draws conclusions from the 
chapter’s discussions. 
7.1 The National Healthcare Structure - External Control & Scrutiny 
7.1.0 Introduction  
A key factor perceived in this study to influence the operation of management control 
practices emerged in the organisational and management structures implemented by 
Government to manage the delivery of healthcare services. As set out in Section 3.1.3.2, the 
Irish healthcare system maintained a relatively stable structure for more than 30 years until 
2004 when a major reorganisation was instigated, resulting in the abolition of the former 
Health Boards and the creation of a single national body: the HSE. This was a 
transformational change in the structure of the Irish healthcare system and was introduced 
following publication of a number of high-profile reports calling for healthcare services to be 
managed as a national system. While the DoH retained overall responsibility for the 
development of healthcare policy, the HSE took full operational and budgetary responsibility 
for the management and delivery of healthcare services. 
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As highlighted in the examination of accountability arrangements between the DoH and the 
HSE in Section 3.1.3.2, the National Service Plan (NSP), an annual agreement between the 
HSE and the DoH for the type and volume of services to be delivered in return for the funds 
provided by Government, was a crucial element in the HSE’s annual management planning 
and control process. In relation to monitoring and reporting on the progression of an 
individual organisation’s (in this case Woodford’s) performance towards the NSP, three 
management control practices were found to be in operation: (i) budget control, (ii) activity 
control and (iii) operational control. It is recognised that ‘performance’ is itself an 
ambiguous term in that it does not indicate to whom such ‘performance’ is directed. In this 
study, an organisational perspective was adopted and it was assumed that an organisation 
that is performing well is one that is successfully attaining HSE objectives; that is, it is 
effectively achieving the strategies established by national HSE management. The purpose 
of this section is to explore how national management and organisational factors were 
perceived to influence the operation of management control practices during the economic 
and fiscal crisis. 
7.1.1 Economic and Fiscal Difficulties  
The findings revealed that national management and organisational arrangements did 
influence the operation of management control practices during the economic and fiscal 
crisis. The establishment of the HSE occurred during a period of unprecedented economic 
and fiscal prosperity in Ireland, with healthcare expenditure increasing by 62 per cent 
between 2002 and 2007 (Section 1.3). During this period, the relationship between 
Woodford and HSE management was perceived as amiable and cordial as noted by the SM3: 
‘during the boom times, we were told spend, spend, spend, everything and everyone was 
awash with money. It was all great’.  However, the economic and fiscal landscape 
fundamentally changed in November 2010 when the Government agreed to a Programme of 
Financial Support from the EU and the International Monetary Fund (collectively known as 
the Troika) with a total value of €85 billion. The drawing down of funds was subject to 
compliance with certain conditions set out in the Programme Documents, which included a 
commitment to achieve a deficit of 7.5 per cent of GDP in 2013 and a 3 per cent deficit by 
2016. Amongst other fiscal reforms, the control and reduction of healthcare expenditure was 
cited by Government as being of critical importance to the attainment of these GDP deficit 
requirements. As a result, the Irish healthcare sector and public hospital organisations, in 
particular, were compelled to operate within unprecedented budgetary constraints.  
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These extraordinary economic and fiscal developments were perceived to influence the 
operation of management control at a national (HSE) level and, ultimately, the operation of 
management control practices at Woodford. In particular, the operation of the budget control 
practice was regarded as having been altered to facilitate achieving the required budget 
reductions. Cost Containment Boards (CCBs) were established and were required to 
formulate Cost Containment Plans (CCPs) that identified cost containment initiatives to 
ensure that activity control targets were achieved within the newly allocated budgets 
(Section 6.2.1). Furthermore, the importance of budget control information in the evaluation 
of organisational performance was amplified. As described in Section 6.3.2.1, additional 
meetings were arranged by HSE management to discuss Woodford’s CCP and budget 
reduction targets, with the frequency of these meetings progressively increasing to the point 
that, by June 2012, they were being arranged on a daily basis. In this way, the findings 
demonstrated that the volume, detail and frequency of budget control information being 
produced increased during the economic and fiscal crisis.  
 
In the study period, the prominence attached to the operational control practice was 
perceived to have declined, which was attributed to the increased attention paid to the budget 
control practice. For example, HSE management no longer met on a quarterly basis with 
Woodford Management to discuss operational control information as had previously 
occurred: ‘at the moment every discussion is about the budget, everything else is secondary’ 
(WM2).  
 
The findings also revealed that the focus of the activity control practice was perceived to 
have changed. The view was expressed that, prior to the fiscal difficulties, the focus of the 
activity control practice had been to ensure that the incremental funding made available each 
year was utilised to increase activity levels in keeping with the DoH’s healthcare policy 
(Section 5.2.2.2). Therefore, before the fiscal crisis, the focus of the activity control practice 
had been to establish the number of additional in-patient and day-case procedures to be 
performed based on the additional funding provided in a given year. However, subsequent to 
the fiscal crisis, the focus of this control practice was regarded as being to establish the 
appropriate in-patient, outpatient and day procedures to be performed in order to ensure that 
the budget reduction targets required could be achieved.  Overall, the study’s findings 
showed that little attention was given to the activity control practice, as its merits were 
considered to be negligible given the increasing and largely uncontrollable demand for 
services. As highlighted in Sections 6.1.2.1 and 6.1.2.2, despite reductions in funding and 
staffing levels, Woodford’s activity levels had increased. The number of inpatients increased 
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from 25,720 in 2008 to 33,514 in 2013, representing a mean annual increase of 5 per cent. 
With respect to the number of outpatients, this number increased from 128,594 in 2008 to 
162,478 in 2013, a mean annual increase of 4.3 per cent.  The reported number of emergency 
attendances in 2013 was 63,122, representing a mean annual increase of 3.2 per cent. The 
issue of integration between the budget and activity control practices is further examined in 
Section 7.3.3.  
 
As discussed above, the study’s findings demonstrated that the operation of the management 
control practices at a national level were perceived to have been influenced by the economic 
and fiscal crisis, with three principal effects highlighted in this regard. Firstly, the volume, 
detail and frequency of budget control information being produced were considered to have 
intensified. Secondly, the focus of the activity control practice was seen as having changed 
to become a mechanism by which to reduce, retain or modify organisational activity levels. 
Thirdly, the significance of the operational control practice was perceived to have declined 
as increased attention was given to budget control practices. These findings provide useful 
insights into the impact of the economic and fiscal crisis on the operation of management 
control practices, an aspect highlighted by Arnold (2009), Hartmann (2000), Hopwood 
(2009) and Van der Stede (2011; 2015) as important but under-researched.  The results from 
this study suggest that poor economic conditions may lead to the increased frequency of 
budget control communication, a finding previously reported by Argyris (1952). 
Furthermore, this study’s findings are consistent with Hopwood’s (2009) discussion of an 
unpublished study by Olofsson and Svalander in 1975, which examined the response of a 
Swedish organisation to an economic downturn and noted that the crisis resulted in an 
intensification of budget information flows within the organisation. The economic and fiscal 
crisis was also considered to have altered the use made of management control information 
by HSE management, which is the focus of the following subsection. 
7.1.2 The Use of Management Control Information by HSE Management 
Since Hopwood’s (1972) seminal paper, the management control literature has demonstrated 
a great interest in understanding the use made of management control practices (Section 
2.3.2). In this study, HSE management was perceived to have begun placing a high emphasis 
on achieving budget reduction targets and to be using budget control information in an 
inflexible manner such that failure to achieve budget reduction targets resulted in poor 
evaluations, regardless of the reasons for that failure. One interviewee gave the following 
description regarding HSE management’s use of budget control information.  
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‘You get a right rollicking basically. They will say this is your Cost Containment 
Plan. You said you would reduce costs by X in this area. The report is saying Y. 
Why is that not happening? No, that’s wrong actually - they don’t say why. They 
just tell you it’s not happening. Why would be seen as an excuse. We would be 
told, we should have mitigated against the risk of that happening. We would be 
told, you had to achieve a reduction of €1 million this month, you said you were 
going to achieve it in five ways, if ways four and five aren’t working; you should 
have used replacements six and seven. We wouldn’t be used to that strong handed 
approach in the public sector’.                                                                        (WM5) 
 
This style of usage by HSE management was, however, not reported to be customary and the 
variation was attributed to the economic and fiscal crisis. A number of implications 
associated with this style were identified by the study.  For example, Woodford Management 
considered that they had become more involved with budget control information as a result. 
Furthermore, Woodford Management believed that they worked together to achieve budget 
reduction targets and working relationships amongst these individuals were regarded as 
having improved. However, the use made of management control information by HSE 
management was also perceived to have negative implications. Woodford Management 
reported that they experienced considerable job-related stress and working relationships with 
their superiors (in this case HSE management) were perceived to have deteriorated.  
 
Previous findings in the literature would suggest that Woodford Management would have 
engaged in harmful behaviour, such as data manipulation, in order to relieve the tensions 
associated with the use made of management control information by HSE management. 
However, evidence of data manipulation was not reported, although it is plausible that such a 
response was not feasible since the majority of the budget control information was collated 
by HSE management, thus restricting the ability of Woodford Management to engage in data 
manipulation (Section 6.3.3.4). Nevertheless, the findings of this study show that, in an effort 
to strengthen their discussions and to relieve tensions associated with the style of usage 
adopted, the Director of Nursing and the Clinical Director of Woodford had begun to attend 
budget-related performance evaluation meetings. It was argued that HSE management would 
not be able to dismiss the explanations and concerns of Woodford Management as easily in 
the presence of these individuals, as they could use their clinical knowledge and expertise to 
communicate the difficulties encountered within Woodford. This approach was suggested to 
have been advantageous as it had facilitated a better understanding of the repercussions of 
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budget reduction targets and was, therefore, more likely to be accepted by HSE management 
(Section 6.3.3.2).  
 
The implications associated with the use made of budget control information by HSE 
management in relation to budget-related performance (i.e. the ability to achieve budget 
reduction targets) at Woodford were also considered.  Woodford successfully achieved the 
budget reduction targets imposed in 2008, 2009 and 2010 and, at the same time, had 
managed to increase activity levels (Section 6.1.1). Consequently, the study’s findings 
suggested that the use made of budget control information by HSE management had 
improved the management of healthcare expenditure in these years. Woodford did not, 
however, achieve its budget control targets in 2011 and was unlikely to do so in 2012 
(Section 6.3.3.2). In this regard, it emerged that the cumulative effect of the budget reduction 
targets was viewed as being too challenging and that, irrespective of the use made of budget 
control information by HSE management, achieving the more recently imposed budget 
reduction target had become unmanageable. The findings demonstrated that, in order to 
continue the delivery of services in the final quarter of 2011, additional money had been 
provided by HSE management.  In this way, the findings supported Otley’s (1972) 
contention that using budget control information in an inflexible manner so that reasonable 
explanations of failure to meet budget targets are unlikely to be accepted will lead to 
improved budget-related performance. However, as indicated by Emmanuel et al, (1990) in 
describing the relationship between budget difficulty and budget-related performance as an 
inverted U-shape, the findings suggest that this style of usage will improve budget-related 
performance up to the highest point in this graph, a point related to budget difficulty, but 
that, beyond that point, this style of usage will no longer lead to improvements in budget-
related performance. However, it must be acknowledged that activity levels continued to rise 
during 2011 and 2012, thereby making it difficult to appropriately assess budget-related 
performance. In addition, this finding has been developed from a case study of a single 
organisation and, consequently, there is a need for future research to examine the 
relationship between the use made of budget control information, target difficulty and 
budget-related performance. This is highlighted as a potential area for future research in 
Section 8.4. Woodford’s budget-related performance during the economic and fiscal will be 
further discussed in Section 7.2.1.  
7.1.3 Ambiguity associated with Budget Allocations  
The findings from this study show that HSE management had a custom of allocating 
additional budget resources in the final quarter of the financial year.  Interviewees explained 
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that this process reflected a cultural history whereby additional budget resources had 
generally been found in the final quarter of the year when the HSE had auxiliary resources 
available. Woodford Management explained that, initially following the establishment of the 
HSE, they had received instructions from HSE management to spend a specified additional 
amount by year-end and, as a result, were under pressure to ensure that this was done.  While 
this process led to the accumulation of organisational resources that were valuable 
immediately after the fiscal crisis began, it was also perceived to have destabilised the 
operation of management control practices. The findings showed that the budget reductions 
imposed by the HSE were achieved in 2008, 2009 and 2010 and, consequently, additional 
funds were not provided to Woodford (Section 5.2.3). However, it was believed that other 
hospitals that had not achieved their budget reduction targets had received an injection of 
money in the final months of those years. In other words, the findings suggested that HSE 
management had provided additional resources to some hospitals in order to ensure that they 
could continue to deliver services during those months. In contrast, there was a perception 
amongst interviewees that hospitals such as Woodford that had achieved their budget 
reduction targets were penalised by the imposition of more challenging budget reduction 
targets in 2010 and 2011.  
 
Further analysis of the budget control process in 2012 provided a deeper understanding of 
the complexity of this issue. Woodford had not fully achieved its budget reduction target in 
2011 and it was explained by interviewees that additional funding had been provided in 
order to deliver services in the final quarter of that year. However, the evidence suggested 
that, in July 2012, Woodford Management had grave concerns about how matters would 
evolve later that year when existing funds had been consumed. While their past experience 
implied that additional funding would be allocated in the final quarter, the hospital sector 
was now largely being funded by the Troika, a situation not previously experienced (Section 
7.1.1.) The evidence suggested that Woodford Management did not know what would 
happen in the final months of 2012. While, on the one hand, they hoped that additional 
funding would be provided in order to ensure that services could be delivered, the findings 
also suggested that they would have been frustrated if this had occurred, as they had 
consistently been asserting the need for budget reductions to be implemented. It was felt that 
the allocation of additional funding would have undermined their position, as noted by 
WM3: ‘if we make cuts and then there’s money found, we look like complete idiots. It’s a 
difficult situation to be in’.  The custom of providing ‘bail-out’ money at year-end was thus 
undermining Woodford Management and had the potential to diminish their motivation and 
morale (Section 6.3.3.2).   
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Furthermore, the findings suggested that this ‘bail-out’ custom had the potential to encourage 
a perverse form of gaming behaviour. In the management control literature, gaming typically 
refers to behaviours where subordinates use job-related actions to deliver a desired message 
to their superiors (Argyris, 1992). In that context, the superior sets the rules of the game (i.e. 
the budget level) and the subordinate chooses his or her actions on the basis of maximising 
payoffs. More precisely, gaming of management control information is deemed to exist 
when subordinates knowingly select courses of action on the basis of achieving a more 
favourable evaluation, rather than in order to reach a more desirable level of performance 
consistent with the goal of their superior.  Observations from this study in Woodford suggest 
that a different kind of gaming behaviour could be linked to budget control practice: namely, 
the selection of actions on the basis of achieving an unfavourable evaluation at the expense 
of selecting an alternative course of action that would result in a more desirable level of 
performance in terms of the goal of HSE management. Hence, despite a commitment to the 
contrary, it is plausible that Woodford Management may have chosen not to fully implement 
initiatives aimed at achieving budget reduction targets in order to ensure that the organisation 
received an unfavourable evaluation and, therefore, benefited from a greater leniency later in 
the financial year. Finally, as an unfavourable performance evaluation was considered a 
means of avoiding the imposition of a more challenging budget reduction control target in 
the following year, it also encouraged an irregular form of budgetary slack to take place. In 
the management control literature, budgetary slack occurs where slack is created by setting 
budget targets to render them easier to achieve (Dunk and Nouri, 1998). Consequently, if 
Woodford received an unfavourable evaluation, this helped to ensure that a less onerous 
budget reduction target was established in the subsequent period. In this way, Woodford 
Management may have deliberately failed to work towards meeting these objectives to avoid 
imposition of a more demanding target in future years. Notably, Woodford Management did 
not admit to engaging in such behaviours themselves, but they alluded to other hospitals as 
doing so.  
 
The findings from this study add to our understanding of the potential outcomes associated 
with an organisation’s budget allocation process thereby making a contribution to literature 
(Merchant, 1990; Van der Stede, 2000). The findings indicate that ambiguities associated 
with the evaluation of budget-related performance were undermining Woodford 
Management and had the potential to diminish their motivation and morale to perform. 
Furthermore, they had the potential to encourage harmful side effects such as gaming and 
budgetary slack.  
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7.1.4 Devolvement of Accountability without Autonomy  
Following the enactment of the Health Act (2004), the HSE was mandated to manage and 
deliver health and personal social services. At a national level, eight directors were 
responsible for leading the planning, monitoring and evaluation of services, as well as 
developing standards and best practice. At a regional level, a RDO and an ISA manager were 
responsible for monitoring and reporting on the performance of individual organisations 
(Section 3.1.3.2). The findings from this study revealed that the accountability and autonomy 
structures connected to these organisational arrangements were important issues influencing 
the operation of management control practices at Woodford. At a strategic level, the findings 
showed that no autonomy had been delegated to Woodford Management. Woodford’s goals, 
objectives, key success factors, performance measures and targets were all formulated by 
HSE management (Section 5.2.3.) The literature would suggest that managers who lack 
authority have little reason to positively embrace management control practices (Abernethy 
and Lillis, 2000; Chenhall and Morris, 1986; Merchant, 1986); yet the findings from this 
study indicated that a lack of strategic autonomy did not have any negative implications in 
this regard. On the contrary, the evidence from the interviews with Woodford Management 
indicated that they were reasonably content to act in accordance with the HSE’s strategic 
direction. It is notable, however, that the HSE’s strategic plan centred on creating a centre of 
excellence at Woodford (Section 6.1.1). It is feasible, therefore, that, had the HSE’s strategic 
direction involved de-prioritising the Hospital’s position, Woodford Management may not 
have been so happy to comply with the HSE’s approach. 
 
Woodford Management were, however, frustrated by their inability to make operational 
decisions. The establishment of the HSE was stated by several interviewees to have resulted 
in excessive centralisation and to have created a separation between those responsible for 
making decisions and those responsible for service delivery. In other words, Woodford 
Management argued that they were held accountable for operational performance despite the 
fact that the authority to make operational decisions had not been delegated to them. This 
issue is best illustrated in Section 6.3.3.2, which describes the reward initiative devised by 
Woodford Management to incentivise clinicians to maximise the organisation’s private 
income. Interviewees explained that this initiative had been terminated and indicated that this 
may have been caused by the use made of budget control information by HSE management 
(Section 7.1.2): ‘I don’t agree with the decision - I think it was the wrong decision, but if we 
are seen to spend a penny more than we should we will be murdered’ (WM3). A further case 
in point was presented in Section 6.3.1.3 where it was explained that, following the 
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establishment of the HSE, the recruitment process had been centralised nationally and, while 
it was acknowledged by interviewees that this change could have enhanced efficiency in 
terms of administrative costs, they also felt that it failed to recognise the importance of 
personnel and social controls. Interviewees stated that it was imperative that the relevant 
management from within Woodford were involved in the recruitment process in order to 
ensure that all staff recruited had the personality and social characteristics necessary to 
successfully partake in organisational activities. 
 
Managing the competing demands of autonomy and accountability has long been recognised 
as important by the research literature (Solomons 1965; Lawrence and Lorsch 1967). 
However, few studies have sought to gather empirical evidence to support the assumption 
that authority structures are an important factor influencing the operation of management 
control practices (Merchant, 1984; Gordon and Narayanan, 1984; Abernethy & Lillis, 1995; 
2001). The findings from this study provide empirical support for this view: Woodford 
Management were not frustrated by their inability to make decisions about the strategic 
direction of the organisation because they were not held accountable for strategic 
performance; rather, it was their lack of authority to determine how the desired results could 
be achieved that had important implications in terms of morale. Woodford Management 
were frustrated because, although their performance was evaluated based on the achievement 
of budget and operational targets, they did not have the authority to make changes, such as 
devising reward incentives or hiring appropriate staff. The frustration resulting from this lack 
of authority affected job satisfaction with regard to the attitude of Woodford Management 
towards their role and towards the operation of management control practices. It also was 
reported by several interviewees to have had an impact on working relationships with 
clinicians (Section 6.3.4.4). The findings showed that many clinicians, while recognising that 
the authority of Woodford Management was restricted, had become jaded from listening, 
with growing scepticism, to their repeated assertions that HSE management were at fault. 
The implication of this issue for the working relationship between clinicians and Woodford 
Management is discussed in Section 7.3.4.   
7.1.5 Information Flows between HSE and Woodford Management 
The HSE’s organisational arrangements were implemented to ensure that management 
control information flowed effectively between the HSE and Woodford (Section 3.1.3.2).  
However, Woodford Management reported that they were hesitant in their communications 
with HSE management, using adjectives such as ‘poor’ (EM1), and ‘guarded’ (WM2) to 
describe the flow of management control information. Furthermore, this restraint was 
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believed to have been continually perpetuated up the organisational hierarchy, leading to the 
communication of inappropriate and ill-timed management control information (Section 
6.3.3.3). Woodford Management felt that the organisational arrangements that should 
theoretically have allowed information to flow effectively between hierarchical levels had 
ultimately not been implemented. However, the interviewees considered that altering the 
organisational arrangements was not the solution; instead, they attributed the problem to a 
lack of trust caused by the emergence of an asymmetrical information gap. In management 
control literature, an information gap normally arises when a subordinate has more 
information relevant to the decision process than his or her superiors (Dunk, 1993). Yet, in 
this study, a reverse information asymmetry gap was perceived to exist, as HSE management 
were deemed to have more information relevant to the decision process than Woodford 
Management. This lack of information was perceived to reduce job satisfaction and to 
weaken the motivation and morale of Woodford Management.   
 
Two issues were identified as connected with this issue. Firstly, the flow of information was 
weakened by political interference, which resulted in decisions not being communicated to 
Woodford Management until political agreement had been achieved (Section 6.3.2.3). As 
highlighted in Section 3.1.3.2, while the HSE was given responsibility for the provision of 
healthcare services, the DoH had retained overall responsibility for the provision of these 
services and for the implementation of healthcare policy as devised by Government. This 
complex relationship created difficulties and several interviewees felt that the DoH had 
remained excessively involved in the organisation’s day-to-day operations. This created 
frustration as it not only delayed the communication process but also implied that decisions 
were often made based on party political preferences, which militated against rational 
decision making and the most effective use of resources. Secondly, as discussed in Section 
7.1.2, Woodford Management were largely dependent upon the HSE’s system to provide 
management control information and, as a result, interviewees argued that HSE management 
had more control information available to them than Woodford Management. For example, 
WM4 noted ‘they know the results, before we do, it puts us on the back foot straight away’.  
 
Consequently, this study’s findings echoed previous research that has suggested that 
effective information flows and systems are important issues influencing the operation of 
management control practices (Ferreira and Otley; Malina and Selto, 2001; Otley, 1999). 
The findings identified a singular information asymmetry gap, whereby HSE management 
had more decision-relevant information than Woodford managers. This information 
asymmetry gap was perceived to have led to an erosion of trust and to affect the job 
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satisfaction of Woodford Management, as well as their motivation to perform. These 
findings, coupled with the evidence presented in Section 7.1.4, demonstrated that the 
national organisational arrangements that were in situ weakened the motivation and morale 
of Woodford Management. 
7.1.6 Summary  
The discussion presented in this section has demonstrated that national management and 
organisational arrangements were perceived to influence the operation of the management 
control practices in Woodford during the economic and fiscal crisis. The economic and fiscal 
crisis was perceived to have initiated a change in the attention provided to and use made of 
management control information by HSE management. Furthermore, ambiguities associated 
with the budget allocation process were shown to have undermined Woodford Management 
and to have encouraged gaming, as organisations that failed to meet their targets were saved, 
or ‘bailed out’, by HSE management, leading to a potential incentive to fail to meet targets. 
Finally, flaws associated with the organisational arrangements in place were perceived to 
weaken motivation and morale and, subsequently, to influence responses to the operation of 
the management control practices. In particular, a lack of operational autonomy was shown 
to result in frustration, which affected job satisfaction in terms of how Woodford 
Management felt about their role. Meanwhile, poor information flows caused an information 
asymmetry gap to occur, which led to an erosion of trust and affected the motivation of 
Woodford Management to perform. 
7.2 The Organisational Context - Incongruity and Divergence  
7.2.0 Introduction 
The organisational context of the study was a large, acute, public teaching hospital, 
Woodford, which stated its overarching mission as being to provide high-quality care for its 
patients (Section 4.3.3). The structural and governance arrangements, comprising an 
executive, a senior and a clinician management structure, were established to ensure that the 
required activities associated with the operation of management control practices were 
carried out. Executive management (i.e. Woodford Management) were held accountable to 
HSE management for organisational performance.  Senior management were responsible for 
reporting to Woodford Management on matters relating to service delivery, human 
resources, information technology and hospital quality programmes. They were supported in 
their role by a service management group and a support services board. Clinical 
management, then, were organised into 15 clinical divisions, which were established by 
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grouping specialist areas of expertise with related service and resource requirements. The 
purpose of this section is to explore how contextual factors associated with these 
organisational arrangements were perceived to influence the operation of management 
control practices during the economic and fiscal crisis.  
7.2.1 The Use of Management Control Information by Woodford Management 
Previous empirical studies have identified a ‘contagion effect’ in the use of management 
control information in performance evaluation (Barrett et al, 1992; Hopwood, 1974). The 
contagion effect refers to a manager’s tendency to evaluate their subordinates as they 
themselves are evaluated (Hartmann, 2000). Section 7.1.2 showed that, as a consequence of 
the economic and fiscal crisis, HSE management were perceived to have begun placing a 
high emphasis on the achievement of budget reduction targets and to be using budget control 
information in an inflexible manner such that reasonable explanations of failure to meet 
budget targets were unlikely to be accepted. Thus, if contagion had occurred, Woodford 
Management may have adopted the same style of usage. However, the evidence from 
interviews with Woodford Management suggested that they were reluctant to adopt the same 
style of usage utilised by their superiors when evaluating the performance of individuals or 
clinical divisions at Woodford. The following comment is indicative of the assessment made 
by Woodford Management of the HSE management’s style of usage and its impact upon 
Woodford Management’s own style:  
 
‘We are not passing the grief down about the budget.  What we were exposed to 
last week was ridiculous. I said to the Area Manager… I perfectly understand 
where you are coming from and I can understand you being like you are but 
bullying me is not going to have a positive outcome.  I am not going to bully the 
people below me.  I said if you behave like that to me - don’t expect me to behave 
like that to staff. I am just not going to do it.  And yes, maybe we just need to go 
that little bit further but I think there are ways around it.  If people knew costs and 
if people knew the implications.  People don’t.  They haven’t a clue. We need to 
make people more aware, but we don’t need to bully them’ .         (WM3) 
 
The findings illustrated that there was a personal reluctance amongst members of Woodford 
Management to impose the same budgetary pressure on others to which they themselves had 
been subjected. HSE managers were perceived to be somewhat removed from the reality of 
the circumstances within the Hospital and, consequently, it was felt that it was easier for 
them to adopt such an inflexible style of usage, as noted by WM5: 
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 ‘Managers working in a hospital are more understanding but the higher up you 
go… the less to the frontline you are, the easier it is to fob it off. Whereas when 
you sit here and see a consultant in their gown and blood …saying we need to get 
this for the patient or he will die you are more emotively attached to the situation, 
it is impossible to be merciless …whereas when I pick up the phone then and ring 
the boss 20 -30 miles away it’s much easier to say no’.                        (WM5) 
 
Woodford Management recognised the need for cost saving and were willing to place a high 
emphasis on the achievement of budget reduction targets. However, the inflexible approach 
adopted by HSE management was considered inappropriate to this setting, and a more 
flexible style of usage was viewed to be appropriate. Woodford Management asserted that 
budgets should provide goals to indicate if budget-related performance is good or bad but 
should be used in a careful manner and viewed as just one indicator of a broader concern 
with organisational performance. However, important organisational obstacles were 
identified that impeded Woodford Management from being able to adopt such an approach. 
One such obstacle was the inability of the budget control practice to align with internal 
structures. This is discussed in the next subsection.  
7.2.2 A Failure to Align Budget Information with Internal Structures  
Woodford’s internal structures were organised around a Senior Management and a Clinician 
Division structure, but the budget control practice had not been developed to align with these 
internal structures and, therefore, the organisation was incapable of supplying disaggregated 
budget control information for the individual service groups, support services or clinical 
divisions. Instead, costs were analysed on an item basis for the Hospital as a whole (Section 
6.2.2.1). For instance, the findings demonstrated that non-pay expenditure was categorised 
into 21 individual cost items, including medicine and blood, but could not be traced to 
divisions. This failure to assign costs to divisions precluded the analysis that was necessary 
for effective use of budget information. The result was that the internal structures were not 
supported by relevant budget information. 
 
In spite of its limitations, the findings demonstrated that the budget control practice informed 
the decision-making processes of Woodford Management. For example, it was explained 
that Woodford Management would closely monitor budget information in order to prevent 
and correct unfavourable deviations from the budget (Section 6.3.3.1). However, the 
inability to analyse variances creates management control difficulties. For instance, if a 
substantial unfavourable variance is for a particular cost item (e.g. medicine), an inability to 
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appropriately trace the cause of the variance to a Clinician Division has the potential to result 
in inappropriate, and at the very least unsubstantiated, decisions being made. Thus, if 
medicine expenditure was found to be unfavourable, it was argued that attention would be 
directed towards examining and reducing expenditure in the oncology division, as this 
specialism would be considered to be a significant driver of medicine expenditure.  Yet, in 
the absence of the relevant information being available, it was impossible to accurately 
determine the true cause of the variance and, consequently, it was feasible that incorrect 
decisions were being made. The frailties of the budget control practice also prevented 
Woodford Management from using budget control information for performance evaluation 
purposes. Specifically, it was not possible to evaluate the budget expenditure of the Clinician 
Divisions in a deliberate manner, as the budget control practice was unable to establish 
budget information for these cost objects.  The implication of this issue in terms of the use 
made of budget control information by Woodford Management is further discussed in 
Section 7.3.4.  
 
Previous literature has suggested that improving the quality of budget control information 
can enhance both financial and operational performance (Section 2.2.1.5). The findings from 
this study supported these assertions by demonstrating that, if the budget control practice 
could have identified and aggregated costs for clinical divisions (i.e. provided divisional 
budget information), Woodford Management would have been able to make better-informed 
decisions on related issues. Furthermore, the failure of the budget control practice to support 
the internal structural arrangements was perceived to give rise to potentially incorrect 
decisions being made and, ultimately, an inability to adopt a more flexible style of 
performance evaluation. The implications of this issue in terms of accountability are 
discussed in the next subsection.  
7.2.3 An Accountability Vacuum Created by a Culture of No Blame  
Management control practices are intended to hold individuals (or sometimes groups of 
individuals) accountable either for their actions or for the results they or their organisations 
produce (Merchant and Otley, 2007). The DoH has included accountability as one of the four 
core principles in the current healthcare strategy. It is defined as including financial, 
professional and organisational accountability to deliver quality, efficiency and effectiveness 
(Department of Health, 2001). Although Woodford Management was perceived to be held 
accountable for its budget performance (Section 7.1.2), this approach to accountability had 
not been mirrored within the organisation.  The preceding section showed that inadequacies 
associated with the budget control practice implied that service groups, support services or 
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Clinician Divisions could not be told prior to the performance period what was expected of 
them in terms of budget expenditure and, consequently, their performance could not be 
evaluated.   
 
This showed that individuals could exert considerable organisational power without being 
held accountable for the budget implications of their decisions or behaviours. They therefore, 
had no incentive to cooperate with management control activities or to consider management 
control information (Section 6.3.1.2). This lack of accountability was perceived to result in 
an apathetic response to the management control practices. There was widespread agreement 
amongst all interviewees that the delegation of budget information would increase individual 
involvement with management control activities.  It was contended that, if individuals were 
provided with budget information aligned with their service group, support service or 
clinician division, it would have an immediate and direct impact upon their involvement 
(Section 6.3.1.3). The perception amongst most interviewees was that the dearth of budget 
information was attributable to an unwillingness to relinquish control on the part of 
Woodford Management. While the frailties of the budget control practice were recognised by 
some others, the evidence suggested that these individuals were frustrated by Woodford 
Management’s inability to solve the apparent weaknesses.  
 
The findings from this study also revealed that a growing lack of accountability had allowed 
a culture of ‘no blame’ (EM1) to develop.  The perception of interviewees that emerged from 
the findings was that individuals did not hold themselves or each other financially or 
organisationally accountable and that, as a result, complacency had become progressively 
more accepted. Examples provided included approving overtime-sheets without verifying 
that work had been completed and agreeing to the provision of additional services without 
determining their necessity. The findings also suggested that an inability to understand how 
individuals’ decisions and behaviours could influence desired results had led to a lack of 
accountability. HSE and Woodford Management were characterised as discussing the 
‘millions and billions’ of reductions that were required (Section 6.3.3.3). These desired 
results were regarded as being too abstract for individuals to relate to and, hence, they were 
deemed to have a demotivational impact. In several instances, a simple initiative of 
providing ‘price tag information’ for items that were routinely used was suggested as a 
potential way of resolving this issue. It was contended that the provision of individual cost 
information would lead to greater involvement with budget information as individuals would 
be able to assess the budget implications of their decisions.  The evidence indicated that the 
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budget control practice was unable to provide this information (Section 7.2.1). The following 
comment recorded was characteristic of the views expressed by interviewees: 
 
‘I would be certainly of the view that if you give people the information then they 
can make an informed judgement. Basic examples … if you had a range of 
dressings on a ward, and you put the price up next to each dressing then 
somebody could say, “I didn’t realise it was three times the price of that…and I 
can use A instead of B.”  Now maybe not everyone would do it but at least you are 
giving them the information, so that at least like they can make an informed 
decision.                                                  (SM4) 
 
Moreover, a failure to develop individual or group level reward systems was also cited as an 
issue influencing accountability. Individual performance evaluation processes had not been 
developed, rendering it impossible to link individual behaviour with rewards and/or 
punishments. While individuals who were performing well craved greater accountability and 
became frustrated when their performance was not recognised, it was also apparent that, for 
many individuals, the lack of accountability resulted in the acceptance of mediocre 
performance. It was acknowledged that the development of individual performance 
evaluations that linked performance with individual rewards/punishments was unfeasible 
given the size of the organisation, public pay agreements and the extent of union resistance. 
Instead, group reward systems were proposed as having the potential to cultivate a culture of 
accountability. This involved allowing service groups, support services or clinical divisions 
that had achieved desired performance levels (i.e. budget, activity or operational control 
targets) to be rewarded by enhancing these areas. For example, it was suggested that painting 
a waiting room, purchasing a new piece of equipment or buying new chairs for the staffroom 
could foster a culture of accountability and provide an incentive to all employees to become 
more involved with the management control practices (Section 6.3.3.2).  
 
These findings are consistent with the wider body of management control literature, which 
has argued that accountability is an important issue influencing the operation of management 
control practices (Merchant and Otley, 2007). Previous literature has shown that three of the 
key conditions essential for management control practices to be effective are: (i) providing 
information about the performance expected prior to the evaluation period; (ii) evaluating 
performance after the performance period; and (iii) good performance being rewarded and 
bad performance being punished (Section 2.2.1). The study’s findings showed that each of 
the three conditions posed a challenge for the operation of management control practices at 
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Woodford. The budget control practice was considered incapable of satisfying any of the 
conditions outlined. Although the activity and operational control practices could 
accommodate conditions (i) and (ii), the failure to provide incentives or, perhaps more 
importantly, deterrents to ensure that individuals behaved in a manner congruent with 
organisational objectives undermined individual motivation to engage with management 
control practices.  The findings indicated that greater accountability could be fostered in two 
ways. Firstly, the current approach to budget reporting was limited and lacked the ability to 
drill down beyond summary level. The budget control practice should have had the ability to 
provide sufficient detail. Secondly, a reward system that appealed to the vocational nature of 
individuals ought to have been considered. This would have provided an incentive and 
motivation to encourage individuals to hold themselves and each other accountable for their 
decision making and behaviour.  
7.2.4 Summary   
Woodford’s management and organisational arrangements were perceived to influence the 
operation of its management control practices during the economic and fiscal crisis. 
Woodford Management were viewed as accepting that placing a higher emphasis on budget 
reduction targets was necessary; however, they were also perceived to be unwilling to adopt 
the inflexible style of usage utilised by HSE management, arguing, instead, that budget 
control information should be used in a more flexible manner. The necessary organisational 
arrangements were not, however, in place to put this style of usage into effect. Individuals 
could not be held accountable for organisational performance, as they did not have access to 
the management control information required to manage it. Furthermore, it was not possible 
to provide them with the necessary information because the budget control practice was 
incapable of providing disaggregated budget control information aligned with the internal 
processes and structures. The implications of these interrelated accountability, authority and 
structural issues were that individuals became apathetic or indifferent towards the operation 
of management control practices. In the next section, the attitudes and responses of 
clinicians, who act as dominant individuals in a hospital context, will be discussed. 
7.3 The Clinician Control Relationship - Tension and Conflict 
7.3.0 Introduction  
There has been a continual movement to encourage clinicians to become more involved in 
the management of Irish hospital services (Section 3.1.3.2). This policy is predicated on the 
belief that clinicians are major resource consumers in hospitals and that clinician 
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involvement in management will lead to improved organisational performance. In fact, 
previous research has shown clinicians to be the main consumers of organisational resources, 
with their decision making accounting for up to 70 per cent of expenditure (Abernethy and 
Stoelwinder, 1995; Broyles and Reilly, 1988, Cardinaels et al, 2004) and, consequently, a 
lack of clinician engagement is a significant issue influencing the operation of management 
control practices. In Woodford, clinician involvement was facilitated through the formation 
of 15 clinical divisions established by grouping specialisations with related service and 
resource requirements (Section 5.2.1.3). The purpose of this section is to explore how the 
clinician-control relationship was perceived to influence the operation of management 
control practices in Woodford during the economic and fiscal crisis.  
7.3.1 The Use of Management Control Information by Clinicians  
The findings from this study revealed that the clinician division structure was not functioning 
in the manner envisaged and interviewees provided numerous examples of divisional 
management’s failures to carry out their responsibilities. These included the cancellation of 
divisional meetings due to poor attendance, bi-annual reporting processes not taking place 
and a failure to discuss management control information amongst divisional management 
(Section 6.3.1.1). Clinicians attributed their failure to fulfil management control 
responsibilities to an anticipated change in the clinical division structure. They reported that 
HSE and Woodford Management had been discussing abolishing clinician divisions and 
implementing a clinical directorate structure for a number of years but had, as yet, failed to 
do so. This ambiguity was perceived to have had a demotivational effect, which influenced 
clinician involvement with management control practices. However, some interviewees 
believed that the uncertainty surrounding the divisional structure was used as an excuse. 
 
Although structural ambiguity was an important factor, the study’s findings revealed that 
clinician involvement with management control practices was a complex issue. Three key 
issues influencing this involvement were identified: (i) the perceived relevance and 
usefulness of management control information; (ii) the professional orientation of clinicians; 
and (iii) the clinician-management relationship. The implications of each of these issues will 
be discussed in the following subsections but it is worth first considering the implications 
associated with the economic and fiscal crisis. 
 
The overall theme to emerge from the findings was that the implications of the three 
contextual issues identified had been exacerbated by the fiscal crisis. As discussed in Section 
7.1.1, prior to the fiscal crisis, the focus of management control practice was to ensure that 
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the additional funding available each year was utilised to augment and enhance the delivery 
of services. However, this had been altered by the fiscal crisis and clinicians were less 
willing to be involved with management control practices that sought to reduce, retain and 
modify the provision of services (Section 6.3.4.1). Consequently, the relevance of their 
misgivings was amplified, which affected their response to the operation of these practices. 
In other words, the findings showed that, despite their concerns, clinicians were more willing 
to accept and engage with management control information and activities when their 
professional objectives were congruent with the management control objectives; however, 
once management control objectives challenged the priorities of their professional 
orientation, their concerns were exacerbated and used to justify their levels of involvement. 
The following comment typified the response of clinicians to the operation of management 
control practices in the aftermath of the fiscal crisis:  
 
‘It is a case of priorities.  The priority of clinicians is patient care. The typical 
phone call will be “I know you have no money but we need to treat this patient.  
This new medication is available and treatment is going to cost an absolute 
fortune.”  That’s their focus.  So while some would be aware of the financial 
situation and others wouldn’t, at the same time, they are all able to 
compartmentalise and say, well that’s no problem.  Now I need to treat my patient 
and I need this expensive drug.’                                          (WM4) 
 
The perception to emerge was that many clinicians adopted the view that management 
control practices were of secondary importance as they focused their attention on patient care 
and meeting clinical controls and standards. The study did, however, point to some variation 
amongst clinicians with regard to the appropriateness of the response adopted. Some 
clinicians accepted this response as appropriate in terms of maintaining their overriding 
professional duty to their patients and asserted that budget-related performance was not their 
concern or responsibility. On the other hand, many other clinicians expressed frustration 
with this type of response. These clinicians were exasperated that budget expenditure was 
not being utilised as efficiently as possible and felt that more consideration should be given 
to budget control issues. Thus, the findings indicated that clinician responses were not 
uniform, but rather a continuum, with a strong lack of enthusiasm on one side of the axis and 
a willingness to devote more attention to management control issues on the other. 
 
The findings also suggested that a clinician’s position on this continuum may be connected 
to their area of specialism. The evidence from the interviews indicated that clinicians in the 
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Cardiac division were considered to be more willing to engage with management control 
practices than their counterparts in the Emergency and Oncology divisions.  Four factors 
were deemed to contribute to this: (i) the provision of incremental budget resources to the 
Cardiac division in recent times (Section 6.1.1); (ii) good working relationships between the 
Cardiac Business Manager and Woodford Management and between the Cardiac Business 
Manager and Cardiac clinicians (Section 6.1.3); (iii) a higher level of controllability 
associated with the provision of Cardiac services; and (iv) a more defined relationship 
between inputs and outputs in the Cardiac Division (Section 6.1.4). The findings also 
signalled that a clinician’s position on the continuum could be influenced by his or her age, 
educational background and professional experience. For example, it was suggested by 
interviewees that clinicians who had trained outside of Ireland were more likely to be 
positioned on the enthusiasm side of the continuum (Section 6.3.4.1). The design of this 
study did not allow such relationships to be explored and this issue is, therefore, highlighted 
as a potential area for further research in Section 8.4.   
 
The study’s findings provide a contribution to the literature examining the responses of 
clinicians to the operation of management control practices (Section 3.3.2). Previous studies 
have reported clinicians to be antagonistic towards the operation of management control 
practices. These studies have shown clinicians to view such practices as a fundamental threat 
to the values of the medical professional that should be rigorously resisted and challenged 
(Jacobs, 2004; Jones and Dewing, 1997; Preston et al, 2001). However, other research has 
also reported clinicians to be accepting of the need for management control practices and 
willing to accept greater management responsibility and central involvement with 
management control practices (Kurunmaki et al, 2003; Kurunmaki, 2004; Llewellyn, 2001). 
The findings from this study add to this body of research in revealing that the responses of 
clinicians will be dependent upon the management control objectives: if the objectives of 
management control practices are congruent with the professional objectives of clinicians, 
they will be more willing to accept the need for these and so will become involved with 
management control information and activities. However, should the management control 
objectives become incongruent with clinicians’ professional objectives, they will alter their 
response. In such circumstances, clinicians will become less willing to be involved with 
management control information and activities, albeit to varying extents.  
 
Prior empirical studies suggest that clinicians will purposefully resist and challenge the 
operation of management control practices that are at odds with their professional objectives 
(Broadbent et al, 2001). However, evidence of such resistance was not found amongst 
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clinicians at Woodford. Specifically, there was no evidence of clinicians hiding information 
or delaying the implementation of management control initiatives. Instead, they sought to 
ignore the management control practices and continue with their clinical day-to-day 
activities oblivious to their operation. For example, time afforded previously to the collation 
and analysis of management control information was diverted to delivering services, while 
attendance at management meetings declined as clinicians reprioritised their time (Section 
6.3.3.3). As discussed in Section 7.2.3, the accountability arrangements were not in place to 
hold clinicians accountable for their decisions or behaviours and they, therefore, did not need 
to purposefully challenge the operation of the management control practices. At Woodford, 
clinicians could decide to use whatever tests, procedures, devices or therapies they chose to 
treat their patients. Unlike hospital organisations in other countries, there were no restrictions 
(control practices) to adhere to and no accountability arrangements in place to hold them 
responsible for the budget implications of their decisions (Section 6.3.1.3). Furthermore, 
interviewees explained that, if clinicians failed to cooperate with management control 
activities (i.e. did not provide the necessary information or attend a management control 
meeting), they were not held accountable for their behaviour (Section 6.3.1.2).   
7.3.2 Professional Orientation  
Previous literature has shown the professional orientation of clinicians to be an important 
issue influencing clinician responses to the operation of management control (Section 
3.3.3.3). These studies contend that the professional training and education of clinicians have 
instilled powerful social controls, which include an emphasis on patient welfare and a desire 
to adopt the best medical practice available. As a consequence, clinicians find it difficult to 
relate to efficiency-driven management control objectives, which results in harmful side 
effects due to role conflict. Role conflict occurs where a job involves expectations that are 
incongruent with individual beliefs, which subsequently leads to frustration and negative 
work outcomes (Abernethy and Stoelwinder, 1990; 1995; Bouillon et al, 2006; Comerford 
and Abernethy, 1999). The findings from this study confirmed the importance of 
professional orientation in influencing the operation of management control practices in a 
hospital setting.  Nevertheless, role conflict among clinicians was not a response identified at 
Woodford, as clinicians could largely ignore management control practices if they so 
wished. The following comment points to the influence of professional orientation on the 
responses of clinicians to the operation of management control practices: 
 
‘It is reasonable to say that the majority of clinicians want to see patients. They 
don’t understand this idea of a service plan. The idea for them is, patients come to 
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the front door, they need to be treated, Oh I can’t do them, because I can only do 
5,000 this year instead of 6,000…is a concept that’s alien to them in how they are 
trained. Because they are not trained to ration healthcare. This needs to be 
accepted and dealt with by management.’                                 (WM2) 
 
The difficulties associated with nurturing clinician involvement regarding accountability 
were, however, acknowledged and interviewees sounded a note of caution that controls 
seeking to restrict clinicians’ autonomy would have harmful consequences in terms of 
commitment and work effort (Section 6.3.1.1). The study’s findings indicated that there was 
a need to accept that clinical responses were driven by a desire to fulfil the needs of 
individual patients and to protect their professional autonomy. Accordingly, rather than 
attempting to control clinical responses, interviewees suggested that ‘tactics’ (WM3) that 
would encourage the alignment of management control and clinical professional objectives 
should be considered (Section 6.3.4.1). Three approaches for encouraging involvement with 
management control practices were suggested by clinicians. Firstly, clinicians argued that 
they were less likely to be attracted to abstract concepts (e.g. needing to improve efficiency) 
that are not recognisable as being relevant to their day-to-day activities, whereas they were 
much more likely to be interested in clinical issues. Consequently, they felt that inducements 
appealing to their vocational nature were more likely to result in their increased involvement. 
This issue was best exemplified in Section 6.3.3.2 where it was explained that, if a clinician 
was involved in achieving a budget saving (e.g. had successfully negotiated with a medical 
device supplier), a percentage of that saving should be returned to the particular clinician to 
invest in a way he or she considered appropriate. It was argued that such a strategy would 
lead to improved clinician involvement due to the perception of receiving a tangible benefit 
related to individual action. In this way, the study’s findings suggested that the design of a 
tailored incentivisation process, which aligned management control objectives with the 
vocational nature of clinicians as individuals, would deliver meaningful benefits in terms of 
clinician involvement with management control practices. Woodford Management 
acknowledged the potential advantages of such initiatives. However, as was highlighted in 
Section 7.1.3, they maintained that they did not have the authority to authorise such 
initiatives during the economic and fiscal crisis.   
 
Secondly, clinicians explained that they were highly competitive and egotistical by nature 
(Section 6.3.4.3) and argued that, if management control practices could exploit these 
characteristics, this would lead to greater clinician involvement. In this regard, it was 
suggested that if benchmarking or comparison information were to be provided, this would 
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create a ‘reputation’ effect and involvement would automatically increase, as clinicians 
would not like their performance to be considered unsatisfactory. This suggestion reinforces 
the need for budget control practices to be aligned with internal processes and structures in 
order to supply relevant disaggregated budget information.  Prior studies by Lehtonen (2007) 
and Eldenburg et al, (2010) have also advocated a need to provide benchmarking or 
comparison information to order to induce a ‘reputation’ effect. 
 
Finally, clinicians asserted that their medical education did not teach them to consider the 
efficiency of their decisions but, rather, to concentrate on the needs of their individual 
patients. They described the medical education curriculum as containing little or no 
‘management’ education. The perception emerging from the evidence presented in Section 
6.3.4.2 was that clinicians could not be expected to consider the wider resource implications 
of their decisions if their training and education had not prepared them to do so. It was 
suggested that clinicians needed to be educated about the management control practices in 
operation and to be enrolled in courses that explained the need for and benefits of greater 
management control. The interviewees argued that this education needed to take place at 
each stage of a clinician’s professional career and that, in the absence of such education 
being provided, clinicians were unlikely to become involved with management control 
activity practices. However, the findings indicated that the accomplishment of any or all of 
these tactics would be difficult and pointed to a pervading sense of distrust of both HSE and 
Woodford Management. The clinician-management relationship is discussed in detail in 
Section 7.3.4.  
 
These findings supported and extended the findings of the study of Abernethy and 
Stoelwinder (1995), which examined the effect of the interaction between professional 
orientation and management control on role conflict and the subsequent impact on 
organisational outcomes. Abernethy and Stoelwinder’s (1995) results indicated that role 
conflict is reduced when professionals do not operate in a hospital context where output 
controls restrict them in their self-regulatory activities. The findings from this study provided 
strong support for the view that creating an organisational context that encourages rather 
than enforces clinician involvement will have a positive effect on job satisfaction and overall 
organisational performance. Consequently, these findings revealed the professional 
orientation of clinicians to be an important contextual factor; however, contrary to previous 
research findings, this study showed that the operation of management control practices did 
not necessarily lead to role conflict and possible harmful side effects identified in the 
management control literature such as gaming, budgetary slack and data manipulation. 
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Instead, the professional orientation of clinicians was perceived to cause them to become 
apathetic or indifferent to the operation of management control practices. The 
implementation of control practices that would attempt to restrict clinical activities was 
considered to be organisationally undesirable and, as an alternative, it was suggested that 
attempting to better align management control and clinician objectives would lead to greater 
clinician involvement without the dysfunctional consequences. Furthermore, from the 
perspective of clinicians, the study provides an important insight into how management 
control practices should operate in order to balance the competing demands of clinician and 
control objectives. Future research should seek to investigate the effects of such strategies on 
clinician involvement.   
7.3.3 Perceived Usefulness and Relevance of Management Control Information 
The perceived usefulness and relevance of management control information was found to 
influence the responses of clinicians to the operation of management control practices. In 
several instances, interviewees explained that clinicians could not be told the specific budget 
for their area of specialisation, nor how it related to service activity, yet they were informed 
that budget reductions were being imposed on their divisions. This led to tensions and 
frustration on the part of clinicians and they believed that decisions were being made based 
on subjective judgements rather than quantified control information (Section 6.3.3.3). Most 
clinicians assumed that the dearth of budget information was attributable to an unwillingness 
to relinquish control on the part of Woodford Management. While the frailties of the budget 
control practice were recognised by some clinicians, the evidence suggests that these 
individuals were frustrated by Woodford Management’s inability to solve the apparent 
weaknesses. One clinician summarised the implications of this issue: 
 
‘On what planet can we control for expenditure when, as a division, we don’t 
know what we are spending? In my ten years, as a Chair of this division, I was 
never presented with a divisional budget. I don’t know if the budget for this 
division is €10 million or €100 million. It’s a ludicrous situation’.           (EConsul) 
 
Consequently, the findings from this study provided clear evidence that a sufficient degree of 
disaggregation is an important issue influencing clinician’s perceptions of the relevance and 
usefulness of budget control information.  
 
In contrast, activity control information had been disaggregated to individual clinical 
divisions at Woodford.  However, deficiencies associated with the provision of budget 
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control information were argued by interviewees to have a knock-on effect on the perceived 
usefulness of the activity control information. The purpose of the activity control practice 
was to ensure that a certain level and type of activity were delivered for the budget provided.  
In this way, the activity control practice should have provided a link between planned 
activity and assigned budget resources. However, the frailties associated with the budget 
control practice prevented this connection from being made, as it was not possible to link 
budget information with activity levels. This issue contributed to the activity control 
information being perceived as ‘irrelevant’ (EConsul) and ‘pointless’ (ONSM).  
Accordingly, the findings indicated that the level of integration between the budget and 
activity control practice was an important issue associated with clinician evaluations of 
activity control information’s relevance and usefulness.  
 
Furthermore, the ability of individuals to influence desired activity results emerged as an 
important factor influencing the perceived usefulness of the activity information. In effect, 
this issue related to the controllability principle, which mandates that managers should only 
be held accountable for events and results that are reasonably under their control (Ferrara, 
1966; Horgren et al, 2004, Merchant, 1987, 1989). The controllability principle has been 
found to be difficult to execute in many circumstances (McNally, 1980; Atkinson, 1987, 
Choudhury, 1986) but the findings revealed it to be particularly pertinent to the issue of 
usefulness of activity control information. Seventy percent of the care provided by Woodford 
was emergency related and, consequently, the ability to influence desired results was 
severely restricted. This issue was found to be particularly pertinent amongst clinicians in the 
Emergency and Oncology Divisions, where the nature of the services provided was deemed 
to negate any attempts to control activity levels. The implications of this issue were 
exemplified in Section 6.3.1.4, where an interviewee outlined a scenario in which a clinician 
in the Emergency Division was treating a patient suffering from a myocardial infraction. The 
interviewee argued that, theoretically, the clinician had the ability to influence the desired 
activity results and could decide that providing care would have an adverse effect on 
performance; however, this clinician also asserted that the desired activity results would have 
no bearing on this scenario, as the consequences of not providing care were explained to be 
‘quite simply death’ (EConsul). While acknowledging that the particular example cited is a 
little inflammatory, it does raise an important issue: clinicians in a hospital context do have 
the ability to influence desired results. The question then is to what extent they should utilise 
this ability. Unlike other sectors, it is suggested that there is a fine line between 
controllability and desired results in a hospital context and this must be acknowledged and 
respected.  
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Overall, the provision of operational control information was perceived as relevant and 
useful (Aidemark, 2001; Kaplan and Norton, 1993). However, opinions were mixed 
regarding the perceived adequacy of the operational control information supplied.  In the 
Emergency Division, clinicians believed that operational control information was generated 
to meet HSE reporting requirements. They felt that there was insufficient operational control 
information available and that this gap hampered their ability to manage their division; they 
provided vivid examples to illustrate the frustrations felt among clinicians in their division.  
For example, it was argued that, where a problem or issue arose, the management control 
information was not sufficiently timely to facilitate arrangements to be made to address the 
problem. It was explained that, at the end of each month, the Chair received a performance 
report detailing, among other things, patient waiting times. Clinicians deemed the provision 
of this information to be too late to inform decision making and it was argued that an 
effective operational control practice providing real-time control information was required. 
This finding supports the research of Chenhall and Morris (1984), which suggests that 
managers, who need to respond rapidly to environmental changes in uncertain situations, 
perceive timely information as an important priority. Thus, increased reporting frequency 
was favourably associated with clinicians’ beliefs about information relevance.  In contrast, 
individuals in the Cardiac Division were largely satisfied with the availability and timeliness 
of operational information. The evidence pointed to clinicians in this division as being 
centrally involved in the design and collection of operational information, which may 
explain their positive attitude. Overall, the findings from this study support previous research 
suggesting that participation in the design of operational performance measures may have 
positive effects (Argyris, 1952, Brownell, 1982).   
7.3.4 The Clinician-Management Relationship 
The clinician-management relationship was, in general, perceived to influence the responses 
of clinicians to the operation of the management control practices. The findings revealed that 
in many instances the relationship between clinicians and Woodford Management was poor, 
described by interviewees as ‘fraught’ (SM1), ‘contentious’ (EConsul) and ‘problematic’ 
(SM4). However, the evidence from the interviews indicated that clinicians in the Cardiac 
Division perceived their working relationships with Woodford Management to be 
‘constructive, there is a healthy respect’ (CChair). As highlighted in Section 7.2.2, two 
issues were believed to contribute to this: (i) the provision of incremental budget resources to 
the Cardiac Division in recent times (Section 6.1.1); and (ii) good working relationships 
between the Cardiac Business Manager and Woodford Management and between the 
Cardiac Business Manager and Cardiac clinicians (Section 6.1.3). 
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The economic and fiscal crisis caused significant budget reduction targets to be imposed on 
the Hospital. Clinicians did not consider that Woodford Management had effectively 
communicated or managed these difficult and unusual circumstances (Section 6.3.4.2).  
Instead, Woodford Management were perceived to have adopted a ‘cloak and dagger 
approach’ (OConsul), only consulting with individual clinicians when a specific issue or 
problem needed to be resolved. The findings revealed that the failure of Woodford 
Management to create the necessary level of trust had not only led to a high level of 
frustration but had also caused clinicians to withdraw their involvement with management 
control practices. Woodford Management recognised their failure to develop effective 
communication processes and, consequently, attempts to improve communication with 
clinicians were being made. For example, the Clinical Director (a member of Woodford 
Management) had recently begun to meet with large groups of clinicians to discuss the 
budget reduction issues at Woodford. While clinicians broadly regarded this initiative as a 
favourable development, they also argued that the absence of useful and meaningful budget 
information would weaken the effectiveness of such initiatives. As discussed in Section 
7.2.2, the inability of the budget control practice to provide disaggregated budget 
information created considerable frustration amongst clinicians.   
 
The findings also revealed that Woodford Management’s decision to centralise control of 
non-direct pay expenditure had a negative impact on their relationship with clinicians. Prior 
to the fiscal crisis, clinician divisions had the authority to utilise the annual non-direct pay 
budget as they considered appropriate. The implications of this decision are best illustrated 
by an example set out in Section 6.3.2.1 whereby a request for the replacement of a light 
bulb in a teaching room had been refused so many times that one clinician, out of sheer 
frustration, had personally purchased the light bulb. The decision to centralise authority in 
this instance was considered to be the ‘straw which broke the camel’s back’ (EConsul). The 
findings indicated that Woodford Management recognised that centralisation was not the 
correct course of action and the potential for harmful implications was acknowledged. 
However, while a more considered style of usage was recognised to have far greater 
potential, it was argued that they were under too much pressure from HSE management to 
ensure that budget reduction targets were achieved. In essence, it emerged that they felt 
powerless to carry out their activities in the correct way and, instead, were forced to behave 
in a manner that prioritised results being achieved quickly.  It was difficult to fully ascertain 
the implications of this decision to adopt a centralised approach. While it was implemented 
to ensure that budget reduction targets were achieved, it was possible that it did more harm 
than good. As discussed in Section 7.2.2, clinicians make autonomous decisions to admit 
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patients and treat them as they considered most appropriate. While clinicians may possibly 
have exploited this autonomy as a means of resisting the centralised approach adopted, there 
was no direct evidence to indicate that they purposefully resisted attempts to achieve budget 
reduction targets, though it was clear that the decision had damaged their relationship with 
Woodford Management and had dampened their motivation to engage with budget reduction 
activities.   
 
Clinicians were also perceived to be sceptical about the capabilities of Woodford 
Management. They expressed scepticism about the frequently made claim that all fault was 
attributable to HSE management. Clinicians believed that Woodford Management failed to 
promote the organisation’s agenda adequately at a national level, which resulted in the 
provision of insufficient resources. They contended that Woodford Management did not 
have the ability to successfully negotiate at this higher level:   
 
‘If you look at the medical core of consultants, almost 100 per cent of them have 
worked overseas in some of the top centres.  Almost 100 per cent of managers 
have never worked outside the hospital. They don’t have that exposure or 
experience that might make them look differently at it. Yes, many of them have 
done courses and many of them have done degrees but they haven’t had that 
exposure to other places or other health systems’.                                    (WM2) 
 
Finally, clinicians who had, in the past, become involved with management control activities 
were frustrated by the lack of attention given to their input. For instance, it was argued that, 
in many circumstances, clinicians had invested considerable time and effort into providing 
advice and recommendations (Section 6.3.4.4). Yet the findings showed that Woodford 
Management had failed to respond appropriately to clinician input. In fact, clinicians 
reported that management had both failed to incorporate their recommendations and, 
moreover, failed to acknowledge receiving them. They considered that such an inadequate 
response by Woodford Management created considerable frustration and unwillingness 
among clinicians in relation to becoming involved in future initiatives. Clinicians were 
cynical about the readiness of Woodford Management to truly involve them in management 
control activities.  Furthermore, they questioned the ability of Woodford Management to 
resolve the many complex and multifaceted issues arising. As a result, clinicians experienced 
considerable frustration and resentment within this working relationship. They further argued 
that if there had been greater consultation and a genuine willingness on the part of Woodford 
Management to seek their cooperation, they would have become more involved. This failure 
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to communicate led to an erosion of trust and affected the motivation and subsequent 
involvement of clinicians.  
 
While the general management literature has begun to recognise the importance of 
developing and managing trusting relationships, there has been relatively little research 
examining the impact of trust on the operation of management control practices. Comerford 
and Abernethy (1999) and Robbins (2007) have identified trust as an important issue but 
have also expressed a need for its implications to be further explored. The findings from this 
study showed that a lack of trust had implications in terms of frustration and commitment 
and hindered efforts to encourage clinician involvement. Furthermore, the study findings 
have identified key issues influencing the clinician-management trust relationship. Finally, 
the working relationships that exist between clinician and hospital management have been 
identified by several studies as an important factor influencing the operation of the 
management control practices in a hospital context (Kurunmaki, 1991; Preston et al, 2001; 
Jacobs, 2004; Modell and Lee, 2001; Robbins, 2007). These studies report that the 
implementation of management control practices results in the development of inferior 
working relationships between clinicians and management. They suggest that this occurs 
because implementation increases management’s awareness of medical practice and this then 
enables them to exercise control over hospital activities. This redistribution of power and 
shift in control from clinicians to management is generally considered by clinicians to be a 
subversion of their professional judgement and an unnecessary incursion into their sphere of 
authority. The findings in this study reinforced previous findings in the literature indicating 
that poor clinician-management relationships are an important factor influencing the 
operation of management control practices. However, in contrast to previous studies, the 
implementation of management control practices was not reported to have caused a transfer 
of power from clinicians to management; rather, this study’s findings suggested that the 
balance of power was shared between management (with control established on the basis of 
management control information) and clinicians (with control established on the basis of 
their professional standing). 
7.3.5 Summary  
At Woodford, clinicians in general were perceived to regard management control practices 
as being of secondary importance and to evaluate decisions by reference to clinical standards 
and controls alone. Three key issues influencing clinician responses were identified: (i) the 
professional orientation of clinicians; (ii) the perceived usefulness and value of management 
control information; and (iii) clinician-management relationships. The implications of these 
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factors included frustration, resentment, mistrust and cynicism and were shown to have 
caused clinicians to become apathetic or indifferent to the operation of management control 
practices. Furthermore, the fiscal crisis, which caused management control objectives to 
focus on the reduction and modification of service delivery, was shown to have amplified the 
implications of these issues. However, clinicians did not seek to purposefully resist and 
challenge the operation of these practices; rather, they remained indifferent towards their 
operation and, instead, focused on continuing to carry out their day-to-day clinical activities. 
Finally, the study pointed to the existence of variation between clinicians with regard to the 
appropriateness of the style of usage adopted. Some clinicians accepted this style as 
appropriate, while, others expressed frustration with the style adopted. Thus, the findings 
suggested that the responses of clinicians were not uniform, but rather a continuum, with a 
strong lack of enthusiasm on one side of the axis and a willingness to give more attention on 
the other. 
7.4 Conclusion  
This chapter has drawn together the findings from both phases of this empirical study in 
order to achieve the overarching objective of examining the operation of management 
control practices in a healthcare context during an economic and fiscal crisis. The findings 
demonstrated that the specific nature of the Irish hospital context posed challenges for the 
operation of management control practices. In particular, they revealed the influences of 
factors associated with the (i) national healthcare structure, (ii) organisational context, and 
(iii) clinician-control relationship. Each of these issues was perceived to influence the 
perceptions and attitudes of individuals towards the operation of the management control 
practices in place. The next chapter highlights the conclusions and contributions of the study 
and discusses the implications of its findings, as well as summarising its strengths and 
weaknesses and identifying areas for future research. 
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8.0 Introduction  
The study’s objective was to examine the operation of management control practices in a 
healthcare context during an economic and fiscal crisis. To achieve this, an in-depth case 
study of a large, acute, public hospital in Ireland was conducted. The research was framed by 
a review of the literature on management control practices (Chapter 2), an examination of the 
characteristics of the Irish hospital context and empirical studies of management control 
practices in hospitals (Chapter 3). In addition, the literature on research methodologies was 
explored in order to ensure that the study’s philosophical orientation was aligned with the 
research objective and approach selected (Chapter 4). This grounded the design of the 
empirical phases of the study and allowed the collection and analysis of data to be planned 
based on an awareness of both the prior literature and the context of the study itself.  A 
preliminary phase was designed and conducted with the aim of developing an understanding 
of the type of management control practices that were in operation and to acquire a broad 
understanding of the factors influencing the operation of these practices (Chapter 5). The 
main phase of the study examined more thoroughly how management control practices 
operate in a healthcare context during an economic and fiscal crisis. In particular, this phase 
explored how contextual factors were perceived to influence individual attitudes and 
responses to the operation of the management control practices in operation (Chapter 6). The 
findings focused on four main themes: the organisational context in which the management 
control practices operated, the nature of the external environment, the appropriateness of the 
management control practices themselves and the attributes and features of the individuals 
considered in the study. The findings also revealed that each of the themes identified could 
not be considered in isolation, as they were all highly interrelated. The findings from both 
phases were considered together in order to allow the study’s overarching objective to be 
achieved (Chapter 7). The purpose of Chapter 8 is to conclude the study. It begins by 
providing an overview of the main conclusions from the research. The contributions of the 
research are summarised in Section 8.2. Its implications are set out in Section 8.3.  The 
merits and limitations of the research are outlined in Section 8.4. Finally, further 
opportunities for investigation are presented in Section 8.5. The chapter concludes in Section 
8.6. 
8.1 The Conclusions from the Research  
The study’s objective was to examine the operation of management control practices in a 
healthcare context during an economic and fiscal crisis. In order to meet its research 
objective, the study adopted a broader and more holistic perspective than previous 
management control studies and, in so doing, its findings contributed to the attainment of an 
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improved understanding of the topic. In particular, the study’s findings revealed that the 
operation of management control practice at HSE level was perceived to have changed 
during the crisis. Based on this examination, the study highlighted three principal aspects in 
this regard. Firstly, the volume, detail and frequency of budget information being collated 
were deemed to have intensified. Secondly, the significance of the operational control 
practice was perceived to have declined as increased attention was paid to the budget control 
practice. Thirdly, the focus of the activity control practice was perceived to have altered. 
Prior to the economic crisis, the focus of this practice had been to ensure that incremental 
funding made available each year was utilised to increase activity levels in keeping with the 
healthcare policies devised by the DoH. However, during to the crisis, the focus of the 
activity control practice was perceived to be concerned with establishing appropriate activity 
levels in order to ensure that budget reduction targets could be achieved. Overall, the study’s 
findings showed that little attention was given to the activity control practice, as its merits 
were considered to be negligible given the increasing, and largely uncontrollable, demand 
for healthcare services. 
The study also demonstrated that the economic and fiscal crisis had initiated a perceived 
change in the use made of management control information by HSE management. HSE 
management were perceived to have begun placing a higher emphasis on budget reduction 
targets and to be using budget information in an inflexible manner, so that reasonable 
explanations of failure to meet budget reduction targets were unlikely to be accepted. The 
implications associated with this style of usage were examined by the study. In terms of 
positive implications, Woodford Management perceived themselves as having become much 
more involved with budget information as a result. Furthermore, they believed that they 
worked together to achieve budget reduction targets and working relationships amongst these 
individuals were perceived to have improved. However, the use made of management 
control information by HSE management was also viewed as having negative implications. 
Woodford Management reported that they experienced considerable job-related stress and 
they indicated that working relationships with their superiors had deteriorated. In addition, 
the study found that, in an effort to strengthen their discussions and to relieve the tensions 
associated with HSE management’s style of usage, Woodford Management had begun to 
bring their clinical colleagues to performance evaluation meetings. It was argued that HSE 
management were not able to dismiss the explanations and concerns of Woodford 
Management as easily in the presence of these individuals, as they could use their clinical 
knowledge and expertise to communicate the difficulties they encountered within Woodford. 
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Previous findings in the literature would suggest that Woodford Management may have 
engaged in harmful behaviour, such as data manipulation, in order to relieve the tensions 
associated with the use made of management control information by HSE management. 
However, evidence of data manipulation was not reported, although it is plausible that such 
behaviour was not feasible since the majority of the budget control information was collated 
by HSE management, thus restricting the ability of Woodford Management to engage in 
manipulation of the data. The study’s findings did, however, indicate that there was a 
potential for harmful side effects, such as gaming and budgetary slack, to occur. However, 
these outcomes were not found to be associated with the use made of management control 
information by HSE management but, rather, with HSE management’s custom of allocating 
additional resources in the final quarter of the financial year. The study revealed that this 
custom had evolved from a cultural history whereby a supplementary budget would be 
provided in the final quarter of a year. The findings suggested that, during the fiscal crisis, 
this custom had the potential to encourage a perverse form of gaming behaviour, whereby 
Woodford Management could avoid the full implementation of initiatives aimed at achieving 
budget reduction targets in order to ensure that the Hospital received an unfavourable 
evaluation, thus benefitting from greater financial leniency later in the year. The study’s 
findings also demonstrated that this custom destabilised budget reduction efforts by 
undermining Woodford Management’s authority. Furthermore, it was perceived to diminish 
the motivation and morale of Woodford Management.  
 
Woodford Management recognised the need for cost saving and were willing to place a high 
emphasis on the achievement of budget reduction targets. However, they were also perceived 
to be unwilling to adopt the inflexible style of usage utilised by HSE management, arguing, 
instead, that budget control information should be used in a more flexible manner. The 
necessary organisational arrangements were not, however, in place to put a more flexible 
style of usage into effect. Within Woodford, individuals could not be held accountable for 
budget-related performance, as they did not have access to the budget information required 
to manage it. Furthermore, it was not possible to provide them with the necessary 
information because the budget control practice was incapable of providing disaggregated 
budget control information. Woodford’s internal structures had been organised around a 
senior management and clinical divisional structure; however, the budget control practice 
had not been developed to align with these internal structures and, as a result, this practice 
was incapable of providing disaggregated budget control information related to service 
groups, support services or clinical divisions. Woodford Management were, as a result, 
unable to evaluate budget-related performance in a flexible manner. Instead, the study’s 
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revealed that they had adopted an inflexible style of usage that involved directing attention to 
specific pay, non-pay and income items and centralising control of non-direct pay 
expenditure in order to meet budget reduction targets.  
 
It is difficult to fully ascertain the implications associated with the use made of budget 
control information by HSE and Woodford Management in relation to budget-related 
performance. Woodford had achieved the budget reduction targets imposed in 2008, 2009 
and 2010 and, at the same time, had managed to increase activity levels. Consequently, the 
study’s findings suggested that the style of usage adopted by both HSE and Woodford 
Management had improved budget-related performance in the initial years of the crisis.  The 
perception to emerge was that the inflexible style of usage removed organisational slack, 
which had accumulated prior to the economic and fiscal crisis and, as a result, budget-related 
performance had improved. Woodford did not, however, achieve its budget reduction targets 
in 2011 and was unlikely to do so in 2012. In this regard, it emerged that the cumulative 
effect of the budget reduction targets imposed by HSE management was viewed as being too 
difficult and that, irrespective of the use made of budget control information by HSE 
management, achieving the more recently imposed budget reduction target had become 
unfeasible.  
 
In addition, the findings signalled that the centralised style of usage adopted by Woodford 
Management may have induced harmful side effects that could be regarded as dysfunctional 
from a budget performance perspective. Clinicians had considerable autonomy in deciding to 
use whichever tests, procedures, devices and therapies they deemed necessary. While there 
was no direct evidence to indicate that clinicians purposefully resisted attempts to achieve 
budget reduction targets, it was clear that this style of usage had dampened clinician 
motivation to engage with budget reduction initiatives. Woodford Management recognised 
that centralisation may not have been the correct style of usage and the potential for harmful 
side effects was acknowledged. While it was conceded that a more flexible style of usage 
could have had far greater potential in improving budget-related performance, it was argued 
that they were under too much pressure to ensure that budget reduction targets were 
achieved. In essence, it emerged that Woodford Management had felt powerless to carry out 
their activities in the most appropriate way and, instead, were forced to adopt a style of usage 
that prioritised results being achieved quickly. Therefore, the findings revealed that the 
centralised style of usage, while initially successful in removing organisational slack, may 
also have led to harmful side effects in the longer term. These effects included reduced 
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motivation to participate in the budget reduction initiatives and an apathetic or indifferent 
response to the operation of management control practices.   
 
In general, clinicians were perceived to regard management control practices as being of 
secondary importance and to evaluate decisions by reference to clinical standards and 
controls alone. Three key issues influencing clinician responses were identified. Firstly, the 
findings from this study confirmed the importance of professional orientation in influencing 
clinician responses to the operation of management control practices. However, role conflict 
and possible harmful outcomes such as gaming, budgetary slack and data manipulation were 
not implications identified amongst clinicians at Woodford. Instead, the professional 
orientation of clinicians was found to cause them to become apathetic or indifferent to the 
operation of management control practices and to seek to focus exclusively on continuing 
with their clinical activities oblivious to their operation. Weaknesses associated with the 
accountability arrangements implied that clinicians could not be held financially accountable 
for their decisions or behaviours and they, therefore, did not need to actively challenge the 
operation of management control practices.  
 
Secondly, the perceived usefulness and relevance of management control information was 
found to influence the responses of clinicians to the operation of management control 
practices. The failure to make disaggregated budget information available was perceived to 
have led to tensions and frustrations on the part of clinicians in each of the three clinician 
divisions examined. It was believed that decisions were being made based on subjective 
judgements rather than quantified control information. The findings suggested that, pending 
the budget control practice being able to identify and accumulate costs at a clinician division 
level, clinicians will not engage with budget-related issues. Deficiencies associated with the 
provision of budget control information were also broadly perceived to have a knock-on 
effect on the perceived usefulness of the activity control information. The purpose of the 
activity control practice was to ensure that a certain level and type of activity was delivered 
for the budget provided. In this way, the activity control practice ought to provide a link 
between planned activity and assigned budget resources. However, the frailties associated 
with the budget control practice prevented this connection from being made, as it was not 
possible to link budget information with activity levels. Accordingly, the findings 
demonstrated that a lack of integration between the budget and activity control practices was 
an important issue influencing these practices. 
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The ability to influence desired activity results was also perceived as influencing the 
perceived usefulness and relevance of the activity information. The perception to emerge 
was that, while activity control information was considered a good idea theoretically, the 
increasing and largely uncontrollable demand for services caused it to be viewed as futile 
and ineffectual. This issue was found to be particularly pertinent amongst clinicians in the 
Emergency and Oncology Divisions, where the nature of the services provided was deemed 
to negate any attempts to control activity levels. Overall, the provision of operational control 
information was seen as relevant and useful amongst clinicians in each of the three divisions. 
Clinicians from the Cardiac division were, however, found as being particularly satisfied. 
The evidence pointed to clinicians in this division being centrally involved in the design and 
collection of operational information, which may have explained their positive attitude. In 
contrast, clinicians from the Emergency Division expressed concern about the adequacy of 
the operational information provided. More specifically, these clinicians considered that the 
operational control information was reported too infrequently to inform their decision 
making, which suggests that clinicians who need to respond rapidly to environmental 
changes in uncertain situations perceive timely information as important. Furthermore, these 
clinicians expressed frustration at the inability of operational control information to reflect 
and manage organisational interdependence. In particular, a need for operational control 
information to account for the effects of decisions on interacting divisions was articulated.  
 
Thirdly, the implications of the clinician-management relationship were highlighted. 
Woodford Management were perceived by clinicians to have failed to effectively 
communicate the difficult and unusual economic and fiscal circumstances within which they 
were operating. For example, in several instances, interviewees explained that they were not 
told the specific budget for their area of specialisation, yet they were informed that budget 
reductions were being imposed. As highlighted earlier, this led to tensions and frustration as 
they believed that decisions were being made based on subjective judgements rather than 
relevant budget information. Most individuals assumed that the dearth of budget information 
was attributable to an unwillingness to relinquish control on the part of Woodford 
Management. While the frailties of the budget control practice were recognised by some 
clinicians, the evidence suggested that these individuals felt frustrated by Woodford 
Management’s inability to solve the apparent weaknesses. These issues also led to 
resentment and cynicism and were believed by many interviewees to have caused individuals 
to become apathetic or indifferent to the operation of management control practices.  
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Woodford Management recognised their failure to develop effective communication 
processes and, consequently, attempts to improve communication were being made. For 
example, the Clinician Director (a member of Woodford Management) had begun meeting 
with groups of clinicians to discuss budget-related performance issues. While such initiatives 
were broadly regarded as a favourable development, it was argued that the absence of 
disaggregated budget information would weaken the effectiveness of such initiatives. A 
sense of disinclination with regard to the provision of disaggregated budget information (if it 
had been available) was apparent amongst Woodford Management. This reluctance appeared 
to stem from the belief that the professional orientation of clinicians would prevent them 
from participating effectively and, consequently, Woodford Management relied on retaining 
budget control information in order to maintain their authority and standing in the 
organisation.  
 
Clinicians were also found to be cynical about the readiness of Woodford Management to 
truly involve them in management control activities. They argued that, had there been greater 
consultation and a genuine willingness on the part of Woodford Management to seek their 
participation, they would have become more involved. However, they believed that 
Woodford Management only consulted with clinicians when a specific issue or problem 
needed to be resolved.  Not only did this failure cause a high level of frustration but it also 
led clinicians to withdraw their involvement with management control practices.  Clinicians 
were also sceptical about the capabilities of Woodford Management. For instance, they 
expressed scepticism about the frequently made claim of Woodford Management that all 
fault was attributable to HSE management. Clinicians believed that Woodford had failed to 
promote the organisation’s agenda adequately at a national level, which resulted in the 
insufficient provision of budget-related resources. They contended that Woodford 
Management did not have the managerial ability to negotiate at this higher level.  
 
Consequently, clinicians in general were perceived to regard management control practices 
as being of secondary importance and to evaluate decisions by reference to clinical standards 
and controls alone. Three key issues influencing clinician responses were identified: (i) the 
professional orientation of clinicians; (ii) the perceived usefulness and value of management 
control information; and (iii) clinician-management relationships. The implications of these 
factors included frustration, resentment, mistrust and cynicism and were shown to have 
caused clinicians to become apathetic or indifferent to the operation of management control 
practices. Furthermore, the fiscal crisis, which caused management control objectives to 
focus on the reduction and modification of service delivery, was shown to have amplified 
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these issues. However, clinicians did not seek to purposefully resist and challenge the 
operation of these practices; rather, they remained indifferent towards their operation and, 
instead, focused on continuing to carry out their day-to-day clinical activities. 
 
The study did, however, point to some variation amongst clinicians with regard to the 
appropriateness of the response adopted. Some clinicians accepted this response as 
appropriate in terms of maintaining their overriding professional duty to their patients and 
asserted that budget performance was not their concern or responsibility. On the other hand, 
many other clinicians expressed frustration with the response. These clinicians were 
exasperated that organisational resources were not being utilised as efficiently as possible 
and felt that more consideration should be given to management control issues. Thus, the 
findings indicated that clinician responses were not uniform, but rather a continuum, with a 
strong lack of enthusiasm on one side of the axis and a willingness to devote more attention 
to management control issues on the other. The findings also suggested that a clinician’s 
position on the continuum may have been connected to their area of specialism. Clinicians in 
the Cardiac Division were regarded as being more willing to engage with management 
control practices than their counterparts in the Emergency and Oncology Divisions. Four 
factors were deemed to contribute to this: (i) the provision of incremental budget resources 
in recent times; (ii) good working relationships between the Cardiac Business Manager and 
Woodford Management and between the Cardiac Business Manager and Cardiac clinicians; 
(iii) a higher level of controllability associated with the provision of Cardiac services; and 
(iv) a more defined relationship between inputs and outputs in the Cardiac Division. 
8.2 The Contributions of the Research 
This study investigated the operation of management control practices in a healthcare 
context during an economic and fiscal crisis and, in so doing, has yielded valuable insights 
that contribute to the literatures on management control and management control in 
healthcare. In particular, the study highlights how an externally-induced organisational crisis, 
in this case an economic and fiscal crisis, influences the operation of management control 
practices. The effects of an economic crisis have been highlighted as important but under-
researched (Arnold, 2009; Hartmann, 2000; Hopwood, 2008; Van der Stede, 2015). To 
effectively contribute to this research gap, the study incorporated three management control 
practices, thereby addressing concerns previously raised that examining control practices 
individually may influence any conclusions drawn (Malmi and Brown, 2008; Otley, 1999). It 
also provided pertinent insights by exploring the manner in which the pressures caused by 
the economic and fiscal crisis were transmitted in the organisational hierarchy. In particular, 
  
210 
 
the findings revealed how different parties adopted defensive mechanisms in order to cope 
with the economic and fiscal crisis.  HSE management were perceived to have adopted a 
high emphasis on budget control information and to have used an inflexible style of 
performance evaluation. Woodford Management were found to recognise the need for cost 
saving and were willing to place a high emphasis on the achievement of budget reduction 
targets. However, they were also found to be unwilling to adopt the inflexible style of usage 
utilised by HSE management and they argued that budget control information should be used 
in a more flexible manner. The necessary organisational arrangements were not, however, in 
place to put a more flexible style of usage into effect. Instead, Woodford Management were 
perceived to have adopted an inflexible style of usage that involved directing attention to 
specific pay, non-pay and income items and centralising control of non-direct pay 
expenditure in order to meet budget reduction targets. Finally, clinicians in general were 
found to regard management control practices as being of secondary importance and to 
evaluate decisions by reference to clinical standards and controls alone. 
 
A further contribution made by the study lies in its consideration of the use made of 
management control information. Numerous studies have concluded that it is the way in 
which management control practices are used, as opposed to their mere existence, which 
determines their effects (Ferreira and Otley, 2009). However, the management control 
literature, has had a tendency to focus on examining the conditions that render a particular 
style of usage in performance evaluation more (or less) effective (Hartmann, 2000). As a 
result, evidence of the effects associated with the use made of management control 
information is piecemeal in terms of the types of outcomes studied (Briers and Hirst, 1995). 
To contribute to this literature, this study explored the use made of management control 
information at different organisational levels and among different professional groupings 
and, in this way, enabled a deeper understanding of the area to be acquired.  
 
In addition, the study makes a contribution to the further development of Ferreira and 
Otley’s (2009) Performance Management and Control framework. The study suggests that 
the framework was beneficial in eliciting a description of a management control system in 
operation. However, in the context of this study, where organisational objectives, strategies, 
key success factors, performance measures and targets were formulated by an external 
stakeholder, the relevance and validity of Questions One to Five of the framework were 
found to be marginal. Consequently, it is suggested that, where management control 
practices are implemented in order to monitor and report on the progression of an individual 
subunit’s performance, it may be advantageous to reduce the emphasis on questions related 
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to the formulation of objectives (e.g. vision, mission, key success factors, key performance 
measures, strategies and plans and target setting) and prioritise questions relating to the 
means by which these goals should be achieved (e.g. performance evaluation, reward 
systems, usage and information flows).   
 
The study makes a contribution to the management accounting in healthcare literature by 
providing additional insights into the responses of clinicians to the operation of management 
control practices. In particular, it examined this issue through an array of organisational 
members including not only clinicians themselves but also hospital managers and nurse 
service managers. Furthermore, the study investigated the responses of clinicians to the 
operation of management control practices during a fiscal and economic crisis, a topic that 
had not been studied previously. Its findings reinforce previous findings in the literature 
indicating that poor clinician-management relationships are an important factor influencing 
the operation of management control practices. However, in contrast to previous studies, the 
operation of management control practices was not reported to have caused a transfer of 
power from clinicians to management; rather, this study’s findings suggest that the balance 
of power was shared between management (with control established on the basis of 
management control information) and clinicians (with control established on the basis of 
their professional standing).  However, contrary to expectations based on previous studies, 
clinicians were not found to purposefully resist or defend themselves against the operation of 
management control practices that were incongruent with their professional objectives. 
Instead, the study contributes to the literature by demonstrating that clinicians tended to 
choose to ignore management control practices and continue their clinical activities oblivious 
to their operation. The study also pointed to variation amongst clinicians in terms of the 
appropriateness of the response adopted. 
 
A further contribution of the study to the management accounting in healthcare literature 
relates to its exploration of how hospital management responded to these practices. In 
particular, this study addresses some of the limitations of previous research regarding this 
issue by investigating the use made of management control practices at middle-level 
management. Woodford Management were found to be unwilling to adopt the inflexible 
style of usage employed by their superiors and regarded a flexible style to be more 
appropriate. However, the findings also demonstrated that the necessary organisational 
arrangements were not in place to put their preferred, flexible, style of usage into effect. 
Instead, Woodford Management were found to have adopted an inflexible style of usage 
which involved directing attention to specific pay, non-pay and income items and 
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centralising control of non-direct pay expenditure in order to meet budget reduction targets. 
The findings revealed that the inflexible style of usage, while initially successful in 
eliminating organisational slack, may also have induced harmful side effects. Such effects 
included a decreased motivation to participate in the budget reduction initiatives and an 
apathetic or indifferent response to the operation of management control practices. 
8.3 The Implications of the Research  
It has been noted that published accounting research is frequently inaccessible to 
practitioners. In fact, Van der Stede (2015, p. 173) contends that there is a need to ensure that 
researchers ‘conduct properly executed academic studies on practice-relevant issues that 
yield potentially applicable insights’. He explains that this implies producing ‘useable 
knowledge, as opposed to academically self-referential knowledge’. With this in mind, the 
purpose of this section is to distil the practical implications emanating from this research 
study. These are discussed below.  
 
HSE management’s high emphasis on budget reduction targets and their inflexible use of 
budget control information were found to have mixed implications. Broadly, the findings 
indicated that their approach had a favourable effect on Woodford Management’s 
involvement with budget information and on efforts to improve budget-related performance. 
Nevertheless, if these impacts were to endure, greater attention needed to be given to the 
information flow process, performance evaluation, reward systems and budget tightness to 
ensure that the potential for harmful side effects was minimised. Furthermore, the custom of 
releasing contingency funds at year-end needed to be evaluated and efforts should have been 
made to develop a system of rewarding the achievement of budget targets. 
 
Similarly, Woodford Management’s high emphasis on budget control targets and their 
centralised control of budget control information were also found to have mixed 
implications. The perception to emerge from the findings was that, while these strategies 
may have been effective initially, in the longer term, this style of usage may have been 
damaging to budget-related performance. The provision of disaggregated budget information 
aligned with internal structures would have permitted budget information to be used in a 
more flexible manner and allowed individuals to consider the budget implications of their 
decisions.  
 
The misalignment between authority and accountability also needed to be evaluated. 
Although Woodford Management were held accountable for performance, their ability to 
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make decisions was limited. A failure to delegate authority to make decisions leads to 
frustration, which affects job satisfaction and motivation.  On this basis, consideration should 
have been given to granting greater authority to Woodford Management. Alternatively, the 
limited authority held by Woodford should have been recognised within the performance 
evaluation processes. Within Woodford, appropriate accountability arrangements needed to 
be put in place in order to ensure that individuals participated with management control 
activities and information. A failure to hold individuals accountable for the authority 
devolved had led to apathetic responses. In this regard, improving the provision of 
disaggregate budget information would have helped to ensure greater accountability. In 
addition, a reward system that appealed to the vocational nature of individuals should have 
been developed. This would have provided an incentive and motivation to encourage 
individuals to hold themselves and others accountable for decision-making.  
 
Woodford Management needed to recognise that the responses of clinicians to management 
control practices were not uniform. On the one hand, there was a cohort of clinicians who 
viewed management control practices as being of secondary importance and who remained 
unwilling to participate with management control activities. On the other hand, there was a 
second cohort of clinicians who were more willing to become involved with these practices. 
Addressing the contextual issues identified, in particular issues connected to the relevance 
and usefulness of management control information would have encouraged this cohort of 
clinicians to become involved with management control activities and information. 
8.4 The Merits and Limitations of the Research 
In drawing any conclusions from this research, it is essential to consider certain parameters 
relating to the interpretation of the study. Its strengths lay in the methodological approach 
adopted. Each aspect of the study, in terms of its design, implementation and analysis, was 
carefully executed. While the research design was formed on the basis of the study’s 
research objective, the overarching qualitative research approach contrasted with the 
quantitative approaches that dominate the management control literature. In this way, this 
study responded to the calls that have been made for more in-depth studies of management 
control issues (Chenhall, 2003; Otley and Pollanen, 2000). This study employed three main 
research methods: interviews, organisational documentation and archival records. The 
advantages of the qualitative case-based approach adopted included its capacity to acquire a 
rich, contextual understanding of the operation of management control practices in an Irish 
hospital during an economic and fiscal crisis. The research design also had merits with 
regard to the rigour injected into the different aspects of the research process, which included 
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data management and collection, interview guide design, acquiring informed consent, 
interview recording, transcription and a pre-planned and detailed systematic approach to data 
analysis. Utilising Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) Performance Management and Control 
framework to frame the preliminary phase was also valuable as it helped to hone the scope 
and design of the main phase of the study, which significantly improved the utility of the 
findings. Finally, a significant advantage of the study design was revealed in the openness 
and trust that was demonstrated by the respondents in their discussion of the issues arising 
and their different perceptions in relation to them.  
 
Despite these advantages, the findings, contributions and implications of the study must be 
considered in light of its limitations. As the study adopted an interpretative orientation and 
was conducted using a qualitative mode of enquiry, the limitations inherent in such an 
approach need to be acknowledged. In particular, the extent to which it is possible to draw 
wider generalisations from the research findings is limited. While the study’s findings 
provide valuable insights into the operation of management control practices in a healthcare 
context during a fiscal and economic crisis, it is not possible to determine the extent to which 
such findings would be replicated in a different research context. However, the research 
objective and subsequent methodological, design and method choices were not made in order 
to lead to empirical generalisations but to allow an in-depth understanding to be achieved.  
 
There are limitations associated with the selection of the case-study approach adopted also, 
as it has been challenged on the basis of its vulnerabilities in terms of reliability of 
documentation, boundary definitions and ethical considerations (Yin, 2009). Although it was 
impossible to fully eliminate these limitations, the rigorous research design documented in 
Chapter 4 ensured that such drawbacks were minimised. The potential risk of interviewee 
bias is, however, acknowledged. The interviews were conducted during an economic and 
fiscal crisis and, therefore, the interviewees were working in close proximity to the stresses 
and tensions inherent in this context. Where possible, organisational documentation and 
archival records were utilised to triangulate findings and to help explain the attitudes and 
perceptions of the individuals. In addition, individual viewpoints and experiences were 
discussed with other individuals in order to construct a full understanding. The findings also 
discussed the feelings and emotions of individuals (e.g. job related tension, job satisfaction, 
motivation and morale). However, these findings were founded upon the perceptions 
expressed by the interviewees themselves and no attempt was made to quantitatively 
measure these variables. The limitations associated with this issue are recognised and offer a 
potential opportunity for future research. Finally, the study explored the operation of these 
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management control practices at a particular point in time and did not adopt a longitudinal 
approach. Future research that has a longitudinal dimension would be of merit.  
8.5 The Opportunities from the Research  
A number of directions for future research may be highlighted as arising from the key 
findings, implications and limitations of the study. In the first instance, this study sought to 
explore the operation of management control practices in a healthcare context during an 
economic and fiscal crisis. The findings, however, developed from an in-depth case study of 
one large, acute, teaching hospital in Ireland and, consequently, there is further opportunity 
to expand this area of research beyond this very specific setting. Future studies should give 
consideration to how other externally-induced organisational events influence the operation 
of management control practices in a healthcare context. In addition, future research should 
examine the operation of management control practices in a variety of healthcare contexts in 
order to compare and contrast empirical findings. Specifically, further research in the 
voluntary and private hospital sector would provide valuable insights.  
 
This study also examined the implications associated with a perceived high emphasis on 
budget reduction targets and the use of budget control information in an inflexible manner so 
that reasonable explanations of failure to meet budget reduction targets are unlikely to be 
accepted. The study’s finding suggested that this usage style leads to improved budget-
related performance up to an undefined point related to budget difficulty. However, this 
finding has been developed from a case study of a single organisation. Future studies should, 
therefore, give consideration to the relationship between the use made of management 
control information, budget difficulty and budget performance and, in particular, it is 
suggested that a quantitative examination of this issue would be beneficial.  
 
A further potential area for research is a deeper investigation of clinicians’ attitudes and 
responses to the operation of management control practices. The findings from this study 
suggested that clinician responses are not uniform, but rather represent a continuum, with a 
strong reluctance on one side of the axis and a willingness for greater engagement on the 
other. The study suggested that position on the axis is influenced by the education, 
professional experience and age of an individual clinician. For example, it was suggested by 
interviewees that clinicians who had trained outside of Ireland were more likely to be 
positioned on the enthusiasm side of the continuum. The design of this study did not 
facilitate the exploration of such relationships and, hence, future research could seek further 
insights to enable a better understanding of the relationship between individual features 
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(characteristics) and clinician responses. The findings also suggested that a clinician’s 
position on this continuum may be connected to their area of specialism. The evidence from 
the interviews indicated that clinicians in the Cardiac division were considered to be more 
willing to engage with management control practices than their counterparts in the 
Emergency and Oncology divisions.  Four factors were deemed to contribute to this: (i) the 
provision of incremental budget resources to the Cardiac division in recent times (Section 
6.1.1); (ii) good working relationships between the Cardiac Business Manager and Woodford 
Management and between the Cardiac Business Manager and Cardiac clinicians (Section 
6.1.3); (iii) a higher level of controllability associated with the provision of Cardiac services; 
and (iv) a more defined relationship between inputs and outputs in the Cardiac Division 
(Section 6.1.4). Future research could seek further insights to enable a better understanding 
of the relationship between departmental characteristics and clinician responses. 
 
Finally, the findings from this study provided strong support for the view that creating an 
organisational context that encourages rather than compels clinician involvement will have a 
positive effect on clinician responses to the operation of management control practices. 
Three approaches for managing the competing demands of clinician and control objectives 
were suggested. Firstly, clinicians argued that they were less likely to be attracted to abstract 
concepts (e.g. needing to improve efficiency) that are not recognisable as being relevant to 
their day-to-day activities, whereas they were much more likely to be interested in clinical 
issues. Consequently, they felt that inducements appealing to their vocational nature were 
more likely to result in their increased involvement. Secondly, clinicians explained that they 
were highly competitive and egotistical by nature and argued that, if management control 
practices could exploit these characteristics, this would lead to greater clinician involvement. 
In this regard, it was suggested that if benchmarking or comparison information were to be 
provided, this would create a ‘reputation’ effect and involvement would automatically 
increase, as clinicians would not like their performance to be considered unsatisfactory. 
Thirdly, clinicians asserted that their medical education did not teach them to consider the 
efficiency of their decisions but, rather, to concentrate on the needs of their individual 
patients. They described the medical education curriculum as containing little or no 
‘management’ education. The perception emerging from the evidence was that clinicians 
could not be expected to consider the wider resource implications of their decisions if their 
training and education had not prepared them to do so. It was suggested that clinicians 
needed to be educated about the management control practices in operation and to be 
enrolled in courses that explained the need for and benefits of greater management control. 
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Future research should seek to investigate the effects of such strategies on clinician 
responses. 
8.6 Conclusion  
This study has examined the operation of management control practices in a healthcare 
context during an economic and fiscal crisis. This chapter completed the study by 
highlighting its conclusions while also outlining the study’s key contributions to both the 
management control and the management accounting in healthcare literature.  In this context, 
it also discussed the practical implications of the study and delineated its merits and 
limitations. The chapter concluded by providing a range of suggestions for further research 
on the basis of the findings. It is hoped that the understanding achieved will improve the 
operation of management control practices in a healthcare context, support the more efficient 
use of healthcare resources and, ultimately, ensure sustainability. 
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Philosophical Assumptions of Social Science Research 
 
Of the many models that have attempted to define paradigms in social science theory, that 
developed by Burrell and Morgan (1979) has attracted the most attention. According to 
Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, and Lowe (2002), the use of this model to explore the philosophical 
assumptions underpinning a research study provides the researcher with a checklist of factors 
to consider when making methodological choices. Furthermore, they argue that it provides 
an appropriate mechanism to structure the methodological discussion in presenting the 
research and, ultimately, makes explicit the implicit dimensions underlying the choices 
researchers make when deciding on a methodology, which is particularly important given 
that these are often outside of the researcher’s conscious awareness (Johnson and Duberley, 
2000). The framework devised by Burrell and Morgan (1979), presented in Figure 4.3, 
consists of a two-by-two matrix based on two bipolar continuums. One continuum posits 
alternative approaches to social science (ranging from ‘subjective’ to ‘objective’) and the 
other contains different assumptions about the nature of society (ranging from the ‘sociology 
of regulation’ to the ‘sociology of radical change’). Burrell and Morgan (1979) combine 
these two dimensions to present four distinct paradigm clusters: (i) functionalist, (ii) 
interpretive, (iii) radical humanist and (iv) radical structuralist.  The following discussion 
presents each of these in turn. 
 
Functionalist Paradigm: The functionalist paradigm assumes that human action is rational 
and rests on the premise that one can understand organisational behaviour through 
hypothesis testing, much like the natural sciences. Functionalists tend to view social 
concerns from the perspectives of realism, positivism and determinism and adopt nomothetic 
methodologies that focus predominantly on providing explanations of coordination, 
integration, cohesion, satisfaction of needs and social order.  
 
Interpretivist Paradigm: The interpretivist paradigm, in contrast, supports the belief that 
reality is constructed through subjective perception and that, therefore, predictions about it 
cannot be made. It holds that human beings cannot be studied using models developed for 
the physical sciences because they are qualitatively different from natural events. The 
interpretivist approach to social inquiry tends to be nominalist, anti-positivist and 
voluntaristic and it is carried out using primarily ideographic methodologies.  
 
Radical Humanist Paradigm: The radical humanist paradigm is similar to the interpretivist 
paradigm in viewing the world from an anti-positivist perspective. However, its frame of 
reference emphasises the importance of overthrowing or transcending the limitations of 
existing social arrangements. Theorists adopting this paradigm are mainly concerned with 
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releasing the social constraints that limit human potential and they often draw on it to justify 
their desire for revolutionary change. Consequently, it is largely anti-organisation in vision. 
 
Radical Structuralist Paradigm: The radical structuralist paradigm advocates the sociology 
of radical change, but from an objectivist perspective. Radical structuralists focus on 
structural relationships within the social world and emphasise the analysis of structural 
conflict, modes of domination and contradiction. Ultimately, they believe that radical change 
is built into the nature and structure of society.  
 
Research in the social sciences is generally concerned with the choice between the 
interpretivist and functionalist sides of the spectrum. The position on the subjective-objective 
continuum is prescribed based on a range of philosophical assumptions related to ontology, 
epistemology, human nature and methodology. Each of these assumptions is reviewed in the 
following discussion of the key research assumptions underpinning this area of research 
activity in general and this study in particular. It is useful, first to note that, within the 
research methodology literature; there is a plethora of terms used interchangeably to 
differentiate between the subjective-objective approaches to research. For example, the 
objectivist perspective has alternatively been referred to as quantitative, positivist, scientific, 
experimentalist, traditionalist and functionalist. Conversely, the subjectivist perspective has 
been denoted as qualitative, anti-positivist, phenomenological, humanist, interpretivist and 
social constructionist (Hussey and Hussey, 1997). 
 
Ontological Assumptions - The first of the four axes on the subjective-objective continuum 
pertains to a basic question of ontology: ‘whether the reality to be investigated is external to 
the individual or the product of individual consciousness’ (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p.4). 
The two extremes on this axis are realism and nominalism. The realist position holds that 
there is a world of tangible structures, external to the individual, and that these external 
structures are empirically identifiable and measurable. Therefore, the realist ontology 
contends that the social world has a reality independent of the cognition of individuals and 
that, equally, the phenomena being investigated are independent of the researchers 
examining them (Lincoln and Denzin, 2000). At the opposite end of the spectrum, the 
nominalist position contends that, in contrast, reality is a product of the cognition of 
individuals and that the social world beyond this cognition is nothing more than ‘names, 
concepts and labels which are used to structure reality’ (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p.4). In 
other words, the nominalist position believes that social reality is constructed by those 
participating in the social world and that there is no single objective truth.  
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Epistemological Assumptions - The second assumption is concerned with epistemology. 
Epistemology involves ‘assumptions about the grounds of knowledge and how one might 
begin to understand the world and communicate this knowledge to fellow human beings’ 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 6).  Epistemological assumptions are predicated upon whether 
it is possible to identify and communicate the nature of knowledge as being hard, real and 
capable of being transmitted in tangible form or, conversely, whether knowledge is 
subjective and based on experience alone. The extremes in this continuum are positivism and 
anti-positivism. Positivism ks to ‘explain and predict what happens in the social world by 
searching for regularities and causal relationships’ (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 5). In 
contrast, anti-positivism is ‘set against the utility of a search for laws or underlying 
regularities in the world of social affairs, the social world is essentially relativistic and can 
only be understood from the point of view of the individuals who are directly involved in the 
activities which are to be studied (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 5).  Thus, anti-positivism 
rejects the standpoint of the observer and ‘one has to understand from the inside rather than 
the outside’. Thus, while the positivist approach is characterised by a clear set of underlying 
principles and tenets, the anti-positivist approach is characterised by a more diversified and 
heterogeneous trend in the philosophy of science.  
 
Human Nature Assumptions - The third continuum concerned with assumptions pertaining to 
human nature. The extremes in this continuum are determinism and voluntarism. 
Determinism regards individuals and their activities as being ‘completely determined’ by the 
situation in which they are located. Thus, human nature is viewed as a product of the 
environment. At the other extreme, voluntarism views humans as ‘completely autonomous 
and free-willed’ and, therefore, the creator of the environment in which they are located 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 6). 
 
Methodological Assumptions  - It is argued that the ontological, epistemological and human 
nature stances adopted in the research process will influence the methodological position and 
overall research approach adopted (Easterby-Smith et al,  2002). Methodology can be 
classified as either ideographic or nomothetic. Gill and Johnson (2002) assert that a 
nomothetic research method entails the development of a conceptual and theoretical structure 
prior to its testing through empirical observation. According to Remenyi, Williams, Money 
and Swartz (1998), the nomothetic research approach allows the researcher to deduce a new 
theory by analysing and then synthesising ideas and concepts already present in the 
literature. It then emphasises the deduction of ideas or facts from the new theory in order to 
provide a more coherent framework than the theories that preceded it. However, Gill and 
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Johnson (2002) argue that the most important aspects are the logic of the nomothetic 
approach and its operationalisation process, which involves the subsequent testing of the 
theory through its confrontation with the empirical world. According to Collis and Hussey 
(2003), nomothetic is the dominant research approach in the natural sciences, where laws 
constitute the basis of explanation, which allows for the anticipation of phenomena and the 
prediction of their occurrence, hence, permitting them to be controlled. Within the 
ideographic approach, the theory follows the data. As Gill and Johnson (2002) note, learning 
is achieved by reflecting upon particular past experiences and through formulation of 
abstract concepts and theories. The greatest strength of inductive research is its flexibility, as 
this research approach does not require the establishment of prior theories or hypotheses. On 
the contrary, theories are built based on observations, thereby allowing a problem or issue to 
be approached in several different ways with alternative explanations of what is occurring. It 
is particularly suited to the study of human behaviour, including within organisations.  
 
According to Gill and Johnson (2002), experimental and survey methods are associated with 
the nomothetic approach, whilst ethnography, action research and case-study methods are 
associated with the ideographic approach. Thus, experiments and surveys are predominantly 
used for theory testing and ethnography and action research for theory building. Notably, 
Eisenhardt (1989) argues that case studies can be used to accomplish both theory testing and 
theory generating. According to Eisenhardt (1989), case studies can begin with a deductive 
reasoning approach with a problem definition and lead to an inductive reasoning process of 
theory building.   
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Preliminary Phase - Interview Guide 
 
Date: Interviewee: 
Time: Case : 
 
- Discuss purpose of research. 
- Stress the respondents’ perceptions are sought and contribution valued. 
- Outline confidentiality guarantees and requisition consent to record interview. 
Section A - Background Information 
a) What is your job title?    
 
b) How long have you worked in the HSE?  
 
c) How long have you been in your current role?  
 
d) Who do you report to in the organisation?   
 
e) Who reports to you in the organisation?    
 
Section B - Design of Management Control Practices 
a) What management control practices are used in the organisation? 
 
b) How management control practices generated are, adapted and communicated? 
 
c) Are those practices driven by the vision and mission of the hospital, the HSE or both? 
 
d) How are key success factors issues brought to the attention of employees and managers? 
Are key performance measures linked to key success factors?  
 
e) How does the organisation go about setting performance targets? 
 
f) Does the organisational structure impact on the operation of the management control 
practices which are in place? What is the lowest level of management who report on 
performance?  
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Section C: Use of Management Control Practices 
a) Can you identify particular strengths in the management control system currently in 
operation?  Probe for detail - what parts of the systems? - Why are they strengths? 
 
b) Can you identify any aspects of the management control system which need to be 
changed or improved? Probe for detail - what parts of the system? - What sorts of 
improvements? - What would you like to include in the system?  
 
c) What if any rewards financial or non-financial will managers/employees/organisation 
gain by achieving performance targets or conversely, what penalties will they suffer by 
failing to achieve them? 
 
d) How does the management control information flow in the organisation – feedback and 
feedforward?  
 
e) How are the management control practices used in the organisations? Does usage vary at 
different hierarchical levels?  
 
f) Are you aware of any potentially adverse consequences of the way the management 
control practices are used by (i) the hospital (ii) the HSE? 
 
g) How, if at all, have the performance mechanisms altered in light of the change dynamics 
of the organisation and its environment?  
 
h) How strong and coherent are the links between the components of the management 
control practices and the ways in which they are used? 
 
Section D - Conclusion  
a) Is there anything else that you feel is important in relation to the operation of 
management control practices  
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 Main Phase - Interview Guide  
 
Date: Time: 
Venue: Interviewee: 
 
A. Purpose of the Study  
 
This study is part of my PhD. It is motivated by a personal in interest in the healthcare 
sector. Since the establishment of the HSE in 2005 there has been a significant penetration of 
management control practices e.g. budgetary controls, national service plans, key 
performance measures, matrixes of financial and non-financial performance measures etc. 
While management control practices can have considerable potential in health service 
management, there is lack of knowledge with respect to how these practices operate in a 
healthcare context. This is despite considerable interest and the fact the countries across the 
world continue to devote vast amounts of resources into the design and implementation of 
these management control practices. This study focuses on three management control 
practices - budgetary control, services planning & HealthStat. I am going to pose a range of 
questions under a number of heading that will require you, in the main, to reflect on your 
experiences to the operation of management control practices and any impact that may have 
arisen both as an individual and also at an organisational level. Please feel free to deviate 
from these questions if you deem relevant. Would you have any objections to the interview 
being tape-recorded? This would enable me to listen carefully and gain the greatest benefit 
from the interview. It also ensures that the accuracy of the data collected is preserved. As 
explained in my email, confidentiality is assured to all participants.  
 
B. Background Information 
 
1. How long have you worked in the Irish Healthcare system? 
 
2. How long have you worked in this hospital? 
 
3. How long have you held your current position? 
 
4. Can you provide me with a brief description of your training and educational background?  
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C. Individual Involvement   
 
1. How would you regard your commitment to the following management control practices?  
 
(i) Budgetary control practice  
(ii) Activity planning practice 
(iii) HealthStat practice  
 
2. How do you feel about interacting with management control practices? 
 
3. What job activities require you to interact most with management control practices?  
 
4. How would you describe the purpose your involvement?  
 
D.  Organisational Issues  
 
1. What do you think management control practices should achieve overall in the hospital? 
In your work area? Based on your experiences, did they achieve this?  
 
2. How well are the management control practices achieving a balance between freedom to 
manage and accountability for results?  
 
3. In your opinion what organisational factors influence the how appropriate management 
control practices are for accomplishing organisational control?  Which issue do you consider 
the most influential? Why.  
 
C.  External Issues 
 
1. In your opinion do external factors influence how appropriate management control 
practices are for accomplishing organisational control?  
 
2. Which management control issue do you consider the most influential? Why 
 
E.  Management Control Issues 
 
1. In your opinion do aspects/characteristics of the management control practices influence 
how appropriate management control practices are for accomplishing organisational control?  
[Probes]  - Accuracy 
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  - Report on vital items 
  - Ease of using data 
  - Appropriate data 
  - Reflection of performance 
  - Timeliness 
  - Coffee room talks  
 
2. What is your assessment of the communication process across the organisation with 
regard to dissemination of management control information in general?   
 
3. Does the communication process differ depending on the management control practices 
being considered?  E.g. budgetary information, service planning, KPI’s etc. … 
 
4. Are there any other issues with influence the appropriateness of management control 
information? 
 
5. Which management control issue do you consider the most influential? Why?    
 
F.  Individual Issues  
 
1. A One of the key issues highlighted in research data, was the low level of involvement by 
clinicians with management control practices? Do you consider this to be an issue?  If yes, 
can you identify explanations for this lack of involvement?  
 
1. B, One of the key issues highlighted from my preliminary research is, that in the main, 
that management were more positive in their perceptions regarding the operation of 
management control practices in comparison with clinician management? Do you consider 
this to be an issue? Do you have any observations on why this might be? 
 
 2. Is there anything the organisation has or could do to improve participation?  
3. Have training and resources been put in place to educate people about the management 
control practices which have been implemented? 
 
4. Do you feel you know enough about general management and each of management 
control practices to be able to use them effectively? How did you learn and develop your 
skills? 
5. What influence has your professional training had upon involvement with to management 
control practices?  
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6. Are there any other issues with influence individual issues which influence the operation 
of management control practices? 
 
7. Which individual issue do you consider the most influential? Why?  
 
G.  Decision Making & Behaviour   
 
1. For you individually, has the change (presumably increase) in the availability of 
management control information affected your decision-making? 
[Probes]   -  Cost consciousness  
- Track process of individuals & units - benchmarking 
-  Management by exception 
-  Individually accountable 
 
2. If decision making hasn’t been affected why?  
[Probes]     - Lack of trust in data 
  - Practices viewed as unnecessary 
  - Lack of relevance 
 
3. For you individually, how has the change (presumably increase) in the availability of 
management control information affected/controlled your behaviour?  
 [Probes]   - Belief or values  
- Off limit activities 
- Made your actions more or less visible 
- Gaming  
- Job tension / Role stress / Working relationships  
- Motivation  
 
4. If behaviour hasn’t been affected why?  
H. Looking Ahead   
 
1. What type of supports and /or changes would you like to be made to the management 
control practices going forward?  Do you feel they will be forthcoming? 
 
2. What factors present the greatest challenge to the hospital management going forward?  
 
3. Any final comments or observations.  
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Case Study Database  
No. Item  Source  
1. Live Register January 2014 Central Statistics Office  
2. Census Report 2011 Central Statistics Office  
3. Population / Labour Force Projections 2016 - 2046 Central Statistics Office  
4. 2012 Medium Term Fiscal Statement Department of Finance  
5. Quality and Fairness: A Health System for You Department of Health & 
Children  
6. The Health Service Reform Programme Department of Health & 
Children 
7. The Health Act 2004 Department of Health & 
Children  
8. The Health Service Reform Programme Department of Health & 
Children  
9. Report of the Expert Group on Resource 
Allocation and Financing in the Health Sector 
Department of Health  
10. The Governance Bill 2012 Department of Health  
11. The Public Sector Reform Programme Department of Public 
Expenditure and Reform 
12. Activity in Acute Public Hospitals in Ireland, 2010 
Annual Report 
ERSI 
13. HealthStat: Supporting High Performance in the 
Irish health system 
HSE  
14. National Service Plan 2009 HSE 
15. National Service Plan 2010 HSE 
16. National Service Plan 2011 HSE 
17. National Service Plan 2012 HSE 
18. National Service Plan 2013 HSE  
19. National Service Plan 2014 HSE  
20. Health Insurance Authority Annual Report and 
Accounts 2012 
HSE 
21. Health at a Glance 2013 OECD 
22. Fiscal- Sustainability of Health Systems OECD 
23. Clinicians in Management Office for Health Management 
24. Audit of Structures and Functions in the Health Stationary Office  
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Service 
25. Woodford Annual Report Deputy General Manager  
26. Woodford HealthStat Reports HSE 
27. Budget Performance Report Finance Manager 
28. Modes of Operation of Clinical Divisions Chair of Oncology 
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Codes Developed During the Early Stages of Data Analyses 
Code  Description Participants Citations 
Accountability Issues References made to accountability issues 5 9 
Adverse Outcomes Reference to adverse outcomes for patients. 2 4 
Authority & Autonomy References made the issue of having the authority or authority to 
make decisions. 
10 18 
Availability of Management 
Control Information 
References made to the availability of management control 
information 
8 25 
Benchmark & Comparison References made to differences between Woodford Hospital & 
other acute hospitals in the Irish healthcare sector. 
4 6 
Clinician - Management 
Relationship 
Reference made to the manner in which clinicians and 
management communicate with each other. 
9 31 
Clinician Attributes References made regarding the attributes and skills required by 
clinicians if they are going to successfully engage with 
management control practices 
6 11 
Clinician Knowledge of 
Management Control Information 
References made to the knowledge displayed by clinicians of 
management control information. 
2 3 
Clinician Performance - Informal 
Controls 
References made to the importance of informal controls play in 
ensuring clinicians performance is maintained. 
1 1 
Clinician Professional Experience References made to clinician professional experience. 6 8 
Clinician Training & Education Reference made to the training or education of clinician - which 
influences their professional orientation. 
5 6 
Collection of Management 
Control Information 
Reference to the data collection of management control 
information. 
4 8 
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Conflicting Goal Sets References by the difficult of managing conflicting goal sets 8 17 
Control of Operating Processes by 
Clinicians 
References made to clinicians controlling core operating 
processes. 
4 5 
Controllability Principle References made to the uncontrollability of management control 
measures 
2 5 
Cost Containment Control 
Practice 
References made to the cost containment control practices 5 6 
Data Manipulation References made to data manipulation of management control 
information. 
3 3 
Emotive Nature of Healthcare References to the emotive nature of healthcare service influencing 
the operation of management control practices. 
3 3 
External  Uncertainty References made to external incidents such as a serious influenza 
influencing the operation of management control practices. 
1 1 
Fiscal Economic Issues References made to fiscal economic issues. 6 9 
Focus of Attention References made to the focus provided to performance measures. 6 12 
Frustrated References made to individuals becoming frustrated. 3 6 
Healthcare National Strategy Reference to healthcare principles and goals 1 1 
HSE - Control Reference to the HSE using management control information to 
control behaviour. 
3 5 
HSE - Governance Relationships References made to the role of parent organisation in terms of 
governance relationships. 
7 12 
Information Flow References made to the communication of management control 10 35 
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information. 
Interdependencies References to performance measures being affected by 
interdependencies and decisions taken elsewhere in the 
organisation. 
3 3 
Integration Among the Control 
Practices 
References made to the degree of integration among control 
practices. 
4 6 
IT Infrastructure References made to IT infrastructure 4 8 
Job satisfaction References made to management control information instilling a 
sense of satisfaction. 
1 1 
Job-Related Stress References to increased job-related stress. 4 6 
Knowledge of Cost Item References to a lack of knowledge regarding the cost of budget 
items. 
3 10 
Lack of Direction References to individual not having a clear sense of direction - 
which influences the operation of management control practices. 
1 1 
Leadership Effect References regarding the effect a 'good' or 'bad' leader has on the 
operation of management control practices. 
4 5 
Management Professional 
Experience 
References made about the professional experience of 
management (executive). 
1 2 
Media References made media - use of performance information by the 
media & the media's influence the operation of management 
control practices. 
5 9 
Motivation References made to the operation of management control practices 4 4 
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impacting upon motivation. 
Organisational Control References made to the organisations using management control 
information to improve organisational control. 
11 31 
Organisational Decision - Making References made to how management control information 
influences decision-making 
6 11 
Organisational Performance References made to performance of Woodford Hospital 3 4 
Participation References made to the issue of participation in the management 
control process 
7 17 
Participation - Clinical References made regarding the need for clinical participation. 8 16 
Performance Evaluation References made to performance evaluation processes - rewards 
and punishments. 
10 24 
Personality References made to influence personality has on the operation of 
management control practices 
3 3 
Political Inference References made to political inference into healthcare issues. 2 3 
Public Scrutiny Reference made to the public scrutiny influencing the operation of 
management control practices. 
1 1 
Reactive Behaviour Reference made to behaving in a reactive manner. 1 1 
Recruitment & Promotion References made to the recruitment and promotion processes. 4 5 
Reluctance & Avoidance References to/regarding reluctance  to engage with management 
control information 
6 22 
Selection of Performance 
Measures 
Reference regarding the number of performance measures being 
of relevance. 
5 6 
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Target Setting Reference made to the existence of target. 5 5 
Target Setting  References with regard to how uncertainty influences the target 
setting process. 
3 3 
Task Unpredictability References made to the fact that there are high levels of 
unpredictability in the control environment 
4 6 
Technology - Work Processes References to how work processes influence the operation of 
management control practices. 
1 1 
Training & Education - 
Management Control Practices 
References made to training & education 8 10 
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The Operational Control Practice  
Access Integration 
 
Resources 
Metric Target Metric Target 
 
Metric Target 
Adult elective procedure  NT, > 6 mths Day case procedures IT, 75 %  Variance from budget Budget is target 
Child elective procedure  NT, > 3 mths Admission on day of 
procedures  
IT, 75 % WTE variances from 
ceiling  
Staff ceiling is target 
EP acute admission  NT, > 6 hrs Inpatient ALOS Individual hospital % of staff lost to 
absenteeism 
NT, = 3.5 % 
GP to hospital referral IT, > 70 days Overall ALOS Best in Ireland No. of meetings per WTE Best in Ireland 
Consultant to physio 
referral  
IT, > 70 days Percentage of cases entered 
into HIPE 
NT, 80% No. of new patients per 
WTE consultant 
Best in Ireland 
Consultant to hospital 
referral for diagnostics 
IT, > 70 days Appropriateness of 
admission & discharge  
NT, 80%  Consultant clinic rates NT, = 10 % 
Consultant led OPD 
clinics 
IT,  0 waits over 90 
days 
  Public versus private split 
of activity 
NT, 80: 20 
Note: NT = National target, IT = International target, WTE = Whole time equivalents, ALOS = Average length of stay, EP - Emergency presentations 
Source: Health Stat User Guide (2009)  
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The Modes of Operation for Clinician Divisions - Extract  
Responsibilities for Divisional Chairs 
i. Lead and manage the development of an annual plan for the division involving the 
appropriate medical, nursing, administrative and support service staff. 
ii. Co-ordinate the implementation of the annual plan for the division, agreed with the 
Executive Management Board 
iii. Manage the resources approved for the division.  Any reallocations of budget must be 
agreed with the EMB. 
iv. Organise and chair the divisional meetings, operational team meetings and other 
meetings, as required. The chairperson should actively seek to reach decisions on the 
basis of consensus at these meetings. 
v. Over the development of bi-monthly reports for the EMB, reporting on the performance 
of the division. 
vi. Promote co-operation with other hospitals, services and healthcare providers in the 
Health Board area on activities within the remit of the division 
vii. Ensure that clinical audits are conducted within each division on a regular basis. 
viii. Promote co-operation with other hospitals, services and healthcare providers in 
the Region on activities within the remit of the division 
Responsibilities for Clinician Divisions 
i. It is proposed that a divisional meeting should be held monthly, attended by all of the 
consultants within the division. It is suggested that: (i) the relevant nurse service 
manager(s), and (ii) the divisional administrator (who will provide support to the Chair 
of the division) also attend these meetings so that they are fully aware of the issues 
arising within the division. 
ii. It is suggested that an operational team should be established within each division to make 
decisions on issues relating to the general operation of the division.  The operational 
team should meet every two weeks.  Membership of the operational team should include, 
at a minimum, the following individuals: (i) the Chair of the division, (ii) the relevant 
nurse service manager(s) and (iii) the divisional administrator. 
iii.    It is proposed that chairs of divisions will meet as a group once every 3 months to discuss 
issues of interest to all the divisions and the CUH Group as a whole. The chairs of 
divisions meeting should be attended by two members of the EMB 
 
Source: Organisational Documentation  
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